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Summary 
 
 
The Earth’s surface, on average, has warmed by about 0.85 °C since pre-industrial times, 
mostly because increasing levels of anthropogenic greenhouse gases in the atmosphere have 
produced an extra greenhouse effect, additional to the natural one (IPCC, 2007). Greenhouse 
gases emissions mainly originate from an extensive usage of fossil fuels, that is the energy 
resources on which all sectors of human activity largely rely. 
Current climatic projections show that our planet might warm up by other 1.8 to 4 °C at the 
end of the century, depending on the emission scenario that the world will stick to in the next 
decades (IPCC, 2007). These emission scenarios rely on assessment of the world’s fossil energy 
resources, that assume very large amounts of reserves to exist, be quite easily exploitable and 
become available in the future (IPCC, 2000). 
However, recent assessments of the Earth’s fossil energy resources show that fossil fuel 
reserves that are recoverable with sufficient economic and energetic return are quite limited 
(ASPO; The Oil Drum). Fossil fuels are expected to almost completely exhaust in the next two 
centuries, with worldwide availability starting to decline in the next years or decades, depending 
on the fuel type (ASPO; The Oil Drum). 
Since the amount of fossil fuels left over for the future is limited, so are total CO2 emissions 
to the atmosphere resulting from their use. The question is: will the limited supply of fossil fuels 
someway constrain future climate change? In other words, will fossil fuels depletion be enough to 
save us from global warming? 
In this thesis we try to answer this question by investigating the implications of fossil fuels 
exhaustion on future climate change. We first assess the energy scenarios accounting for fossil 
fuels exhaustion and the estimates of fossil fuel proved reserves, that are currently available in the 
literature. We then derive corresponding scenarios of greenhouse gases emissions and finally 
develop resulting projections of future climate change. 
The projections of global fossil energy accounting for fossil fuels depletion are show in 
figure S.1 for the 2000-2200 period. The nine energy projections assessed in this thesis are split 
into two main families: the first group stems from assessments of the world fossil energy 
availability performed by Independent Researchers (IR, figure S.1a), while the second one 
originates from estimates of fossil fuel reserves reviewed by Energy Corporations and 
Governmental Agencies (ECGA, figure S.1b). According to both groups, world energy 
production from fossil fuels is expected to reach its maximum between 2015 and 2030. 
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Figure S.1. The projections of energy from fossil fuels for the 21st and 22nd century, according to the 
assessments of the IR (a) and ECGA group (b). 
 
Figure S.2 illustrates the emission scenarios of fossil CO2 originating from the projections of 
world fossil energy shown in figure S.1. Global fossil CO2 emissions are predicted to peak about 
amid 2015 and 2030 as well. 
 
 
 
Figure S.2. Emissions scenarios of the IR (a) and ECGA group (b) for anthropogenic CO2 from fossil 
fuels and land-use change. 
 
CO2 emissions from land-use changes are projected to decrease by 5% every 5 years (figure 
S.2). Emissions of other greenhouse gases and SO2 aerosols from natural sources are predicted to 
remain constant in the future; anthropogenic emissions, on the contrary, are assumed to be 
proportional to fossil CO2 emissions, because indirectly related to human activities. 
To derive climatic projections, we make use of the simple climate model 
MAGICC/SCENGEN (Wigley, 2008). This climate model has been used in the Assessment 
Reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change since 1990 to produce projections of 
future climate change. 
The results of the projections of future climate change show that, despite fossil fuels 
exhaustion and depending on the emission scenario, atmospheric CO2 concentration will reach 
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levels between nearly 460 and 520 ppm at its maximum, that is by the end of the century (figure 
S.3). 
 
 
 
Figure S.3. Projections of atmospheric CO2 concentration derived from the emissions scenarios of the IR 
(a) and ECGA (b) group. Shown are also ensemble means with their confidence range. 
 
Global-mean temperature change is projected to be as large as +1.4 °C to +3.1 °C by the 
turn of the century relative to pre-industrial times (figure S.4). A potentially dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system is expected to occur when CO2 concentration 
is going to exceed 450 ppm or global temperature crosses the +2 °C limit above pre-industrial. 
Hence, we find that dangerous climate change might already be experienced within the first half 
of the 21st century. We estimate the probability of exceeding the +2 °C threshold to lie between 
55% and 90% among the scenarios. 
 
  
Figure S.4. Projections of global-mean temperature change relative to 2000 for the emissions scenarios of 
the IR (a) and ECGA (b) group and the ensemble means with their uncertainty bound. 
 
The magnitude of the temperature increase is expected to be larger over continents and 
remarkably high at the mid-high latitudes of the Northern Hemisphere. The expected global 
range of temperature change by 2100 is from -0.7 °C to +4.6 °C with respect to 1990. 
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The projections of sea level change obtained with MAGICC span from nearly +10 to +50 
cm at the end of this century relative to 2000 level. Since climate models currently cannot 
accurately reproduce the contribution to sea-level rise of melting water from ice sheets and caps 
over continents, but only the component related to oceanic thermal expansion, we undertake an 
alternative assessment of future sea-level change. These additional projections are based on the 
numerical outputs of MAGICC for global-mean temperature change (figure S.4) and on a semi-
empirical model of sea-level change, which has recently been developed by Vermeer and 
Rahmstorf (2009). We obtain that the full climate-related sea level response by 2100 might be as 
high as +70 to +110 cm above the 2000 level. This result clearly indicates that sea level rise will 
probably be among the most impacting future effects of global warming. 
The need of avoiding a dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system calls 
for actions aiming at reducing the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases and the 
resulting warming. Among these techniques, we investigate the proposal of injecting large 
amounts of sulphur into the stratosphere to reflect back part of the incoming sunlight and thus 
cool the Earth’s surface (stratospheric SO2 aerosols geoengineering). Here, we analyse the 
feasibility of this method by analysing the world reserves and future geological availability of 
sulphur. We derive a projection of global-mean temperature change based on a scenario of 
stratospheric sulphur injections, which is limited by the global annual production of this resource. 
We find that sulphur availability may limit the stratospheric injections to a time span of only 10 to 
20 years, if the injections start in 2010. The cooling effect would be enough to keep global 
temperature at about the current level for that time period. Nevertheless, after stopping the 
sulphur injections, global temperature would turn back to the projection without geoengineering 
at a warming rate much higher and dangerous than before. 
We stress that the projections by existing climate models are affected by large uncertainties, 
owing to the current poor knowledge of some important mechanism in the climate system, like 
aerosols or the carbon cycle. These processes often involve positive feedbacks on the climate and 
thus will likely amplify the climatic effects of the projected warming, once properly included into 
the models. Thus, there are several reasons to believe that the projections obtained here should 
be regarded as lower bounds, rather than mean values, to the climatic changes that will actually 
take place in the future. 
In addition, should new reserves of conventional fossil fuels be discovered or even 
unconventional sources be exploited in the future, or new extraction and mining techniques be 
implemented, these would only add additional CO2 to the projected emissions. Temperature 
projections would then be enhanced by such extra emissions. 
The present outcomes support the key conclusion that fossil fuels depletion alone will likely 
not help avoiding dangerous climate change. The safest and on the long-term most effective way 
to climate change risk minimization is the reduction of anthropogenic greenhouse gases 
emissions. Deliberate mitigation actions aiming at reducing emissions cannot be avoided, if we 
wish to stay below the +2 °C limit. 
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Introduction 
 
 
1. Climate change: global warming 
 
Since the beginning of the industrial revolution in the 18th century, mankind has been 
emitting large amounts of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere, mainly as the result of an 
extensive usage of fossil fuels, first coal, then oil and later on natural gas, to satisfy the world’s 
energy demand to support all kind of human activities (IPCC, 2007). Hence, the atmospheric 
concentration of the main greenhouse gases, namely carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and 
nitrous oxide (N2O) has considerably increased with respect to pre-industrial times (see figure 
I.1). The result of the alteration of the Earth’s atmospheric composition is the establishment of 
an anthropogenic greenhouse effect in the climate system (IPCC, 2007). This process is 
additional to the natural greenhouse effect, that basically allows the Earth’s surface to be by 
about 32 °C warmer than it would otherwise be in its absence (+14 °C instead of -18 °C) (IPCC, 
2007) and that is mainly driven by water vapour, other than CO2, CH4 and ozone (O3) (Kiehl and 
Trenberth, 1997). 
 
 
Figure I.1. Atmospheric concentration of the most important long-lived greenhouse gases from AD 0 to 
AD 2005 (IPCC, 2007). 
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As a consequence of the anthropogenic greenhouse effect, the world has got warmer by 
about 0.8 °C since mid 19th century (IPCC, 2007), as the instrumental records of global 
atmospheric surface temperature clearly show (see figure I.2). The warming is apparent on all 
time scales, from monthly means (figure I.2a), to annual values (figure I.2b) and decadal averages 
(figure I.2c). It is important to note that the warming has been accelerating faster in recent times, 
as the increasing values of warming rate per decade indicate, especially since the ‘80s of the 20th 
century (figure I.3). 
 
 
(b) 
(a) (c) 
Figure I.2. Global atmospheric surface temperature change from instrumental measurements averaged on 
different time scales: (a) monthly (Hansen et al., 2006), (b) annual (WMO, 2009) and (c) decadal (Arndt et 
al., 2010) means. 
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Figure I.3. Global annual mean surface temperature to 2005 from instrumental measurements (black dots) 
(IPCC, 2007). Linear trend fits to the data of the last 25 (yellow), 50 (orange), 100 (purple) and 150 years 
(red) are also shown. The blue thick curve is a smoothed version of the time series. Decadal 5% to 95% 
(light grey) error ranges about the smooth line are given. 
 
2. The planetary boundaries and the limits to growth 
 
However, climate change is not the only global environmental change occurring on Earth. 
Largely because of a rapidly growing reliance on fossil fuels and industrialized forms of 
agriculture, human activities have reached a level that may damage those environmental systems 
that had been keeping Earth within a relatively narrow range of natural variability for millennia 
(Rockström et al., 2009). This regulatory capacity, that characterized the whole pre-industrial 
Holocene, maintained the conditions that enabled human development itself (Rockström et al., 
2009). 
At present many Earth’s biophysical subsystems or processes appear to be close, to have 
reached or even already crossed the so-called “planetary boundaries”. These boundaries define 
the safe operating space for humanity with respect to the Earth system (Rockström et al., 2009). 
In fact, certain key variables of the planet’s subsystems, called tipping points, are particularly 
sensitive around threshold levels, that, if crossed, may generate abrupt environmental change 
with damaging or potentially disastrous consequences for the human society (Schellnhuber et al., 
2006). 
Nine of such Earth-system processes have been identified, for which it is necessary to define 
planetary boundaries (Rockström et al., 2009): climate change, rate of biodiversity loss (terrestrial 
and marine), interference with the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles, stratospheric ozone 
depletion, ocean acidification, global freshwater use, change in land use, chemical pollution, and 
atmospheric aerosol loading (see table I.1). Three of these processes (climate change, rate of 
biodiversity loss and interference with the nitrogen cycle) are very likely already beyond their 
boundaries. Humanity may soon be approaching the boundaries for global freshwater use, 
change in land use, ocean acidification and interference with the global phosphorous cycle.  
12 
 
 
Table I.1. The identified Earth-system processes and associated thresholds, that, if crossed, may generate 
unacceptable environmental change (Rockström et al., 2009). Boundaries for processes in red have already 
been crossed. 
 
 
The fact that, sooner or later, the human society was going to exceed the planetary 
boundaries if keeping on growing that way, is already known since at least the early 1970’s. At 
that time, in fact, the book “The limits to growth” (Meadows et al., 1972) was first published by a 
team at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The book was commissioned by the Club of 
Rome to study the implications of finite resources on a rapidly (exponentially) growing world 
population. 
The book used the World3 model to simulate the consequences of interactions between the 
Earth’s and human systems (figure I.4). Five variables were examined in the original model: world 
population, industrialization, pollution, food production, resource depletion. The original 
projections (see figure I.4) up to the current time are largely accurate: changes in industrial 
production, food production and pollution are all in line with the book's predictions of economic 
and societal collapse in the 21st century (Hecht, 2008). 
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Figure I.4. The original projections of the World3 model examining the relation of a growing population 
to finite resources and pollution (Hall and Day, 2009). 
 
3. Fossil fuels depletion and the implications for future 
climate change 
 
Among the world’s depleting resources, the non-renewable energy sources, namely fossil 
fuels, have called for a growing concern in the scientific community in the last decade or so. 
Given the current world’s consumption rates, fossil fuels are, in fact, expected to exhaust during 
this and the next century, with availability starting to decline worldwide in the next years and 
decades, depending on the fuel type (see figure I.5) (ASPO; The Oil Drum). The fact that, at 
some point in time, fossil fuels production will reach a peak and then begin to decline is obvious, 
since oil, natural gas and coal are finite natural resources and their geological reserves on Earth 
are limited (Brecha, 2008). Even owing to the economic principle of the efficient substitution, as 
extraction costs increase once the easily obtained reserves have been extracted and further mining 
becomes more and more difficult, it is clear that production will reach a maximum and then start 
to decrease, since market forces will create favorable conditions for a transition to alternative 
sources of energy (Brecha, 2008). 
Until now, however, current projections of future climate change have not accounted for the 
geological depletion of fossil fuels. The scenarios of future emissions of greenhouse gases, on 
which climate projections rely on, simply assume that very large amounts of fossil fuels are 
available, without reckoning on reliable estimates of the physical reserves. But, since the amount 
of fossil fuels left over for the future is limited, so are total CO2 emissions into the atmosphere 
resulting from their burning. This may limit the atmospheric CO2 concentration and even 
constrain the consequent temperature change. 
14 
 
 
Figure I.5. Global oil and natural gas production profiles (ASPO). Shown is the historical production 
together with a projection to 2050. 
 
Current climate projections are thus implicitly neglecting possible constraints of fossil fuels 
depletion on future global warming. The main aim of the present thesis is to assess the 
implications of the exhaustion of fossil fuels on future climate change. 
 
4. Outline of the thesis 
 
A brief description of the structure and subjects covered in the present thesis is given in the 
following. 
Chapter 1 is an introduction to climatic changes occurred in the past. The need for making 
projections of future climate change requires the understanding of changes occurred in the past 
and the investigation of the most recent changes and of what is currently going on. 
For these reasons we first describe the paleoclimatic reconstructions of the last two millennia 
and discuss the possible sources of climate variability and trends. In particular, a new hypothesis 
is introduced and assessed for the origin of a climatic oscillation with a period of ~76 years, 
which is present in many paleorecords: the dust released by comet Halley during its orbit 
throughout the inner solar system is assumed produce a “shadowing” on the Earth’s surface, 
resulting from the scattering of incoming sunlight. 
To accurately project future changes of CO2 concentration, that is the main driver of the 
anthropogenic greenhouse effect, we need first to precisely understand and correctly reproduce 
the dynamics of the carbon cycle in the climate system. Hence, in the second part of this chapter 
we examine the performance of the Bern/HILDA carbon cycle model. Two new versions of this 
carbon cycle model, that accurately fit the available paleoclimatic and instrumental CO2 records, 
are introduced and used to project future CO2 concentration changes. 
In the chapters 2 to 5 the implications of fossil fuels depletion on the projections of future 
climate change are investigated. 
A review of the most relevant climatic projections that are available in the literature is given 
in chapter 2. After defining what potentially dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
15 
 
climate system means, the climatic projections for the 21st century from the Fourth Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007) are introduced along 
with the underlying greenhouse gas emissions scenarios from the IPCC’s Special Report on 
Emissions Scenarios (SRES) (IPCC, 2000). We critically analyse the estimates of fossil fuels 
reserves on which the SRES scenarios are based and provide evidence to support more prudent 
evaluations of fossil fuels availability on Earth and their ongoing exhaustion. All previous 
scenarios of fossil energy, resulting CO2 emissions and consequent climate projections, already 
accounting for fossil fuels depletion, are also presented to provide the framework on which the 
present work is set. 
In chapter 3 we introduce the present projections throughout the end of the 22nd century 
for global fossil energy, reckoning with fossil fuels depletion. The resulting scenarios of fossil 
CO2 emissions are derived and the assumptions underlying the emissions of CO2 from land-use 
changes, other greenhouse gases and SO2 aerosols are discussed. We define nine emissions 
scenarios, that are split into two main families: the first group stems from assessments of world 
fossil energy availability performed by independent researchers, while the second one originates 
from evaluations carried out by energy corporations and governmental agencies. 
The model used to develop the present climatic projections is briefly presented in chapter 4. 
We make use of MAGICC/SCENGEN, which is a coupled gas‐cycle/climate model (Model for 
the Assessment of Greenhouse-gas Induced Climate Change), that drives a spatial climate-change 
scenario generator (SCENGEN) (Wigley, 2008). MAGICC is a simple climate model tuned to 7 
AOGCMs, producing simulations of future global-mean temperature change and sea level rise. 
The climate model is coupled interactively with a set of gas‐cycle models, that provide 
projections of the atmospheric concentration of the most important greenhouse gases. 
SCENGEN employs a version of the pattern scaling method to produce projections of changes 
in the spatial patterns of the following climate-related variables: temperature, precipitation and 
mean sea level pressure. SCENGEN projections are consistent with the outputs of 20 AOGCMs 
in the CMIP3 database. 
Chapter 5 contains the results of the present projections of future climate change accounting 
for fossil fuels exhaustion, that are derived from the emissions scenarios developed in chapter 3, 
by making use of the climate model introduced in chapter 4. Projections are provided for the 
following climatic parameters: atmospheric concentration of the major greenhouse gases (CO2, 
CH4, N2O), main radiative forcing components and total net anthropogenic radiative forcing, 
global-mean atmospheric surface temperature and spatial patterns of temperature change, sea 
level rise, precipitation, mean sea level pressure. However, since climate models currently cannot 
accurately reproduce the contribution to sea-level rise of melting water from ice sheets and caps, 
we undertake also an alternative assessment of future sea level change. This additional sea-level 
projection is based on a semi-empirical model, that has recently been developed by Vermeer and 
Rahmstorf (2009), and on the present numerical outputs for global-mean temperature change. 
To avoid a future potentially dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, 
numerous countermeasures have been proposed in order to offset the anthropogenic warming: 
they are shortly described in chapter 6. Among these techniques, we canvass the proposal of 
injecting large amounts of sulphur into the stratosphere to reflect back part of the incoming 
sunlight (stratospheric SO2 aerosols geoengineering). We briefly summarize the pros, cons and 
efficacy problems of its implementation. The physical limits to the deployment of this 
geoengineering method are then examined, by analysing the world geological reserves and future 
availability of sulphur. We finally derive a projection of global-mean temperature change with 
stratospheric SO2 aerosols geoengineering limited by the geological availability of sulphur. 
The main results obtained in the present thesis are summarized and discussed in the 
conclusive section. Finally, we draw some conclusions about the present result and review the 
issues raised in this thesis, that are still open subjects of scientific research and debate. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Climatic changes in the past 
 
 
 
 
Overview 
 
If we wish to understand the behaviour of recent climatic changes and 
correctly attribute the mechanisms and their causes, we need to disentangle the 
various factors that influence climate variability. One of these modes may be 
related to the shadowing effect, that is caused by the dust released by comets 
during their transits throughout the inner solar system, connection that none 
has ever proposed before. 
Here, we employ a sunlight attenuation model to estimate the cooling 
effect that is produced by the dust released by comet 1P/Halley. We find that 
comet Halley left a detectable fingerprint in the paleoclimatic records of the 
last two millennia, that shows up as a periodic cooling on the order of slightly 
less than 0.1 °C. This temperature swing is comparable to the magnitude of 
other natural fluctuations. 
 
The mechanisms that drive the fluxes of carbon throughout the 
components of the climate system can be described by biogeochemical carbon 
cycle models. The Bern/HILDA model is one of the most commonly used 
approaches in the field of CO2 biogeochemistry. Nevertheless, starting from 
the datasets of historical carbon emissions from fossil fuels and land-use 
changes, this model in its original formulation is not able to accurately 
reproduce the paleoclimatic and instrumental records of the past atmospheric 
CO2 concentration. 
Here, we show that a semi-empirical tuning of the Bern/HILDA model 
can faithfully reproduce the observational CO2 data. With a modified 
Bern/HILDA-type equation, by applying some simple criteria and imposing 
reasonable physical constraints to the parameters in agreement with laboratory 
experiments and the behavior of carbon isotopes in natural conditions, we 
obtain best-fits that agree with CO2 concentration records better than the 
original model. The empirical parameters that we find lie within a narrow range 
from the original values, as given, for instance, in the 2007 IPCC 4th 
Assessment Report. 
 
For further information about the topics covered in this chapter, please refer to the 
papers by Zecca and Chiari (2009) and Zecca and Chiari (to be published c), respectively. 
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1.1 The last two millennia 
 
The Earth’s climate has always changed as a result of internal and external natural forcings 
acting on the climate system (IPCC, 2007). In the context of recent anthropogenic global 
warming, it is interesting to compare the warming trend of the last century and a half with climate 
changes occurred in the last two millennia. Thanks to many different recently developed 
paleoclimatic techniques, it was possible to reconstruct the globe and hemispheric-mean climatic 
changes of the last two thousand years or so with a relatively good accuracy and high resolution 
(of even one year in some cases) (figure 1.1). 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Paleoclimatic reconstructions of Northern Hemisphere temperature variations during the last 
1300 years with respect to 1961-1990 average using multiple climate proxy records (IPCC, 2007). Please 
refer to (IPCC, 2007, table 6.1) for the references of the records. Shown is also the HadCRUT2v 
instrumental temperature record (Jones and Moberg, 2003) in black. All series are smoothed with a 
Gaussian-weighted 30-years low-pass filter. 
 
Recent warmth and warming trend observed in the 20th century are almost certainly 
unprecedented compared to at least the last 1700 years (Mann et al., 2008), even allowing for the 
greater variance expected in an average of few early data compared to the much greater number 
in the 20th century (IPCC, 2007). Even though there are noticeably fewer proxy data for the 
Southern Hemisphere compared to the Northern Hemisphere, they confirm the unusually high 
temperatures of the last century at-large (IPCC, 2007). The exceptionality of the recent warm 
period was apparent in the reconstruction by Mann et al. (1999), which was then called “hockey 
stick” for the peculiar shape. This reconstruction has been subject of several critical studies, 
however the several proxy data published in the following years by independent research teams, 
that were based on various proxies and were analysed with different statistical techniques, all 
confirmed the shape and the overall conclusions of Mann et al. (1999) (IPCC, 2007). 
However, if the behaviour of recent temperature change is to be understood, and the cause 
of global warming correctly attributed to anthropogenic roots, then the mechanisms and origins 
of natural climate fluctuations should be addressed (Bradley et al., 2003; Jones and Mann, 2004). 
It is already known, for instance, that the main drivers of climatic changes in the pre-industrial 
period are: solar irradiance (11-year sunspot cycle or Schwabe cycle, Hale cycle and Gleissberg 
cycle), volcanic forcing, greenhouse gases (CO2, CH4, N2O), land use changes, tropospheric 
aerosols and ozone (IPCC, 2007). However, these factors account only for a part of the large 
climatic variability that the paleoclimatic reconstructions show. 
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1.2 The cometary shadowing 
 
Here, we assess the possibility that the periodicities ranging from 70 to 80 years that are 
present in several astronomical phenomena (Stuiver, 1980; Parkinson et al., 1980; Parkinson, 
1983; Gilliland, 1981; Gleissberg, 1966; Lomb and Andersen, 1980) and climatic records 
(Gilliland and Schneider, 1984; Dansgaard et al., 1975; Mann et al., 1999; Esper et al., 2002; 
Moberg et al., 2005) can be traced back to cometary origin. Such climatic signal may, in fact, be 
generated by the periodical transits of comet 1P/Halley throughout the inner solar system. 
 
1.2.1 The circumsolar dust disk 
 
It is well known that interplanetary dust particles (IDPs) released by asteroidal collisions and 
by comets follow orbits, that are primarily defined by the dynamical parameters and 
characteristics of the particles: small particles (with typical diameters between 1 and 100 μm) 
spiral down to the Sun under the combined action of Poynting-Robertson drag and gravitational 
pull (see for instance Dohnanyi, 1978). Such dust particles slowly degrade to form a circumsolar 
disk located close to the solar system invariable plane (Muller and MacDonald, 2000). If and 
when a cometary dust particle (CDP) disk comes to be interposed between the Earth and the 
Sun, shadowing occurs and the amount of solar radiation reaching the Earth’s surface is reduced. 
This may lead to a detectable climatic effect. 
 
1.2.2 The disk shape and the time evolution of its structure 
 
The details of shape, size and time evolution of the disk are dictated by the (largely) 
unknown parameters of the dust particle ensemble. The formation time of the disk is mainly 
determined by the orbital parameters of the parent comet, by the distance where a large fraction 
of the dust is released (which is mostly of the order of the perihelion distance) and by the size 
distribution of the CDPs. Order of magnitude calculations yield times in the range of a few 
decades (typically 60 to 75 years) for comets with small perihelion distances. 
The decay time of the disk is mainly determined by the spatial size of the disk and by the size 
distribution and density of the CDPs. For a disk extending up to 1 AU, typical times are of the 
order of a few decades (a straightforward estimate based on Poynting-Robertson drag for typical 
particles yields a time of 90 years), that is on the same order of magnitude of the formation time. 
Such time structure implies that the density of the disk should be an almost continuous function 
of time for cometary periods of, say, less than ten years, a pulse function for periods much larger 
than one century and some sawtooth function in between those limits. 
 
1.2.3 Cometary signal detection criteria 
 
Since there is a large number of short period comets, we can expect their effect to add, 
producing a “white noise” on the climate. We guess that the numerous short period comets may 
possibly be responsible for a part of the known natural variability of the climate. On the 
opposite, a very long period comet (centuries or more) would be difficult to detect since high 
resolution climate series with a span larger than several periods of such a comet would be 
required. The intermediate case (period close to 100 years) is the most favourable for detection in 
the currently available paleoclimatic records. 
In order to leave a fingerprint in the Earth’s climate record, a comet has to fulfil a number of 
requirements. By and large, shadowing is larger for: greater quantities of dust, if the inclination of 
the cometary orbit does not lie far from the invariable plane, if the perihelion distance is smaller 
than (about) 1 AU and if its eccentricity is not far from 1. The last two conditions deserve 
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comments: perihelion distances larger than 1 AU imply a modest dust release; distances much 
smaller than 1 AU imply a large release but this is possibly connected with a short life (small 
number of returns) of the comet. A small perihelion distance and a small eccentricity imply a 
short (of the order of a few years, say) cometary period: these comets produce a quasi-stationary 
disk, which would be difficult to detect in a paleoclimate record. An almost circular cometary 
orbit implies that the release of dust would be almost continuous and any eventual shadowing 
would be a stationary condition, again very difficult to detect. Comet 1P/Halley fulfils all these 
criteria: in addition it is known to release large amounts of dust. 
Wigley (1988) showed that the effects of irradiance variations on global-mean temperature 
are damped by the oceanic thermal inertia. According to his calculations, the response to a 80 
year periodic forcing is about 39-59% of the equilibrium response. Any climatic effect of short 
period comets (P ~10 years) would be strongly damped. Wigley’s results strengthen the above 
conclusions on the detectability of a cometary signal in climate records: comets with periods close 
to 100 years are the most favourable for detection. 
Aiming at a first evaluation of the cometary cooling relevance, we assume a triangular 
waveform for the climate signal (see figure 1.2). This is a good first approximation especially in 
the view of the quoted damping, but we are aware that the real climatic signal may have a 
somewhat different shape. We do not have enough information to give a second approximation 
for this shape. 
 
 
Figure 1.2. The paleoclimatic reconstruction of Northern Hemisphere surface temperature from AD 831 
to 1992 by Esper et al. (2002) (blue). The triangular waveform (red) gives the correct order of magnitude 
for the amplitude and the temporal position of the cometary cooling triggered by 1P/Halley. The lower 
curve (green) shows the same temperature time series corrected for the cometary induced cooling. The 
Northern Hemisphere combined land and ocean instrumental surface-air temperature record (HadCRUT3 
dataset; Brohan et al., 2006) from 1850 to 2007 is also shown (black). The pink curve shows the same 
instrumental data after correcting for the cometary cooling. All displayed time series are temperature 
anomalies relative to 1961-1990 average. The temperature reconstruction is smoothed with a 10-years low-
pass filter. 
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1.2.4 Comet 1P/Halley 
 
Among the list of known comets, the orbital parameters of comet 1P/Halley are such as to 
produce a sawtooth-like time dependence of the circumsolar disk density with a quasi-periodicity 
of 76 years. In addition, Halley was studied by several space missions during the 1986 return 
(Sagdeev et al., 1986; Hirao and Itoh, 1986; Reinhard, 1986) and its properties are known better 
than for any other comet. On these grounds, we use comet Halley as a case study to evaluate the 
dust-induced climate forcing. 
Currently there is no observational evidence about the existence of a cometary dust disk 
close to the invariable plane. With the aim of having an order of magnitude evaluation of the 
predicted shadowing, we make reasonable, first approximation assumptions about the disk 
dimensions. We assume that after a suitable delay the disk reaches the shape of a torus with a 
thickness on the order of the cometary trails width, that is 104-105 km (Reach et al., 2007; Sykes 
and Walker, 1992) at the heliocentric distance of 1 AU. 
 
1.2.5 The shadowing model 
 
The sunlight attenuation due to cometary dust particles (CDPs) shadowing is estimated by 
making use of the Mie theory (that is spherical particles and elastic scattering approximations are 
assumed). In addition, the scattering process is assumed to be isotropic and geometric, since the 
dimension of the particles is greater than the light wavelength. 
Our calculations integrate for CDPs diameters only in the range dmin = 1 µm to dmax = 100 
µm, since smaller particles are pushed out of the inner solar system by radiation pressure, while 
the greater ones are numerically non significant. The size distribution of the CDPs released by 
1P/Halley is assumed to be a power law function of the type: 
 
 ݊ሺ݀ሻ ן ݀ିଷ (1.1)
 
on the base of the samplings carried out during the last 1P/Halley passage (Mazets, 1986; 
McDonnell et al., 1987) and of model results (see, for instance, Fulle et al., 1995). 
Beer-Lambert’s law (equation 2) allows to estimate the sunlight intensity attenuation ΔF due 
to a CDPs layer of thickness dx: 
 
 ݀ܨ
݀ݔ
ൌ െܾ௘௫௧ܨ (1.2)
 
where bext is the extinction (scattering and absorption) coefficient of the CDPs population, which 
stands for the loss of light intensity per unit path length (Seinfeld and Pandis, 1998). If F0 is the 
starting radiation intensity (that is the solar constant F0 = 1368 W/m2, estimated average value as 
measured by satellites in the last 30 years; Fröhlich, 2006), then F(x) is the observed intensity 
after a given path x: 
 
 ܨሺݔሻ ൌ ܨ଴݁ି௕೐ೣ೟௫ ؠ ܨ଴݁ିఛ (1.3)
 
The optical depth τ gives the fraction of sunlight removed from the incoming radiation beam 
by extinction during its path x through the CDP layer (Seinfeld and Pandis, 1998). Note that, in 
order to simplify the estimate of the shadowing effect, in the present calculation no multiple 
scattering events are taken into account.  
According to the Mie theory, the extinction coefficient bext can be expressed as a function of 
the incoming light wavelength λ and of the refractive index m of the absorbing mean (here the 
CDPs) (Seinfeld and Pandis, 1998): 
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where r is the heliocentric distance, d the diameter of the particles, n(r,d) the number density 
distribution and Qext the extinction efficiency of the CDP population. The latter depends on the 
extinction cross section and geometric cross section of the particles; in the geometric scattering 
range it behaves in completely different ways for absorbing and non-absorbing matters (Seinfeld 
and Pandis, 1998), both being present in the mean CDP composition. Indeed, on the strength of 
the instrumental analysis of the dust released by Halley during the 1986 passage, the CDPs are 
known to be made of a mixture of astronomical silicate (94% of volume fraction) and amorphous 
carbon (6%) (Krishna Swamy, 1997). Astronomical silicate is a very low absorbing material (m = 
1.72 – i 0.03 at λ = 550 nm) (Mishchenko, 1990) and therefore its extinction efficiency is assumed 
to be (Seinfeld and Pandis, 1998): 
 
 lim
ఈ՜∞
ܳ௘௫௧ሺ݉, ߙሻ ൌ 2 (1.5)
 
where α is equal to πd/λ (Seinfeld and Pandis, 1998). On the contrary, amorphous carbon is a 
very absorbing mean (m = 1.96 – i 0.66 at λ = 550 nm) (Seinfeld and Pandis, 1998) and its 
extinction efficiency is estimated to vary as a function of d and λ according to equation (1.6) 
(Andersen et al., 1999): 
 
 ܳ௘௫௧ሺ݉, ߙሻ ؆
5݀
2ߣ
 (1.6)
 
The amount of dust released by Halley during its 1986 return was on the order of 5·1011 kg 
(1011 to 1012 kg) (Fulle, 1997; Krishna Swamy, 1997; Whipple, 1986). By using the extinction 
coefficient and extinction efficiency calculated from equations (1.4-1.6), the results of our model 
show that the optical depth related to a dust mass of 5·1011 kg (1011 to 1012 kg) is τ = 8.3·10-5 
(1.7·10-5 to 1.7·10-6, the error bar being determined by the uncertainty on the dust mass). The 
resulting shadowing can thus produce a negative radiative forcing on the order of 0.11 W/m2 
(0.02 to 0.23 W/m2). The mean surface temperature change ∆T is related to the change of 
radiative forcing ∆F by equation (1.7): 
 
 Δܶ ൌ ߣΔܨ (1.7)
 
where the sensitivity parameter λ is 0.7 °C/(W/m2) (Seinfeld and Pandis, 1998; Hansen et al., 
1993). Therefore we expect from Halley a periodic cooling on the order of 0.08 ± 0.06 °C, with 
the uncertainty being estimated starting from the lower and higher values of the total dust mass. 
This has to be considered as an order of magnitude estimate, since we do not account for the 
detailed shape of the dust disk, nor for the detailed time dependence of the shadowing. 
The present dust mass data refer to the 1986 passage (Fulle, 1997), but we are allowed to 
extrapolate that comet Halley has released similar amounts of dust during its previous passages: 
this is supported by the knowledge that the absolute magnitude M of comet Halley has shown a 
remarkable stability (4.28 < M < 6.66 mag) (Hughes, 1983; Nakano and Green, 2004) for almost 
all of the last 27 passages (going back ~2000 years). Thus, we guess that a climatic signal with the 
same periodicity of Halley (74 to 79 years) (Stephenson, 1990) and an amplitude of the order of 
0.08 °C should be present in the temperature records of the last two millennia. 
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1.2.6 Paleoclimatic data and spectral analysis 
 
Among the available paleoclimatic temperature records, only reconstructions of the last two 
millennia are eligible for a search of Halley’s signature. Longer records like the ones obtained 
from ice cores or sedimentary cores do not possess the needed time resolution or the required 
signal to noise ratio. Shorter records cover a few 76 years periods and this makes more difficult 
the extraction of the signal we are looking for. The present search is made by performing Fourier 
Transforms (FT) on three of the available Northern Hemisphere temperature paleoclimatic 
reconstructions. The record by Esper et al. (2002) spans from AD 831 to 1992, the one by Mann 
et al. (1999) ranges from AD 1000 to 1980, while the one by Moberg et al. (2005) extends from 
AD 1 to 1979. The FT are performed by first cutting the original temperature records in 1880. 
This allows to reduce the low frequency noise introduced by the last century global warming. For 
the same purpose, before applying the FT algorithm, the data are smoothed with a 10-years 
moving-average low-pass filter. The computations of the FT are performed with the software 
Redfit (Schulz and Mudelsee, 2002), which allows also to estimate the red-noise by performing 
Monte Carlo simulations. Therefore, it is possible to clearly detect whether the peaks in the FT 
are below or above a certain confidence level (95% in figures 1.3, 1.4, 1.5). 
The FT show periodicities around 69 years (figure 1.3; Esper et al., 2002), 75 years (figure 
1.4; Moberg et al., 2005) and 67 years (figure 1.5; Mann et al., 1999). These numbers are all 
consistent with a periodicity of 76 years within the error bars of the FT. The combined analysis 
of the spectra shows a robust component with a period of 72 ± 5 years (confidence level larger 
than 95 %). This finding is coherent with the FT results published by Mann et al. (1999). The 
astronomical value of Halley’s quasi periodicity lays within the error bars of our FT results. 
The cooling events are expected to be delayed by an unknown time interval with respect to 
the cometary perihelion passage. In order to evaluate such a delay and, therefore, establish the 
phase of the cometary signal, residuals are computed, by subtracting from the climate 
reconstructions a triangular signal with a 76 years period, as found with the FT. Minimizing these 
residuals allows to tag the phase and to obtain an indication for the temperature amplitude of the 
dust cooling (amplitude of the triangular waveform). As the average for the three reconstructions, 
this amplitude turns out to be 0.08 ± 0.04 °C. In spite of the error bar, the agreement with the 
temperature drop calculated above for Halley’s shadowing is impressive. The calculated phase 
sets the delay of the maximum cooling at 62 ± 13 years after the perihelion passage of Halley. 
The phase result is in agreement with the value found by Gilliland and Schneider (1984) (65 
years), by using a completely different approach. They imposed a 76 year solar forcing in their 
climate model in order to reproduce the 1880-1982 global temperature record. Note that their 
paper quotes a 76 year temperature swing much larger than the one we are coupling with 
cometary shadowing. 
As an example, figure 1.2 shows the Esper et al. (2002) temperature paleo-reconstruction 
from AD 831 to 1992; on the same plot a triangular waveform shows the temporal location and 
the magnitude of Halley’s cometary cooling. 
 
1.2.7 Other comets 
 
By investigating the possibility of other cometary signals to be present in the paleoclimatic 
temperature records, we find a consistent signal at 29 years in the Esper et al. (2002) and in the 
Mann et al. (1999) spectra: on the opposite, no signal seems to be present in the Moberg et al. 
(2005) FT. This peak may be tentatively attributed to comet 55P/Temple-Tuttle, although also 
27P/ Crommelin has similar parameters. Using the same method as for the 76 years peak, we 
find that the climate signal at 29 years turns out to be very weak: 0.01 to 005 °C in amplitude. 
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Figure 1.3. Fourier transform of the paleoclimatic reconstruction by Esper et al. (2002). The original data 
are smoothed with a 10-years moving-average low-pass filter and are truncated in 1880. Also shown is the 
95% red-noise level estimated with Redfit (Schulz and Mudelsee, 2002). 
 
Figure 1.4. Same as figure 1.3, but for the paleoclimatic reconstruction by Moberg et al. (2005). 
 
 
Figure 1.5. Same as figure 1.3, but for the paleoclimatic reconstruction by Mann et al. (1999). 
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1.2.8 The phase of the cometary shadowing signal 
 
An interesting information comes from the phase found with the present algorithm: 
according to the three mentioned reconstructions (Mann et al., 1999; Esper et al., 2002; Moberg 
et al., 2005), the last cometary cooling episode was centred in the years around 1972 (1960 to 
1985). It is well known that the instrumental global temperature records show a slow down of the 
greenhouse warming with a broad minimum located in that period. There is a consensus on the 
fact that such a slow down was produced by the competition of anthropogenic SO2 cooling with 
greenhouse gas-induced warming (Zecca and Brusa, 1991). Our present finding supports the view 
that such a slow down was partially produced by Halley’s shadowing. This yields one more 
information on the entire global warming process. Qualitatively we can state that the SO2 
negative forcing during the last decades was smaller than what had been guessed until now from 
the raw temperature record. We can draw also a semi-quantitative conclusion: the warming trend 
in the decades 1970 to 2010 should be corrected downward by an amount of approximately 0.02 
°C/decade. A similar upward correction should be applied in the decades 2010 to 2050. Although 
these are small numbers, it is worth to insert this further “natural contribution” into the climate 
models. 
 
1.3 The last century: global warming 
 
The recent period of global warming is largely the result of the positive radiative forcing 
induced on the climate by anthropogenic carbon emissions into the atmosphere (IPCC, 2007). 
The carbon emissions mainly originate from the extensive usage of fossil fuels as energy sources 
to sustain human activities since the beginning of the industrial era (figure 1.6a). Also cement 
production and gas flaring contributed to a small part of the emissions (figure 1.6a). Another 
source of carbon fluxes to the atmosphere are the changes in land-use, that have become 
important especially from the beginning of the 20th century (figure 1.6b). 
 
 
Figure 1.6. (a) 1750-2006 global annual anthropogenic carbon emissions from fossil fuels, cement 
production and gas flaring (Boden et al., 2009). (b) 1850-2005 global and regional annual carbon fluxes to 
the atmosphere from land-use changes (Houghton, 2008). 
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However, a large part of these carbon emissions is not in the atmosphere any more, 
otherwise global warming would be much stronger than currently observed (Knorr, 2009). 
Between 1959 and 2008, about 43% of each year’s CO2 emissions remained in the atmosphere on 
average (Le Quèrè et al., 2009); the rest was absorbed by carbon sinks. As a matter of fact, once 
emitted into the atmosphere, carbon dioxide is gradually soaked up with time by natural carbon 
sinks, e.g. terrestrial vegetation, the ocean surface layer and the deeper ocean (Eby et al., 2009). 
These sinks act with different timings and amplitudes, such that a fraction of the emitted CO2 
may remain in the atmosphere even for many millennia (Archer and Brovkin, 2008; Montenegro 
et al., 2007; Solomon et al., 2009). Figure 1.7 shows a schematic of the global carbon cycle in the 
climate system. 
The biogeochemical cycle of CO2 in the climate system can be described by carbon cycle 
models. These models allow calculating the atmospheric CO2 concentration change as a function 
of time, once anthropogenic carbon emissions to the atmosphere are given. It is important to 
properly model the dynamics of anthropogenic carbon fluxes in the climate system, if we wish to 
fully understand the role of carbon dioxide in the recent warming trend and be able to correctly 
project its atmospheric concentration change. 
 
 
Figure 1.7. Schematic of the global carbon cycle for the 1990s, showing the main annual fluxes in Gt C 
per year: pre-industrial “natural” fluxes are marked black and “anthropogenic” fluxes in red (IPCC, 2007). 
 
1.4 Carbon cycle models and observed CO2 concentration 
records 
 
A simple way to validate the performance of a carbon cycle model is trying to reproduce the 
historical records of atmospheric CO2 concentration change by taking as input the estimates of 
anthropogenic carbon emissions to the atmosphere from the beginning of the industrial era on. 
Among all the currently available carbon cycle models, the one that is most frequently 
quoted in the literature is probably the Bern model (see Joos et al., 2001; IPCC, 2007), because of 
its relatively high accuracy at modeling the physical processes responsible for the carbon fluxes 
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between the components of the climate system. Nevertheless, even the Bern model is not able to 
accurately reproduce the atmospheric CO2 concentration change observed in the past century 
and a half (see e. g. Kharecha and Hansen, 2008 and figure 1.8a). In the following, we show that 
it is possible to fit the observational CO2 datasets more thoroughly with a simple variant of the 
Bern carbon cycle model. 
 
1.4.1 CO2 emission datasets 
 
To this purpose, the 1850-2005 historical datasets of global CO2 emissions from fossil fuels 
by Boden et al. (2009) (figure 1.6a) and from land-use changes by Houghton (2008) (figure 1.6b) 
are used. The Bern model is known to overestimate the CO2 concentration in recent years, if 
these emission datasets are used as input (Kharecha and Hansen, 2008). It is also known that 
there are large uncertainties in the estimates of net land-use emissions (particularly for 1950–
2000) (Houghton, 2003), opposite to fossil fuel emissions, that are relatively certain. Thus, we 
decide to reduce land-use emissions by 50%, by accepting the suggestion supported by Kharecha 
and Hansen (2008) and by other studies (e.g., see IPCC, 2007, ch. 7). Nonetheless, this choice 
does not allow to completely offset the overestimate of the Bern model, as we will see later. 
 
1.4.2 The Bern/HILDA model 
 
The Bern model (Joos and Bruno, 1996) considers the distribution and the fast exchange of 
carbon and carbon dioxide in a climate system constituting of its three main reservoirs: the 
atmosphere, the ocean and the biosphere. In its original version, the atmosphere is assumed as 
well-mixed, while the other two reservoirs are modelled in more detail: the ocean through the 
HILDA model (Siegenthaler and Joos, 1992), the biosphere through the vegetation, wood, 
detritus and soil components. The diffusion of matter and heat is modelled by using coefficients 
that turn out to be in good agreement with experimental evaluations (Joos and Bruno, 1996; 
Siegenthaler and Joos, 1992). 
However, to save CPU time, it was proposed to perform scenario calculations by means of a 
“pulse response function” substitute version of the model (Sarmiento et al., 1992). This 
simplified approach is based on the hypothesis of linearity and time invariant of the system 
(conditions for the Green’s functions to be valid); problems may arise from non-linearities 
essentially introduced by seawater chemistry and land carbon storage; moreover, other troubles 
are present in treating non-CO2 tracer gases. 
A further modification of the model (Joos et al., 1996) was proposed through the use of the 
so called “mixed-layer pulse response functions”. Instead of a CO2 pulse input into the 
atmosphere, in this case a pulse input into the surface ocean is considered, by treating the air-sea 
equilibration explicitly. The transport of excess CO2 and other passive tracers within the ocean is 
described by a set of linear equations and can therefore be exactly captured by pulse response 
functions. 
Here we employ an empirical least-squared tuning of the HILDA model coefficients in the 
mixed-layer version; this approach is different with respect to the analytical and quasi-analytical 
strategies chosen in the original papers, which, however, gives a good but not completely 
acceptable fit (see e.g. Kharecha and Hansen, 2008). 
Exponential-sum functions employed in the HILDA model are used in many different 
topics and physical models (biology, pharmacology, etc.), where the overall behavior of the 
systems resembles the multi-compartment property of the climate system. While it is clear that 
exponential-sum functions are in general non-linear functions, their sensitivity to coefficients and 
exponents modifications strongly depends on the exact interval chosen for the parameter changes 
(Garloff et al., 2007; Julius, 1972). Their insensitivity to “appropriately” chosen changes of 
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parameters (Julius, 1972) was correlated with the well-known ability of biological (and generally 
of complex) systems to maintain a constant functional behavior of the important variables. 
In the case of the HILDA model, the coefficients found on an analytical and quasi-analytical 
base are not able to attain a perfect fitting to experimental data, while the coefficients and 
exponents chosen by least-squaring, as we propose, seem to achieve this goal. Notwithstanding 
their difference, both resulting functions show the same general behavior and their total 
difference is negligible in a wide part of the data interval. This situation is in good agreement with 
the general properties of the multi-exponential sum functions. 
As anticipated, the Bern model is not able to accurately reproduce the observed CO2 
concentration records (see e. g. Kharecha and Hansen, 2008). In order to give an idea of this 
inability, the atmospheric CO2 concentration change resulting from anthropogenic carbon 
emissions is calculated as a function of time by using the Bern/HILDA model (equation 1.8) 
(UNFCCC, 2002): 
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Equation 1.8 gives the CO2 concentration C in year t, where t0 is the time when 
anthropogenic CO2 starts to be emitted into the atmosphere (here 1850), c is the emission to 
concentration conversion coefficient (about 2.12 ppm per Gt C; IPCC, 2007; Kharecha and 
Hansen, 2008), E stands for the carbon emissions in year t’, τi (i = 1-3) are time constants related 
to the intrinsic times of natural CO2 sinks, ai (i = 1-3) are the amplitudes related to such time 
constants and a0 is the atmospheric retention factor (ARF), that is the fraction of an emission 
pulse that may remain in the atmosphere for many thousands of years (IPCC, 2007; Archer and 
Brovkin, 2008). By adding the observed CO2 concentration value in 1850 to the yearly results of 
equation (1.8), the 1850 to 2005 atmospheric CO2 record should be reproduced. 
The values of the time constants τi and the amplitudes ai employed in the second (IPCC, 
1995), third (IPCC, 2001) and fourth (IPCC, 2007) IPCC Assessment Reports are given in table 
1.1. Please note that the IPCC AR2 employed a version of the Bern model with five time 
constants τi and as many related amplitudes ai (i = 1-5). 
 
 
Parameters 
IPCC Assessment Reports Tuned models (best fit) 
AR2 AR3 AR4 Law Dome Siple Station
Low Standard High Standard Standard + Mauna Loa 
a0 0.1253 0.1369 0.1504 0.152 0.217 0.20 0.20 
a1 0.0989 0.1298 0.1787 0.253 0.259 0.27 0.21 
a2 0.1839 0.1938 0.1798 0.279 0.338 0.20 0.32 
a3 0.2674 0.2502 0.2201 0.316 0.186 0.33 0.27 
a4 0.2380 0.2086 0.1725     
a5 0.0865 0.0807 0.0975     
τ1 407.2 371.6 330.8 171.0 172.9 172.9 172.9 
τ2 50.86 55.70 67.03 18.0 18.51 18.51 18.51 
τ3 15.19 17.01 21.72 2.57 1.186 1.186 1.186 
τ4 3.73 4.16 5.61     
τ5 1.42 1.33 1.51     
CO2 in 1850 (ppm)     287 287 288 
Table 1.1. The parameters of the different versions of the Bern carbon cycle model according to the most 
recent IPCC Assessment Reports (IPCC, 1995; 2001; 2007) and the present best-fit tuned models. 
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Figure 1.8a compares the results of the Bern model with the parameters employed in the 
IPCC AR4 and a CO2 concentration in 1850 of 287 ppm, together with the historical CO2 
concentration change. Figure 1.8a evidences a clear lack of agreement between the results of the 
Bern model and the observed data. The disagreement is small, but becomes more significant in 
the last years of the record and increases when projecting into the next decades, as is shown later 
on. 
 
1.4.3 The historical records and the paleoclimatic reconstructions of 
atmospheric CO2 concentration 
 
The observational CO2 datasets shown in figure 1.8a come from the instrumental records 
and the paleoclimatic reconstructions of the past CO2 concentration. The instrumental data are 
measurements performed at Mauna Loa (Hawaii, USA) from 1959 to 2005 (Tans, 2010b) and the 
1980-2005 global average (Tans, 2010a). Also shown are the paleoclimatic reconstructions of Law 
Dome (MacFarling Meure et al., 2006) and Siple Station (Neftel et al., 1985; 1994; Friedli et al., 
1986) ice cores. At the best of our knowledge, these cores have at present the best time 
resolution in the last 300 years. 
Figure 1.8b compares the two paleoclimatic CO2 reconstructions of Law Dome (MacFarling 
Meure et al., 2006) and Siple Station (Neftel et al., 1985; 1994; Friedli et al., 1986) ice cores from 
1850 to 1996. The paleoclimatic data shown here are the presently calculated 20-years smoothed 
versions of the original datasets. We note that they are generally in very good agreement except 
for the years between about 1850 to 1880 and 1930 to 1970, when there is only a slight 
disagreement. Nevertheless, the two datasets agree within the combined error bars (± 3 ppm for 
Siple Station; Neftel et al., 1985; Friedli et al., 1986; ± 1.1 ppm for Law Dome; MacFarling Meure 
et al., 2006) in the entire time range. 
 
  
Figure 1.8. The records of atmospheric CO2 concentration change from 1850 to 2005. (a) The 
instrumental measurements performed at Mauna Loa (Tans, 2010b) and the global average estimated by 
NOAA (Tans, 2010a) together with the paleoclimatic reconstructions of Siple Station (Neftel et al., 1985; 
1994; Friedli et al., 1986) and Law Dome (MacFarling Meure et al., 2006) ice cores are compared with the 
result of the Bern model with a starting concentration of 287 ppm in 1850 and parameters consistent with 
the IPCC AR4. (b) The presently computed 20-years smoothed versions of the paleoclimatic 
reconstructions of Siple Station (Neftel et al., 1985; 1994; Friedli et al., 1986) and Law Dome (MacFarling 
Meure et al., 2006) ice cores. 
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1.4.4 The tuning procedure 
 
We are not aware of any evaluation of the error bars affecting the parameters of the Bern 
model version according to the IPCC AR4. This lack entitles us to attempt an empirical tuning of 
such parameters to the measured data. By leaving free all the seven parameters a0, ai and τi in 
equation (1.8), obviously all sorts of measured data can be easily reproduced. In order to achieve 
a meaningful fit, physical constraints to the parameters have to be imposed. 
In the literature, the ARF is quoted to have a value close to 0.2 (Montenegro et al., 2007; 
Archer and Brovkin, 2008; Solomon et al., 2009). We accept any value between 0.18 and 0.22. 
The pre-industrial CO2 concentration (here the value in 1850) measured in the ice cores 
spans from 286 ppm to 289 ppm, depending on the sample (MacFarling Meure et al., 2006). 
Therefore we accept any value in that range.  
The choice of the τi and ai parameters is much more difficult, since, as in all lifetime 
deconvolution procedures, the role of the two sets is interchangeable: it is possible to obtain the 
same fit by keeping the ai fixed, while tuning the τi, or the opposite. Here, we use a physical hint 
coming from the measurements of 14C concentration change (Δ14C) in the carbon dioxide after 
the nuclear tests performed in the atmosphere in the late ’50s and early ’60s (figure 1.9a). We 
suppose that the carbon sinks for 14CO2 are the same as for 12CO2, while in the few years around 
1960 the dominant 14CO2 sources came from nuclear explosions. Hence, the 14C time series can 
almost directly be interpreted as the time evolution of the airborne fraction of 14CO2 after an 
emission pulse into the atmosphere. 
 
  
Figure 1.9. (a) The instrumental measurements of atmospheric Δ14C annual mean values in Vermunt 
(Austria), Schauinsland (Germany) and Jungfraujoch (Austria) (Levin and Kromer, 2004). Shown is also an 
exponential fit to the three combined datasets for the years 1964-2003. (b) The instrumental 
measurements of atmospheric Δ14C monthly (and/or bimonthly) values in Vermunt (Austria) (Levin et al., 
1994) and Wellington (New Zealand) (Manning and Melhuish, 1994). 
 
The Δ14C annual records available in the time range from 1959 to 2003 (Levin and Kromer, 
2004) show a prominent atmospheric lifetime of ~17 years (figure 1.9a), in very good agreement 
with the second lifetime τ2 of the Bern model version according to IPCC AR4 (table 1.1). 
A hint for a short lifetime is found in a closer analysis of the Levin et al. (1985) Δ14C records 
with higher resolution. The curve recorded at Vermunt (Austria) shows an identifiable 1 year 
oscillation after the October 1963 maximum (figure 1.9b). The oscillation has to be directly 
related to the yearly oscillation present in the in the Mauna Loa CO2 record: it is the fingerprint 
of the vegetation respiration in the Northern Hemisphere. It is not surprising that such 
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oscillation is not present in the Wellington (New Zealand) record (Manning et al., 1990) (figure 
1.9b). From one side the vegetated area of the Southern Hemisphere is quite smaller than the 
Northern counterpart. From the other side, 14C produced in the Northern Hemisphere takes time 
to travel to the Southern Hemisphere, as it is marked by the one year and a half delay in the 
Wellington peak. The concentration drop from the first maximum to the first minimum in the 
Vermunt record gives a rough indication of the existence of a sink with a short lifetime on the 
order of 1 year (τ3). 
Any longer lifetime, on the order of centuries (τ1), cannot be detected due to the shortness of 
the instrumental time series. 
Thus, we can trust the second lifetime in equation 1 to be τ2 ~18 years. This fact places a 
constraint on the other two lifetimes: one has to be much smaller and the other one much larger 
than τ2. We know that the short lifetime τ3 is somehow connected with biological sinks. We 
therefore expect τ3 to be on the order of 1 year, as confirmed by the above analysis of the 14C 
record. The long lifetime τ1 is possibly related to deep oceanic sinks and we expect τ1 to be of the 
order of centuries. Based on such physical assumptions, a tuning of the Bern model may be 
performed, by keeping the τi constant at the IPCC AR4 values of table 1.1, while allowing the ai 
to change in order to fit the observed CO2 data. 
 
1.4.5 The tuned models 
 
The paleoclimatic CO2 reconstructions of Siple Station and Law Dome ice cores show some 
differences, as seen in figure 1.8b. However, there is no reason to make a choice between them. 
Therefore we attempt two separate tunings: one to Siple Station paleoclimatic reconstruction 
(from 1850 to 1958) plus the Mauna Loa instrumental record (from 1959 to 2005) and the other 
one to Law Dome (from 1850 to 1958) plus Mauna Loa (from 1959 to 2005). Figure 1.10 shows 
both observed CO2 combined datasets compared with the outputs of the two tuned models. The 
numerical values of the parameters of our best fitting models as of figure 1.10 are given in the last 
two columns on the right of table 1.1. The two tuned models in figure 1.10 are almost 
indistinguishable from each other and the overall agreement with the observed data is very good. 
The largest discrepancy is found in the years from about 1910 to 1950, where the tuned curves 
are below the paleoclimatic data by a few ppm. Minor discrepancies can be seen in the epoch of 
the first  oil shock (1973-1975) and in the years from 1990 to 1995, time correlated with the fall 
of the Soviet Union and the consequent global CO2 emissions reduction. It is impossible to 
assign a preference to one or the other set until new paleoclimatic datasets with higher resolution 
will become available. 
Figure 1.11 shows the atmospheric CO2 impulse response function after a carbon pulse into 
the atmosphere as a function of the elapsed time for the two tuned carbon cycle models 
introduced here, compared with the Bern model (IPCC AR4 version). The largest difference 
between the tuned models and the Bern model occurs at ~4 years, where the airborne fraction 
amounts to ~75% for the Bern model, and to ~68% and ~64% for the models tuned to Siple 
Station + Mauna Loa and to Law Dome + Mauna Loa, respectively. Note that the tuned models 
are always lower than the Bern model. 
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Figure 1.10. The 20-years smoothed versions of the atmospheric CO2 concentration reconstructions of 
Siple Station (Neftel et al., 1985; 1994; Friedli et al., 1986) and Law Dome (MacFarling Meure et al., 2006) 
ice cores (for the years 1850-1958) plus the Mauna Loa instrumental record (for 1959-2005) are compared 
with the corresponding Bern-like tuned models. The parameters of the tuned models are given in table 
1.1. 
 
 
Figure 1.11. The atmospheric impulse response function at different times after a CO2 emission pulse: the 
Bern model (IPCC AR4) is compared with the present two tuned models (see table 1.1).  
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1.4.6 CO2 concentration projections with the tuned models 
 
To further examine the differences in the physical properties between the Bern/HILDA 
model and the present two tuned models, we also project the future atmospheric CO2 
concentration for two different GHG emission scenarios. The carbon emissions used for 1850-
2005 are the same historical datasets introduced in §1.4.1 (emissions from fossil fuels by Boden et 
al., 2009; 50% of the emissions from land-use changes by Houghton, 2008), while the two 
scenarios of future (2006 to 2100) emissions are the IPCC SRES B1 and A1B (IPCC, 2000). 
Figure 1.12a and 1.12b show the concentration profiles predicted by both the Bern model (IPCC 
AR4 version in table 1.1) and the present tuned models. Figure 1.12a illustrates to the tuning 
performed to Law Dome data, while fig 1.12b refers to the tuning to Siple Station data. Both 
figures show that the projections based on the tuned models give slightly lower concentration 
values than the original Bern model. 
 
  
Figure 1.12. Projections of future atmospheric CO2 concentration with the IPCC SRES emission 
scenarios B1 and A1B (IPCC, 2000): (a) the Bern model is compared with the model tuned to Law Dome 
+ Mauna Loa data; here the CO2 concentration in 1850 is 287 ppm; (b) same as in (a) but for the model 
tuned to Siple Station + Mauna Loa data and with a CO2 concentration in 1850 of 288 ppm. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Review of available climatic projections 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Overview 
 
The commonly accepted limit for avoiding a dangerous anthropogenic 
interference with the climate system is keeping the atmospheric concentration 
of all greenhouse gases away from reaching about 450 ppm of CO2 equivalent, 
or, alternatively, constrain global-mean surface temperature rise below +2 °C 
with respect to pre-industrial times. 
According to the climatic projections of the Fourth Assessment Report of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change published in 2007, global-
mean temperature rise might reach +4 °C by the end of the century relative to 
1980-1999 average. These projections rely on emissions scenarios developed in 
the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change published in 2000. 
The SRES scenarios are developed by assuming cumulative fossil CO2 
emissions throughout the 21st century that may be as high as about 2500 Gt C. 
The emissions scenarios derive, in turn, from estimates of the planet’s fossil 
fuels reserves, that, however, were performed in the early ’90s and including 
not only proved reserves, but also resources remaining to be discovered or 
recoverable with technological progress and additional occurrences. 
Here we show that a critical analysis of these evaluations calls for more 
prudent estimates of fossil fuel known reserves available for exploitation. 
The very first studies investigating the constraints imposed by fossil fuels 
depletion on future global warming are introduced and their results are 
discussed. In spite of fossil fuels consumption expected to decrease, 
atmospheric CO2 concentration is predicted to increase further and reach 
between about 450 to 550 ppm by 2100. Global-mean temperature change will 
very likely exceed +2 °C relative to pre-industrial levels before the end of this 
century. These results support the conclusions that the exhaustion of fossil 
fuels itself will not prevent climate change from reaching dangerous levels for 
the Earth’s environment and ecosystems. 
 
More information about some of the subjects presented in this chapter is included in the 
papers by Zecca and Chiari (2010; to be published a).  
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2.1 A dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system 
 
As seen in the Introduction, the Earth’s global-mean temperature has increased by about 0.8 
°C since the beginning of the industrial era. The recent extraordinary anthropogenic global 
warming can be fully appreciated only in the context of the long-term climatic evolution, by 
comparing it with model simulations of the past and future natural climate variability and trend, 
as shown in figure 2.1. 
 
 
Figure 2.1. The observed global mean temperature change from 1850 to 2008 from the HadCRUT3v 
dataset (in red) with its uncertainty (yellow band), expressed as anomaly with respect to 1861-1899 
average, superimposed on a 1000 year simulation of global mean temperature from the HadGEM1 model 
(black line) (Stott et al., 2010). 
 
Of course, none knows exactly how much and how long the Earth’s temperature will keep 
on rising. But the existence of many tipping points in the climate system is well known (Lenton et 
al., 2008): because of positive feedbacks, even a small perturbation can qualitatively alter the state 
and the evolution of the climatic system, such that it comes to cross a dangerous threshold. The 
danger, in this case, refers to the impacts that this kind of rough and sudden climatic change 
might have on natural and human systems (see e.g. Schellnhuber et al., 2006). 
Human activities might cause this threshold to be exceeded in the future, due to sustained 
emissions of GHGs and the resulting increase in global temperatures. Therefore, the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has already acknowledged in 
1992 the need of reducing GHG emissions by a substantial amount, in order to avoid a 
potentially dangerous anthropogenic interference (DAI) with the climate system (UNFCCC, 
1992). It is common opinion in the scientific community that, in order to avoid DAI, the global 
temperature increase should be constrained below +2 °C with respect to pre-industrial level, or, 
equivalently, the atmospheric GHG concentration below about 450 ppm CO2 equivalent (i. e. the 
concentration of CO2 that would give an equivalent radiative forcing to that provided by all 
anthropogenic GHGs) (see e.g. Hansen et al., 2007; Mann, 2009). In fact, an increase of global 
temperature up to nearly 2 °C would still allow many human systems to undertake adaption 
strategies at affordable economic, social and environmental costs (IPCC, 2007; Stern, 2007). 
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Thus, avoiding DAI requires the future stabilization of atmospheric GHG concentrations. 
This means that anthropogenic GHG emissions have to reach a maximum and then begin to 
decline. However, to meet the +2°C climate target, emissions would need to be reduced globally 
by at least as much as 50% within 2050 relative to the 1990 levels (Stern, 2007). 
 
2.2 The IPCC projections 
 
Climatic projections up to the end of the 21st century and beyond have been performed for 
a few decades now, also to assess the eventuality of DAI to occur in the future. However, 
relatively high uncertainty remains in the projections, since neither future emissions of GHGs 
nor any policy action aiming at reducing the emissions cannot be predicted at present. 
A selection of the most recent projections of temperature change by the 2007 Assessment 
Report (AR4) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007) is shown in 
figure 2.2. A summary of the main results for CO2 concentration and temperature change 
predicted by the end of this century is also given in table 2.1 for each family scenario. 
 
 
Figure 2.2. The IPCC 2007 projections of the future temperature rise relative to 1980-1999 (IPCC, 2007). 
The multi-model mean and relative uncertainty range (±1 standard deviation) is given here for the 
scenarios A2, A1B and B1. 
 
SRES 
scenario
CO2 concentration (ppm) Temperature change (°C) 
2100 2090-2099 relative to 1980-1999 
Range Best estimate Range 
B1 485 – 680 1.8 1.1 – 2.9 
A1T 505 – 735 2.4 1.4 – 3.8 
B2 545 – 770 2.4 1.4 – 3.8 
A1B 615 – 920 2.8 1.7 – 4.4 
A2 735 – 1080 3.4 2.0 – 5.4 
A1FI 825 – 1250 4.0 2.4 – 6.4 
Table 2.1. The projections of the atmospheric CO2 concentration in 2100 (IPCC, 2001) and temperature 
rise for the last decade of this century with respect to 1980-1999 (IPCC, 2007) for each of the IPCC SRES 
family scenarios. Uncertainty ranges are -40% to +60% for temperature. 
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According to the IPCC projections, the atmospheric CO2 concentration in 2100 might be as 
low as 485 ppm, or even exceed the 1000 ppm threshold, reaching 1250 ppm. At about the same 
time, global temperature is predicted to range from about 1.8 °C to 4.0 °C relative to 1980-1999, 
depending on the scenario. 
 
2.3 The IPCC SRES scenarios 
 
The IPCC simulations are based on GHG emissions scenarios developed in the Special 
Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) (IPCC, 2000). These 40 scenarios originate from detailed 
energy system models in which world population, technology and economics (gross world 
product) are used to generate projections of future world energy consumption from fossil fuels, 
and consequently, of GHGs emissions. These scenarios consist of six groups, called “families”, 
each sharing some common assumptions on the future evolution of the above variables: four sets 
of scenarios A1, A2, B1, B2 and three groups within the A1 family, characterized by alternative 
developments of energy technologies, A1FI (fossil fuel intensive), A1B (balanced), and A1T 
(predominantly non-fossil fuel) (IPCC, 2000). 
 
 
Figure 2.3. Global fossil CO2 emissions relative to 1990: historical values from 1900 to 1990 and the 40 
SRES scenarios from 1990 to 2100 (IPCC,2000). The dashed thin lines are for the individual SRES 
scenarios. The thick lines are for the six family scenarios. The coloured vertical bars on the right indicate 
the range of emissions in 2100 for each family scenario. 
 
SRES scenario 
Cumulative fossil CO2 emissions (Gt C) 
1990-2100 
Mean Range 
B1 989 794 – 1306 
A1T 1038 989 – 1051 
B2 1160 1033 – 1627 
A1B 1437 1220 – 1989 
A2 1773 1303 – 1860 
A1FI 2128 2079 – 2478 
Table 2.2. 1990-2100 cumulative fossil CO2 emissions for each SRES family scenario (IPCC, 2000). 
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Global annual CO2 emissions for the SRES scenarios are shown in figure 2.3. The SRES 
scenarios are grouped into the six families also according to their cumulative emissions (table 
2.2). Total  cumulative carbon emissions from all sources (fossil fuels and land-use change) 
through 2100 range from approximately 770 Gt C to nearly 2540 Gt C (IPCC, 2000). 1990-2100 
cumulative carbon emissions from fossil fuels only are given in table 2.2 for each SRES family 
scenario. The mean value of the cumulative CO2 emissions is about 990 Gt C in the lowest case 
(B1) and nearly 2130 Gt C in the highest one (A1FI). 
 
2.4 Estimates of fossil fuel reserves 
 
The estimates of fossil energy resources, on which the SRES carbon emissions rely stem 
from the assessments of the world hydrocarbon and energy resources for the 21st century by 
Rogner (1997) and Gregory and Rogner (1998). These include reserves, resources, and additional 
occurrences and are defined in the SRES in the following way (IPCC, 2000): 
• Proved reserves are those quantities which geological and engineering information indicates 
with reasonable certainty can be recovered in the future from known reservoirs under 
existing economic and operating conditions. 
• Resources are those hydrocarbon occurrences with uncertain geologic assurance or that lack 
economic attractiveness. 
• Additional occurrences are all other hydrocarbons that do not fall within the reserve and 
resource categories and have a high degree of geologic uncertainty, are not recoverable with 
current or foreseeable technology, or are economically unwarranted at present. 
For the development of the scenarios, the SRES considers at least the already identified 
reserves, conventional resources remaining to be discovered and resources that are recoverable 
with technological progress to be available for use in the future (see table 2.3). Only the sum of 
the identified reserves, conventional resources remaining to be discovered (high case) and 
resources that are recoverable with technological progress amounts at more than 30 thousand 
billion barrels of oil equivalent (table 2.3), corresponding to emissions higher than nearly 3900 Gt 
C. 
 
 
Consumption 
1860-1990 
Reserves 
identified
Conventional 
resources remaining 
to be discovered 
Recoverable 
with 
technological 
progress 
Additional 
occurrences
Low High 
Oil 
Conventional 548 1030 262 965 
Unconventional 1161 1472 >2453 
Gas 
Conventional 278 883 1537 3696 >1635 
Unconventional 1128 3271 >3598 
Hydrates >130839 
Coal 850 3745 13084 >24532 
Total 1676 7949 >1799 >4661 >17827 >161423 
Table 2.3. Global fossil energy reserves, resources, and occurrences (in billion barrels of oil equivalent) 
(IPCC, 2000). 
 
The estimates of reserves and resources as of table 2.3 presume a huge quantity of fossil 
fuels to be available for use in the future. However, recent research indicates that these 
evaluations are overestimated (see, for instance, ASPO; The Oil Drum and references therein)). 
The reasons for such a bias are mainly geopolitical: in the last decades both oil producing 
countries and energy corporations have blown-up (for different reasons) their remaining reserves 
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assessments. Beside this, many statements on oil, gas and coal residual availability have been 
published without any objective demonstration. Most of these statements rely heavily on non-
demonstrated trust in future technology and on the existence of “speculative” geological reserves. 
For oil, for instance, the major fields had already been discovered in the 1950s and ‘60s and 
since then world discovery has been falling inexorably for 40 years (Hall and Day, 2009); future 
discoveries of new huge oil and gas fields or coal ores are at present highly unlikely. Most 
importantly, the amounts of fossil fuels that can be extracted from the Earth’s crust with an 
EROEI and economic return enough to sustain the energy source itself are, in fact, quite limited 
(Hall and Day, 2009). Fossil fuels are already exhausting worldwide and the effects of the 
shortage are expected to become visible soon in the near future (ASPO; The Oil Drum). 
 
2.5 Available scenarios and climatic projections accounting 
for fossil fuels depletion 
 
In recent years a few papers have appeared pointing out the need for climatic projections to 
account for the ongoing depletion of fossil fuels and the resulting limited emissions of GHGs 
(see e.g. Laherrère, 2001; Aleklett et al., 2003). Until now, indeed, all projections of future climate 
change have always been performed implicitly assuming that very large amounts of fossil fuels are 
available. 
Only in the very last years a few independent researchers have been carrying out projections 
of energy availability in the next centuries, that have been developed starting from estimates of 
the fossil reserves (Rutledge, 2007; Brecha, 2008; de Sousa and Mearns, 2008; Kharecha and 
Hansen, 2008; Nel and Cooper, 2009; Zecca and Chiari, 2010; to be published a). Their aim is at 
evaluating possible constraints of fossil fuels depletion on the projections of climate change. 
Since the amount of fossil fuels left over for the future is limited, so are the total CO2 emissions 
resulting from their burning. Thus, the CO2 concentration in the atmosphere and the consequent 
temperature rise must be restricted as well. 
Most of these papers assume that mankind will exploit fossil resources at the maximum rate 
allowed by technological and economic constraints, though limited by geological availability. 
 
2.5.1 Fossil CO2 emissions scenarios 
 
Figure 2.4 shows the CO2 emission scenarios, derived by the authors of the papers 
themselves from the respective projections of word fossil energy availability. Table 2.4 
summarizes the cumulative CO2 emissions, as well as the year in which annual emissions peak. 
Excluding the BAU scenario by Kharecha and Hansen (2008), 2000-2100 cumulative CO2 
emissions from fossil fuels range from the lowest value of 430 Gt C of the Less oil reserves 
scenario by Kharecha and Hansen (2008) to 910 Gt C of the Fossil limit-high scenario by Brecha 
(2008). In any case, it is clear that the cumulative emissions of all these scenarios are typically 
lower than the ones underlying the SRES scenarios (table 2.2). This is because the total fossil 
energy availability on which the SRES scenarios are based is usually highly overestimated, since it 
assumes very large values for the remaining reserves of fossil fuels, as seen above. In addition, 
among the SRES scenarios, the business as usual (BAU) scenarios project a sustained growth of 
the emissions, as they assume a continuous and extended energy consumption without any upper 
limit due to a hypothetical nearly infinite availability of fossil fuels. 
Fossil CO2 emissions are predicted to peak in between 2016 (Coal phase-out scenario by 
Kharecha and Hansen, 2008) and 2050 (Fossil limit-low scenario by Brecha, 2008), if the BAU 
scenario by Kharecha and Hansen (2008) is excluded. 
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Figure 2.4. Scenarios of fossil CO2 emissions from available papers based on fossil fuels exhaustion. 
 
 
Reference Scenario 
Fossil CO2 emissions (GtC) 
Cumulative 2000-2100 Peak (year)
Rutledge (2007) Producer Limited Super-Kyoto 
540 
470 
2020 
2030 
Brecha (2008) Fossil limit – low Fossil limit – high 
750 
910 
2050 
2035 
de Sousa and Mearns (2008) 2008 Olduvai assessment 590 2020 
Kharecha and Hansen (2008) 
BAU 
Coal phase-out 
Fast oil use 
Less oil reserves 
Peak oil plateau 
1100 
500 
520 
430 
550 
2077 
2016 
2025 
2022 
2025 
Nel and Cooper (2009) ERC model: AH (0.03) ERC model: AL (0.022) 800 2030 
Zecca and Chiari (2010) ERC model: Bern 800 2030 
Zecca and Chiari (to be 
published a) ERC model: MAGICC 800 2030 
Table 2.4. A brief summary of the CO2 emissions scenarios from available papers accounting for fossil 
fuels depletion. Fossil CO2 emissions are given: cumulative values for 2000-2100 and the year in which 
annual emissions peak. 
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2.5.2 Atmospheric CO2 concentration 
 
The results obtained in terms of projected CO2 concentration up to the end of this century 
are shown in figure 2.5 and summarized in table 2.5. The predicted CO2 concentration in 2100 
lies in the range from about 440 ppm to 550 ppm, except for Kharecha and Hansen (2008), 
intentionally aiming at emissions scenarios limiting the CO2 concentration below 450 ppm, and 
for the AH (0.03) and AL (0.022) scenarios of the ERC model by Nel and Cooper (2009), 
employing a non-physical carbon cycle model (see Zecca and Chiari, 2010; to be published a; in 
press). The maximum of the CO2 concentration is expected to occur after 2070, reaching 
between about 440 ppm and 560 ppm. 
Please note that all these scenarios project values of CO2 concentration for the 21st century, 
that are by far lower than the corresponding ones, based on the SRES scenarios (see table 2.1). 
 
 
Figure 2.5. A selection of the projections of atmospheric CO2 concentration from available papers 
accounting for fossil fuels depletion. 
 
2.5.3 Temperature change 
 
The projections of global temperature change with respect to 2000 are shown in figure 2.6 
and summarized also in table 2.5. The temperature rise predicted by the end of the 21st century is 
in between +1.4 °C and +2.3 °C with respect to 2000, except again for the AH (0.03) and AL 
(0.022) scenarios of the ERC model by Nel and Cooper (2009), employing an extremely low 
value for the climate sensitivity and a too simplistic calculation of the temperature change starting 
from the total radiative forcing, other than a wrong carbon cycle model (see again Zecca and 
Chiari, 2010). The temperature peak might occur by the turn of the century or even after with 
values ranging from 1.4 °C to more than 2.3 °C. 
Thus, all these climatic simulations project on average lower values of the world temperature 
change during this century than the ones predicted by the SRES scenarios (figure 2.2 and table 
2.1). 
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
2000 2050 2100 2150 2200
A
tm
os
p
h
er
ic
 C
O
2
co
n
ce
n
tr
at
io
n
 (
p
p
m
)
Producer-Limited Super-Kyoto
Fossil limit - low Fossil limit - high
2008 Olduvai ass. BAU
Coal Phase-out Fast Oil Use
Less Oil Reserves Peak Oil Plateau
ERC model: AH (0.03) ERC model: AL (0.022)
ERC model: Bern ERC model: MAGICC
43 
 
Reference Scenario 
CO2 concentration 
(ppm) 
Temperature change 
relative to 2000 (°C) 
Peak (year) 2100 Peak 2100 
Rutledge (2007) Producer Limited Super-Kyoto 
460 (2070) 
440 (2100) 
452 
440 
1.8 (2150) 
1.8 (2200) 
1.7 
1.5 
Brecha (2008) Fossil limit – low Fossil limit – high 
508 (2100) 
560 (2075) 
508 
550 
>2.1 (>2100) 
>2.3 (>2100) 
2.1 
2.3 
de Sousa and 
Mearns (2008) 2008 Olduvai assessment 471 (2075) 463 1.4 (2100) 1.4 
Kharecha and 
Hansen (2008) 
BAU 
Coal phase-out 
Fast oil use 
Less oil reserves 
Peak oil plateau 
>575 (>2100) 
445 (2046) 
463 (2046) 
439 (2045) 
456 (2060) 
575 
433 
435 
419 
445 
  
Nel and Cooper 
(2009) 
ERC model: AH (0.03) 
ERC model: AL (0.022) 
439 (2060) 
480 (2070) 
416 
462 
0.6 (2100) 
0.7 (2100) 
0.6 
0.7 
Zecca and 
Chiari (2010) ERC model: Bern 541 (2130) 536   
Zecca and 
Chiari (to be 
published a) 
ERC model: MAGICC >527 (>2100) 527 >1.4 (>2100) 1.4 
Table 2.5. A brief summary of the climatic projections by the available papers accounting for fossil fuels 
exhaustion. Values at peak and in 2100 are provided for atmospheric CO2 concentration and temperature 
rise referred to 2000. 
 
Figure 2.6. A selection of the temperature projections from available papers accounting for fossil fuels 
depletion. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Energy projections and emissions 
scenarios accounting for fossil fuels 
depletion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Overview 
 
Original climate projections reckoning with fossil fuels depletions are 
going to be developed in the next chapters. To this purpose, the present 
projections of global fossil energy availability and use throughout the end of 
the 22nd century are introduced here. 
The nine energy scenarios developed in this chapter are split into two 
main families: the first group stems from assessments of the world fossil 
energy availability performed by independent researchers, while the second one 
originates from evaluations carried out by energy corporations and 
governmental agencies. In both groups world energy production from fossil 
fuels is expected to reach its maximum nearly between 2015 and 2030. 
The emissions scenarios of CO2 resulting from the projections of fossil 
energy use, CO2 from land-use changes, other greenhouse gases and SO2 
aerosols are derived and discussed together with the underlying assumptions. 
Because originating from the world fossil energy availability, global fossil 
CO2 emissions are predicted to peak about amid 2015 and 2030 as well. 
Cumulative fossil CO2 emissions for the 21st century are expected to range 
from about 450 and 810 Gt C. 
CO2 emissions from land-use changes are projected to decrease by 5% 
every 5 years. 
Emissions of other greenhouse gases and SO2 aerosols from natural 
sources are expected to remain constant in the future; anthropogenic 
emissions, on the contrary, are assumed to be proportional to fossil CO2 
emissions, because indirectly related to human activities. 
 
Some topics introduced in the present chapter are also contained in the papers by Chiari 
and Zecca (to be published) and Zecca and Chiari (to be published a).  
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In the following, a new set of climatic projections accounting for the exhaustion of fossil 
fuels is developed. In this chapter an original assessment of emissions scenarios for the most 
important anthropogenic GHGs and SO2 aerosols is introduced and discussed. Chapter 4 gives a 
short description of the carbon cycle model and climate models used for the present projections. 
The resultant projections of atmospheric GHG concentrations, global temperature change and 
sea level rise will be reported in chapter 5. Results are given for the 21st and 22nd century, 
however we are aware of the fact that projections loose their reliability when proceeding away 
from present: we are using here the 2200 horizon only because we would like to have an idea of 
the timing when global-mean temperature will start decreasing. 
The scenarios for anthropogenic fossil CO2 emissions employed here derive from two 
distinct groups, assessing the reserves of fossil fuels still left onto the Earth. The first group 
consists of independent researchers (denoted as “IR group” hereafter), developing the most 
recent projections of future global energy availability from fossil fuels. The second one includes 
energy corporations and governmental agencies (called “ECGA group” from now on) and 
restricts itself to the appraisal of the amount of conventional fossil fuels reserves. 
 
3.1 Energy projections 
 
3.1.1 Independent Researchers (IR) 
 
The five projections by the IR group of the world energy availability from all kind of 
sources, both fossil and renewable, are shown in figure 3.1a-e: 
a) Conservative scenario by Clugston (2007); 
b) Optimistic scenario by Clugston (2007); 
c) WEAP model by Chefurka (2007); 
d) 2008 Olduvai assessment by de Sousa and Mearns (2008); 
e) ERC model by Nel and Cooper (2009). 
All these energy projections assume an economic development driven by a full exploitation 
of all remaining fossil reserves. No future policy intervention aiming at reducing emissions of 
optically active gases is included. 
Please note that the present assessment includes also the energy profiles by de Sousa and 
Mearns (2008) and Nel and Cooper (2009), even if these papers already provide their own 
climatic projections starting from their respective emission scenarios. However, firstly, the 
assessment of non-CO2 GHG emissions is different here relative to the one carried out in the 
original papers; for instance, in the paper by de Sousa and Mearns (2008) the non-energy related 
emissions of the 2008 Olduvai assessment are based on MAGICC WRE stabilization profiles 
(see IPCC, 2001). Secondly, as already stated above and as found by Zecca and Chiari (2010; to 
be published a; in press), the ERC model by Nel and Cooper (2009) employs a wrong carbon 
cycle model, an extremely low value of the climate sensitivity and a too simplistic calculation of 
the temperature change, albeit their evaluation of fossil reserves and their appraisal of future 
world energy supply is correct, accurate and very extensive. 
Figure 3.1a and 3.1b show the projections of global energy availability by Clugston (2007) 
according to the Conservative (a) and Optimistic (b) scenario, respectively. Please note that the 
denomination of these scenarios as “Conservative” or “Optimistic” may be ambiguous: the two 
terms here refer to the energy availability only and not to the magnitude of GHG emissions. This 
assessment includes energy production from the following sources: conventional oil and 
condensates, coal, natural gas, oil sands, heavy oil, coal to liquids and gas to liquids as carbon 
emitting sources, and nuclear, traditional biomass, hydropower, biofuels, solar, geothermal, wind 
and waves and tides as carbon free energy resources. 
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Figure 3.1a-e. The profiles of the five projections of energy availability through the 22nd century both 
from fossil sources and renewables. (a) Conservative Scenario (Clugston, 2007), (b) Optimistic Scenario 
(Clugston, 2007), (c) WEAP model (Chefurka, 2007), (d) 2008 Olduvai assessment (de Sousa and Mearns, 
2008) and (e) ERC model (Nel and Cooper, 2009). 
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In the Conservative Scenario the total energy production peaks at about 99 Bboe (billion barrels 
of oil equivalent) in 2025 (74 Bboe in 2015 from fossil fuels only). The Optimistic Scenario, 
instead, predicts a peak of the entire energy availability by 2030 with a higher value of 123 Bboe, 
while all fossil fuels reach a maximum at 92 Bboe in the same year. 
The WEAP model (Chefurka, 2007) stops in 2100 (figure 3.1c), opposite to all other 
assessments considered here, proceeding up to the end of next century. In this case, the following 
energy sources are considered: oil, natural gas, coal, nuclear, hydro and renewables. The entire 
global energy use peaks in 2018 at 81 Bboe and two years before with 70 Bboe for fossil fuels 
only. 
The 2008 Olduvai assessment (de Sousa and Mearns, 2008) of world energy, other than 
conventional fossil fuels (oil, coal and natural gas), includes also alternative energy sources like 
nuclear, unconventional coal, wind and solar. We note that figure 3.1d shows the fossil fuel 2008 
Olduvai assessment only up to the end of the current century, even if the corresponding 
emissions scenario goes up to 2200 (see figure 3.4a). The fossil energy production is predicted to 
peak in 2018 at 77 Bboe. 
Finally, the ERC model (Nel and Cooper, 2009) incorporates oil, gas, coal, nuclear and 
renewable energy in its projection of world energy supply (figure 3.1e). Here a peak in total 
primary energy occurs around 2030 at 92 Bboe, while the contribution of fossil fuels only reaches 
a maximum in 2025 at 80 Bboe. Note that also figure 3.1e stops in 2100, although carbon 
emissions from this model are given until the end of the following century in figure 3.4a. 
 
3.1.2 Energy Corporations and Governmental Agencies (ECGA) 
 
Among the ECGA group, the following institutions are considered here: 
a) USGS (2000); 
b) EIA (2005-2009); 
c) BP (2009). 
The above organizations periodically produce new and updated estimates of world energy 
reserves and resources of conventional fossil fuels. The year indicated in brackets after the 
organization’s name corresponds to the year of review. The most up-to-date estimates of 
Ultimate Recoverable Reserves (URR) of the Earth’s fossil fuels provided by the ECGA group 
are shown in figure 3.2a. We remind that URR include both past total consumption of fossil fuels 
and proved reserves for the future. Consumption through 2008 can be inferred from the 
historical dataset of annual fossil CO2 emissions (Boden et al., 2009), by calculating 1750-2008 
total cumulative emissions from each fossil fuel. It turns out that about 1060 billion barrels 
(Bbbl) of oil, nearly 540 billion barrels of oil equivalent (Bboe) of natural gas and almost 1080 
Bboe of coal have already been exploited so far. The whole picture in figure 3.2a reveals, first, 
that coal is the most abundant fossil resource, followed by oil and natural gas, respectively. 
Second, despite the difference between the assessments of proved reserves, oil production has 
almost get through half of total reserves, while natural gas is exhausted by about one third. Being 
much more plentiful than all other resources, coal seem to be depleted by only one fourth of its 
reserves as yet. Proved reserves estimated by USGS (2000) are typically higher than what both 
EIA (2005-2009) and BP (2009) declare, which, instead, is of about the same magnitude. 
It is also interesting to assess the full amount of fossil fuels available on Earth in terms of 
their carbon content and thus of potential total CO2 emissions to the atmosphere (figure 3.2b). 
Figure 3.2b shows total CO2 emissions from Ultimate Recoverable Reserves of conventional 
fossil fuels. Note that total CO2 emissions are not proportional to total URR, as each fossil fuel 
has a different carbon emission factor per unit energy (see §3.2.1). Shown are the historical 
cumulative emissions to 2008, together with potential future emissions from estimated reserves. 
Past emissions through 2008 from all fossil fuels amount to a total of 335 Gt C. Potential total 
future emissions from all proved reserves are expected to be as high as 738 Gt C according to 
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EIA (2005-2009) and BP (2009), while USGS (2000) estimates a larger amount of 977 Gt C. 
Assuming an increase of 1 ppm in the atmospheric CO2 concentration per 2.12 Gt C emitted into 
the atmosphere (Kharecha and Hansen, 2008), emissions from all proved reserves might thus 
virtually enhance CO2 concentration by additional 348 to 461 ppm, if natural carbon sinks were 
not to absorb more than half of each year’s CO2 emissions (Le Quéré et al., 2009). Hence, if 
humanity decides to exploit all reserves available on the planet in the future, total CO2 emissions 
from fossil fuels seem to be large enough to cause considerable climate change at least in 
principle. 
 
  
Figure 3.2. (a) Ultimate Recoverable Reserves of conventional fossil fuels in billion barrels of oil 
equivalent (Bboe). Consumption through 2008 (black bars) and proved reserves estimated by energy 
corporations and governmental agencies (coloured bars) are shown. (b) Total CO2 emissions from 
Ultimate Recoverable Reserves of conventional fossil fuels. Again, historical cumulative emissions to 2008 
(black bars) are given together with potential future emissions from estimated reserves (coloured bars). 
 
We must stress, however, that that current estimates of fossil fuel proven reserves are largely 
uncertain (see the scatter between the different assessments in figure 3.2a), probably owing to the 
low reliability of the geological information about the available reserves. Furthermore, this picture 
does not include additional occurrences of conventional fossil fuel resources and unconventional 
sources, that might become reserves available for exploitation in the future, should new mining 
technologies be implemented and /or once their extraction should turn out to be economically 
convenient and with a sufficient energetic return. None knows if and when these resources will 
ever become available for use in the future, but if they will, the presently projected CO2 emissions 
would be enhanced by extra-emissions from these sources. 
The mere knowledge of the reserves is not enough to develop an energy profile, that is a 
projection of global energy production from fossil fuels as a function of time. A model 
illustrating the time dependence of energy availability stemming from some 
economic/physical/technological assumptions is also required. 
Here, we make use of Hubbert’s peak theory (see the Introduction), since our aim is at 
evaluating possible constraints of fossil fuels depletion on climatic projections. A comprehensive 
description of Hubbert’s linearization technique and logistic analysis (Hubbert, 1982) can be 
found in Appendix A. However, this procedure is not applied here to the historical data of fossil 
fuels consumption. Given that our goal is to develop fossil CO2 emissions scenarios, Hubbert’s 
theory is directly applied to the historical dataset of global CO2 emissions for each fossil fuel type 
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shown in figure 1.6 (Boden et al., 2009). Fossil fuels consumption and resulting CO2 emissions 
are, in fact, simply connected by a carbon emission factor (i. e. the mass of carbon emitted per 
unit energy of fossil fuel burnt), which changes according to the nature of fossil fuel. Carbon 
emission factors for many different substances can be easily found in the literature: see, for 
instance, EPA (2004) and EIA (2008) for an exhaustive review of these factors for fossil fuels. 
For ease, Hubbert’s fits with simply one bell (that is one logistic derivative) are considered: it 
means that production of each fossil fuel reaches a peak only once (just one absolute maximum) 
and then turns down. The results of Hubbert’s model applied to the historical fossil CO2 
emissions datasets are shown in figure 3.3a. Consumption of oil, natural gas and coal is predicted 
to peak in 2008, 2013 and 2070, respectively, while total consumption is expected to reach its 
maximum in 2017. According to the logistic analysis, the URR amounts at about the equivalent 
of 246 Gt of carbon emissions (corresponding to nearly 2117 Bbbl) for oil, 103 Gt C (1224 
Bboe) for natural gas and 804 Gt C (5193 Bboe) for coal, with total fossil fuels URR of 1153 Gt 
C (8534 Bboe). 
 
 
  
  
Figure 3.3. The logistic derivatives obtained with the Hubbert’s linearization technique and logistic 
analysis of the historical CO2 emissions from fossil fuels (a). The same as in (a) is shown also in (b-d), but 
with URR values by USGS (2000) (b), EIA (2005-2009) (c) and BP (2009) (d). 
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If substituting the URR of each fossil fuel in the above logistic analysis with URR and 
proved reserves values (converted to correlated carbon emission values through corresponding 
carbon emission factors) reviewed by energy corporations and governmental agencies (figure 3.2), 
three new energy profiles compatible with fossil fuels depletion are obtained (see figure 3.3b-d). 
By using the URR estimated by USGS (2000), production of oil, gas and coal reaches a maximum 
in 2018, 2028 and 2065, respectively, and total production is predicted to peak in 2026 (figure 
3.3b). With the proved reserves evaluated by EIA (2005-2009), instead, oil, gas and coal 
consumption peaks in 2012, 2019 and 2059, respectively, with total consumption expected to 
peak in 2019 (figure 3.3c). By making use of the proved reserves according to BP (2009), fossil 
fuels total production reaches a maximum in 2019, with oil peaking in 2011, gas in 2019 and coal 
in 2060 (figure 3.3d). 
As expected from the comparison of the reserves given in figure 3.2 and as confirmed by 
figure 3.3, future world fossil energy availability (both cumulative as well as annual values) turns 
out to be much higher according to the estimates by USGS (2000), rather than by EIA (2005-
2009) and BP (2009), which, instead, are quite close with each other. The existence of a 
suspicious congruence between the reserve estimates and the energy profiles of EIA (2005-2009) 
and BP (2009) is probably not be by chance, but may be perhaps due to the fact that they make 
reference to the same or very similar data sources for their assessments. The energy projection 
based on the plain logistic analysis is in between the one by USGS (2000) and the one by EIA 
(2005-2009) and BP (2009). 
 
3.2 Emissions scenarios 
 
In the next paragraphs the emissions scenarios of GHGs and SO2 aerosols are developed 
and discussed, that originate by the energy projections of the IR and ECGA group. Of course, 
only the fossil contributes to the projections, that is the GHG emitting parts, are considered for 
the present emissions scenarios, since the remaining parts are green energy sources and therefore 
do not emit GHGs. 
 
3.2.1 Fossil fuel CO2 
 
If not directly calculated by the authors of the IR papers themselves, CO2 emissions from 
fossil fuels consumption are estimated here by using the following values for carbon emission 
factors (EIA, 2008): 
• crude oil, oil sands and heavy oil: 3.15 kg C/boe; 
• natural gas: 2.28 kg C/boe; 
• coal and coal to liquids: 4.00 kg C/boe; 
• gas to liquids (LPG): 2.63 kg C/boe. 
Table 3.1 summarizes fossil CO2 emissions of all scenarios of both the IR and ECGA group: 
cumulative emissions for the 21st and 22nd century, as well as value and year in which emissions 
peak, are given. The corresponding fossil CO2 emission profiles for 2000-2200 are shown in 
figure 3.4a for the IR group and in figure 3.4b for the ECGA group. 
In the IR group, 2000-2100 cumulative fossil carbon emissions range from 449 Gt C in the 
lowest case (WEAP model) to 809 Gt C in the highest one (Optimistic Scenario), while for 2000-
2200 they span from 490 Gt C of the Conservative Scenario to 996 Gt C of the ERC model. 
Cumulative emissions in the ECGA group do not greatly differ with respect to the IR group: they 
vary from 601 Gt C to 793 Gt C for 2000-2100 and from 763 Gt C to 998 Gt C for 2000-2200, 
with EIA (2005-2009) and USGS (2000) supporting the lowest and highest emissions values, 
respectively. Also the cumulative emissions resulting from the logistic analysis are in agreement 
with both the IR and ECGA group. 
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The time range in which annual emissions are expected to peak is about 2016-2030, with 
both groups and the logistic analysis yielding quite similar year spans. 
 
 
Scenario 
Cumulative fossil CO2 emissions
(Gt C) 
Peak fossil CO2 emissions
2000-2100 2100-2200 2000-2200 year Gt C 
Independent researchers (IR) 
Conservative scenario 471 20 490 2025 9.0 
Optimistic scenario 809 155 961 2030 11.1 
WEAP model 449   2016 8.4 
2008 Olduvai assessment 608 32 639 2019 9.7 
ERC model 803 197 996 2027 10.0 
Energy corporations and governmental agencies (ECGA) 
Logistic analysis 608 236 840 2017 7.5 
USGS (2000) 793 209 998 2026 10.8 
EIA (2005-2009) 601 165 763 2019 8.2 
BP (2009) 605 173 774 2019 8.2 
Table 3.1. Summary of the fossil CO2 emissions scenarios for each energy scenario: cumulative values for 
three time spans, as well as value and year in which annual emissions reach the maximum are given. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4. Emissions scenarios of the IR group (a) and ECGA group (b) for anthropogenic CO2 from 
fossil fuels and land use change. 
 
 
Greater difference between the IR and ECGA group shows up when annual CO2 emissions 
values are compared. Yearly emissions, in fact, turn out to be typically lower at peak in the 
ECGA group, except for USGS (2000), while are much higher towards the high-end of the bell-
shaped profiles, especially according to the logistic analysis. The lowest/highest emission value at 
the maximum is predicted by the logistic analysis/Optimistic Scenario with 7.5 Gt C/11.1 Gt C. 
Finally, note that among the scenarios of the IR group, the WEAP model and the 
Conservative Scenario yield quite similar emissions profiles, as for the couple EIA (2005-2009) 
and BP (2009) in the ECGA group. 
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3.2.2 CO2 from land-use changes 
 
The scenario introduced here for CO2 emitted by land use changes (figure 3.4) employs the 
historical values for the emissions from 2000 to 2005 (Houghton, 2008). Emissions amount to 
about 1.4 Gt C and 1.5 Gt C in 2000 and 2005, respectively (Houghton, 2008). 
According to the IPCC AR4 (IPCC, 2007), emissions from land-use changes are expected to 
shrink in the future due to a slow-down in the deforestation rate and thanks to rising initiatives of 
reforestation or, at least, preservation of the existing forest heritage. Therefore, from 2005 on, 
emissions are supposed here to decrease with time by 5% every 5 years and linearly within each 
of the 5-years time span. Emissions reach 0.6 Gt C in 2100 and approach 0.2 Gt C at the upper 
end of the scenario. 
This land-use CO2 scenario is used for all the present projections, irrespective of the scenario 
group. 
 
3.2.3 Other greenhouse gases and SO2 aerosols 
 
The present scenarios for all non-CO2 GHGs and SO2 aerosols is summarized in table 3.2. 
The values for the emissions in the years 2000 and 2005 (where available) are given, together with 
a brief description of the magnitude of the sources and the assumptions underlying the scenario 
for future emissions. 
Emissions from natural sources are kept constant for all gases listed in table 3.2 throughout 
the entire time span of the scenario. This is based on a simplifying assumption that natural 
sources will remain constant in the future. For CH4 at least, there is evidence that this has not 
been the case in the past (Osborn and Wigley, 1994), and therefore might not be so in the future 
as well. Thus, we do not account here for future natural emissions changes. 
Recent work on methane hydrates (see e.g. Archer, 2007; Archer et al., 2008) definitely sets 
the question of a possible methane hydrates-climate feedback, but no clear answer is available 
about the strength of such a feedback. In the lack of such information, we keep constant the CH4 
natural contribution. There are hints of possible feedbacks involving the natural production of 
other optically active gases: N2O, NOx, VOCs, CO and SO2. In the absence of information about 
these feedbacks we do not account for future natural emissions changes and we assume a 
constant contribution (table 3.2). Nevertheless, we stress that any degree of positive feedback on 
the natural production of these gases would lead to an increase of the projected warming. 
All future anthropogenic emissions of non-CO2 GHGs and SO2 aerosols are assumed to be 
proportional to future CO2 emissions from fossil fuels. This is clearly a useful simplification. 
Nevertheless, the rationale for this assumption is based on the observation that all the emissions 
listed in table 3.2 are directly or indirectly bound to the fossil energy consumption and thus to 
fossil CO2 emissions. The assumption will break down if and when actions will be undertaken to 
reduce emissions. Such reductions will be probably selective: studies show that it could be useful 
to graduate timing and intensity of reductions for different gases (Hansen and Sato, 2004). The 
scenarios presented here do not account for unpredictable reduction decisions and therefore the 
proportionality assumption is the best available today. 
Please note that halocarbons have only anthropogenic sources, since they do not exist in 
nature, but have been produced in laboratory only in recent times. The emissions of 23 
halocarbons, other than the 7 ones listed in table 3.2, are accounted for in the present scenario as 
well, even if not present in table 3.2: CFC-11, CFC-12, CFC-13, CFC-113, CFC-114, CFC-115, 
CCl4,CHCl3, CH2Cl2, MCF (Methyl ChloroForm), Ha-1211, Ha-1301, HCFC-22, HCFC-123, 
CH3Br, HFC-141b, HFC-142b, Ha-2402, HFC-23, HFC-32, HFC-43-10, HFC-143a, HFC-245ca, 
C4F10. However, all these gases (CFCs, HCFCs, PFCs) have fixed future emissions, controlled by 
the Montreal Protocol. The concentrations and forcings for these gases are, indeed, hard wired 
into the code of the model used for the present projections (see chapter 4) (Wigley, 2008). 
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GHG/aerosol 
Units 
(yr-1) 
Past emissions 
Region 
Emissions scenario 
2000 2005 
Natural 
sources 
Anthropogenic 
sources 
CH4 Mt 315 a 349 a Global 
Constant 
275 b 
Proportional to 
fossil fuel CO2 
N2O Mt N 9.0 a 9.6 a Global 
Constant 
7.5 c 
NOx Mt N 38.5 d - Global 
Constant 
12.0 c 
VOCs Mt 186 d - Global Constant 1780 e 
CO Mt 1077 d - Global Constant ~5000 f 
SO2 Mt S 
75.2 d - Global Constant 28.7 g 
22.5 d - North America and Europe - 
40.5 d - Asia - 
12.2 d - Southern Hemisphere - 
CF4 kton 11.2 a 10.6 a Global 0 
C2F6 kton 2.5 a 2.0 a Global 0 
HFC-125 kton 5.2 a 19.0 a Global 0 
HFC-134a kton 84.6 a 135.2 a Global 0 
HFC-143a kton 9.2 a 23.4 a Global 0 
HFC-227ea kton 2.0 a 4.9 a Global 0 
SF6 kton 5.2 a 5.7 a Global 0 
Table 3.2. Summary of the emissions scenarios of all non-CO2 GHGs and SO2 aerosols. Historical 
emission values in 2000 and 2005, the Earth’s region from which corresponding emissions originate and 
scenario of future emissions from both natural and anthropogenic sources are given. References of the 
data: a JRC/PBL (2009); b IPCC (2007), table 7.6; c IPCC (2007), table 7.7; d Olivier et al. (2005); e 
Guenther et al. (1995); f Weinstock and Niki (1972); g Haywood and Boucher (2000). 
 
 
The emissions profiles of the most important non-CO2 GHGs, namely CH4 and N2O (total 
emissions), together with those of SO2 aerosols (anthropogenic emissions only), are shown in 
figure 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7, respectively, for both IR (a) and ECGA (b) groups. As a consequence of 
the above assumptions, the profiles of total CH4 and N2O emissions (figure 3.5 and 3.6) 
asymptotically reach the natural emissions level towards the high end of the scenario, while the 
profile of anthropogenic SO2 emissions (figure 3.7) falls down towards zero. 
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Figure 3.5. Same as figure 3.4, but for total (natural and anthropogenic) CH4 emissions. 
 
  
Figure 3.6. Same as figure 3.4, but for total (natural and anthropogenic) N2O emissions. 
 
  
Figure 3.7. Same as figure 3.4, but for anthropogenic SO2 emissions only. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
The coupled gas-cycle/climate model 
MAGICC/SCENGEN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Overview 
 
The model used to obtain the present climatic projections is briefly 
presented here. We make use of MAGICC/SCENGEN, which is a coupled 
gas‐cycle/climate model (Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse-gas 
Induced Climate Change), that drives a spatial climate-change scenario 
generator (SCENGEN). 
MAGICC is a simple climate model tuned to 7 AOGCMs, producing 
simulations of future global-mean temperature change and sea level rise. The 
climate model is coupled interactively with a set of gas‐cycle models, that 
provide projections of the atmospheric concentration of the most significant 
greenhouse gases. The carbon cycle in MAGICC has been calibrated 
consistently with the outcomes of the 11 models of the Coupled Climate-
Carbon Cycle Model Intercomparison Project (C4MIP). 
SCENGEN employs a version of the pattern scaling method to produce 
annual, seasonal or monthly mean projections of the changes in the spatial 
distribution of surface temperature, precipitation and mean sea level pressure. 
SCENGEN outputs are consistent with the results of the 20 AOGCMs in the 
Coupled Model Intercomparison Project phase 3 (CMIP3) database. 
SCENGEN projections maps have a resolution of 2.5° by 2.5° 
latitude/longitude grid. 
MAGICC/SCENGEN has been used also for the climate projections 
described in the four Assessment Reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change since 1990. 
 
Additional information about using MAGICC/SCENGEN can be found in the papers 
by Chiari and Zecca (to be published) and Zecca and Chiari (to be published a).  
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The present climatic projections are carried out starting from emission scenarios detailed in 
the previous chapter taken as input and by making use of the version 5.3 of the model 
MAGICC/SCENGEN (Wigley, 2008). 
MAGICC/SCENGEN is a coupled gas‐cycle/climate model (Model for the Assessment of 
Greenhouse-gas Induced Climate Change), that drives a spatial climate-change scenario generator 
(SCENGEN). It was developed by the team of Prof. Tom M. L. Wigley at The National Center 
for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) and University Corporation for Atmospheric Research 
(UCAR) in Boulder, CO (USA) and has been used by the IPCC since 1990 to generate 
projections of future global‐average temperature change and sea level rise (Wigley, 2008). A brief 
description of how MAGICC/SCENGEN is configured follows in the next paragraphs and a 
summarizing flow chart is shown in figure 4.1. For further details about MAGICC/SCENGEN, 
please refer to the user manual (Wigley, 2008). 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Flow chart describing the structure of MAGICC/SCENGEN. 
 
4.1 MAGICC 
 
MAGICC is an upwelling‐diffusion, energy‐balance climate model, producing simulations of 
future global- and hemispheric-mean temperature change, together with outcomes for oceanic 
thermal expansion. The climate model is coupled interactively with a set of gas‐cycle models, that 
provide projections of the atmospheric concentration of the most important GHGs, namely 
CO2, CH4 and N2O (Wigley, 2008). 
The version 5.3 of MAGICC is able to emulate the IPCC AR4 2005 values (IPCC, 2007): 
radiative forcings, parameters in the carbon cycle model, methods for assessing sea level rise, CH4 
and N2O budgets and climate sensitivity are all consistent with the AR4 results (Wigley, 2008). 
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4.1.1 Carbon cycle models and carbon-cycle climate feedbacks 
 
The carbon cycle in MAGICC has been adjusted consistently with the outcomes of the 11 
models of the Coupled Climate-Carbon Cycle Model Intercomparison Project (C4MIP) 
(Friedlingstein et al., 2006). For a detailed description of the main characteristics of the 11 C4MIP 
models, please refer to the work by Friedlingstein et al. (2006) and to the IPCC AR4 (IPCC, 
2007, par. 7.3.5). These models differ mainly in the complexity of their components. However, 
under the main 6 families of the SRES scenarios, the projections of the carbon cycle model in 
MAGICC are extremely close to the results of the Bern model (Joos et al., 2001): in fact, the 
discrepancy amounts to less than 2% to 2100 (Wigley, 2008, p. 74). We remind that the Bern 
model is possibly the best carbon cycle model available in the literature up to now and was also 
used in the most recent IPCC AR4 (IPCC, 2007). 
Carbon cycle processes are sensitive to climate: their effect is to slow down CO2 uptake by 
natural carbon sinks as the world gets warmer, leaving therefore a higher CO2 airborne fraction in 
the atmosphere. The net result is an overall positive feedback. A coupling between global 
temperature increase and carbon cycle response has been introduced in MAGICC, in order to 
more correctly estimate atmospheric CO2 concentrations. Therefore, the effects of climate 
feedbacks on the carbon cycle are accounted for in the projections performed by MAGICC 
(Wigley, 2008). 
 
4.1.2 Climate models 
 
MAGICC was calibrated to generate projections of future climate change consistent with the 
results of seven AOGCMs run under all SRES scenarios (Wigley, 2008). The climate models 
available in MAGICC are seven AOGCMs, that were used in the IPCC AR3 (IPCC, 2001) (see 
table 4.1). The climate model output used for all present projections of atmospheric CO2 
concentration and global mean temperature change is simply the average of the outcomes of the 
seven AOGCMs. 
 
AOGCM Institution Country
GFDL Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory (GFDL)/National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) USA 
CSIRO Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) Australia
HadCM3 Hadley Centre for Climate Change/Met Office UK 
HadCM2 Hadley Centre for Climate Change/Met Office UK 
ECHAM4/OPYC Climate Research Centre Germany
PCM Climate and Global Dynamics Division (CGD)/National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) USA 
CSM Climate and Global Dynamics Division (CGD)/National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) USA 
Table 4.1. List of AOGCMs available in MAGICC version 5.3. 
 
4.1.3 Assessment of sea-level rise 
 
In MAGICC the method used for the evaluation of inputs to future changes in sea level 
from GSICs (Glaciers and Small Ice Caps) is based on the realistic, physical formulation given by 
Wigley and Raper (2005). This formulation produces GSIC melt that increases asymptotically 
towards the total available amount of GSIC ice, as warming continues. If the world becomes 
warm enough in the future, almost all of the GSIC ice might eventually melt in the simulations. 
The default total GSIC ice mass in MAGICC 5.3 is about the equivalent of a global sea level 
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change of 29 cm (Wigley, 2008). This is in accordance with IPCC AR4, giving a best-estimate of 
24 cm, but then scaling up GSIC melt projections by 20% to account for outlet glaciers in 
Greenland and Antarctica (IPCC, 2007, chapter 10). The uncertainty range on total GSIC ice 
mass is 18 to 44 cm (Wigley, 2008). 
MAGICC 5.3 ignores the contributions from (Wigley, 2008): 
1) Greenland and Antarctica still reacting to past climatic change; 
2) runoff from thawing of permafrost; 
3) deposition of sediment on the ocean floor. 
MAGICC sea level projections are very similar to those in IPCC AR4 (IPCC, 2007, chapter 
10): under the IPCC SRES scenarios, MAGICC projections for 2090-2099 relative to 1980-1999 
differ by less than 8% with respect to those in AR4 (Wigley, 2008). The results of the projections 
by MAGICC and by AR4 are so similar, due to a compensation between slightly higher thermal 
expansion and somewhat lower values for GSIC and Greenland contributions in MAGICC 
relative to AR4 models (Wigley, 2008). The discrepancies in these terms contributing to sea level 
change are, however, within their confidence bounds (Wigley, 2008). 
Finally, like the IPCC AR4, MAGICC does not include the potential effects of fast 
accelerating ice flow in Greenland and Antarctica (Wigley, 2008). According to the AR4 (IPCC, 
2007, p. 821), their contribution is expected to increase the upper estimate of AR4 projections to 
2100 by 9 to 17 cm. 
 
4.1.4 Model parameters 
 
The following changeable parameters in MAGICC has been set according to the description 
given below. 
The carbon cycle model option allows to change the 1980s-mean value of net land-use 
change CO2 emissions (Wigley, 2008). Here it is set on 1.1 Gt C per year (mid option) (Wigley, 
2008), that is IPCC AR2 (IPCC, 1995) best estimate. 
The carbon-cycle climate feedbacks are kept on in the present assessment, such that their 
effects are accounted for in the projections of the atmospheric GHG concentrations. We remind 
that the net effect is a positive feedback, so it leads to higher concentration values than would 
otherwise be obtained. 
The aerosol forcing here is set on the mid option. It means that the total net aerosol forcing 
is estimated to be about -1.1 W m-2 in 2005 (Wigley, 2008), concordant with IPCC AR4 (IPCC, 
2007) estimate. 
The equilibrium climate sensitivity, that is the equilibrium response of global-mean surface 
air temperature to a doubling of the atmospheric CO2 concentration, is set here on ΔT2x = 3.0 
°C, or ,alternatively, λ = 0.81 °C/(W/m2), in agreement with the most likely estimate by IPCC 
AR4 (IPCC, 2007). 
The thermohaline circulation (THC) is an important driver of temperature variations. 
According to the results of many climate models (IPCC, 2007, par. 10.3.4), the thermohaline 
circulation is predicted to moderately slow-down in the future as global mean temperature gets 
higher. Therefore it is kept variable here; this corresponds to a sensible slow-down of the THC, 
at a rate equal to the average of THC change results for the seven AOGCMs, that were used to 
calibrate MAGICC (Wigley, 2008). 
Another important parameter that rules temperature gradients in the ocean is the vertical 
diffusivity, which parameterizes the speed of heat transfer from the surface to the deep ocean, by 
water mixing originating from convection processes. Here it is set on KZ = 2.3 cm2/s, that is the 
default case, corresponding again to the mean value for the effective diffusivity of the seven 
AOGCMs used to calibrate MAGICC (Wigley, 2008). 
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4.2 SCENGEN 
 
Global-mean temperature outputs from MAGICC are used to drive SCENGEN. 
SCENGEN employs a version of the pattern scaling method described by Santer et al. (1990) to 
produce projections of changes in the spatial distribution of the following climate-related 
variables: mean temperature, precipitation and mean sea level pressure. Projections in 
SCENGEN can be generated for annual mean values, seasonal averages or even monthly means. 
The pattern scaling method is based on the separation of the global-mean and spatial-pattern 
components of future climate change, and the further separation of the latter into GHG and 
aerosol components. Spatial patterns in the database of climatic data are “normalized” and 
expressed as changes of the climatic variable per unit change in global-mean temperature. These 
normalized GHG and aerosol components are appropriately weighted, added, and scaled up to 
the global-average temperature defined by MAGICC for a given year, emissions scenario and set 
of climate model parameters (Wigley, 2008). 
The present projections have all been obtained by linearly scaling up the spatial-patterns 
components of future climatic changes to the global-mean temperature. 
The spatial patterns of change in SCENGEN originate from the database of 
atmosphere/ocean general circulation model (AOGCM) results archived by the World Climate 
Research Programme's (WCRP's) Coupled Model Intercomparison Project phase 3 (CMIP3) 
(Meehl et al., 2007; CMIP3) and by the IPCC AR4 (IPCC, 2007). 
 
4.2.1 Climate models 
 
Projections of the spatial patterns of change of a climatic variable can be obtained from a 
number of different AOGCMs through the SCENGEN scaling component. The AOGCM 
database of SCENGEN 5.3 consists of model results generated for the IPCC AR4 (IPCC, 2007) 
(state-of-the-art as of June 2007). The AR4 models have high native spatial resolution: most have 
resolution that is finer than 2.5° by 2.5°. For the latest CMIP3 models, most have also resolution 
that is finer than 2.5° by 2.5°. The exceptions are ECHO-G, GISS-EH, GISS-ER and INM-
CM3.0. Nevertheless, in SCENGEN 5.3 all model results have been re-gridded to a common 
2.5° by 2.5° latitude/longitude grid (compared with 5° by 5° in version 4.1), without loss of 
information (Wigley, 2008). 
There are 24 models in the CMIP3 database (CMIP3), but only 20 have the full set of data 
required for use in SCENGEN. The 20 models are listed in Table 4.2. 
The present projections have all been generated with SCENGEN by averaging the outcomes 
of the 20 models listed in table 4.2 over the entire globe and over yearly values. 
SCENGEN makes use of sets of observed data (at 2.5° by 2.5° resolution), for instance, to 
have values for reference years and periods. Temperature data come from the European Centre 
for Medium-range Weather Forecasting‘s (ECMWF) reanalysis dataset, ERA40 (Uppala et al., 
2005; ERA40). For precipitation, the CMAP dataset (Xie and Arkin, 1996) is employed at a 
resolution of 2.5° by 2.5°. For mean sea level pressure (MSLP) data, again the ERA40 reanalysis 
is used. 
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AOGCM 
(CMIP3 I.D.) Institution Country 
BCCR-BCM2.0 Bjerknes Centre for Climate Research Norway 
CCSM3 National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) USA 
CGCM3.1(T47) Canadian Centre for Climate Modelling and Analysis Canada 
CNRM-CM3 Météo-France/Centre National de Recherches Météorologiques France 
CSIRO-Mk3.0 CSIRO Atmospheric Research Australia 
ECHAM5/MPI-OM Max Planck Institute for Meteorology Germany 
ECHO-G 
Meteorological Institute of the University of Bonn, 
Meteorological Research Institute of KMA, and Model and 
Data group. 
Germany/Korea
FGOALS-g1.0 LASG/Institute of Atmospheric Physics China 
GFDL-CM2.0 Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory (GFDL)/National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) USA 
GFDL-CM2.1 Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory (GFDL)/National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) USA 
GISS-EH Goddard Institute for Space Studies (GISS)/National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) USA 
GISS-ER Goddard Institute for Space Studies (GISS)/National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) USA 
INM-CM3.0 Institute for Numerical Mathematics Russia 
IPSL-CM4 Institut Pierre Simon Laplace France 
MIROC3.2(hires) 
Center for Climate System Research (The University of 
Tokyo), National Institute for Environmental Studies, and 
Frontier Research Center for Global Change (JAMSTEC) 
Japan 
MIROC3.2(medres) 
Center for Climate System Research (The University of 
Tokyo), National Institute for Environmental Studies, and 
Frontier Research Center for Global Change (JAMSTEC) 
Japan 
MRI-CGCM2.3.2 Meteorological Research Institute Japan 
PCM National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) USA 
UKMO-HadCM3 Hadley Centre for Climate Prediction and Research/Met Office UK 
UKMO-HadGEM1 Hadley Centre for Climate Prediction and Research/Met Office UK 
Table 4.2. List of AOGCMs used in SCENGEN version 5.3 (Wigley, 2008; CMIP3). 
 
 
4.2.2 Model parameters 
 
Aerosol effects have always been accounted for in the present projections run with 
SCENGEN, with the exception of MSLP. For the SCENGEN scaling components of MSLP, in 
fact, the aerosol response patterns are not available, so projected MSLP changes are just the 
GHG responses scaled up to the actual (i.e. determined by GHGs and aerosols as well) global-
mean temperature (Wigley, 2008). 
The map in figure 4.2 shows the three regions used for the partitioning of SO2 aerosol 
emissions in the scenarios (table 3.2). Emissions from ocean and air transport are divided equally 
over the three regions (Wigley, 2008). 
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Figure 4.2. The three regions used for the breakdown of SO2 emissions (Wigley, 2008). 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Climatic projections accounting for fossil 
fuels exhaustion 
 
Overview 
 
Here we show the results of the present projections of future climate 
change reckoning on fossil fuels exhaustion. Projections are provided for the 
following climatic parameters: atmospheric concentration of the major 
greenhouse gases (CO2, CH4, N2O), main radiative forcing components and 
total net anthropogenic radiative forcing, global-mean atmospheric surface 
temperature and spatial patterns of temperature change, sea level rise, 
precipitation, mean sea level pressure. 
Atmospheric CO2 concentration is predicted to reach levels nearly 
between 460 and 520 ppm at its maximum, which is typically going to occur at 
the end of this century. 
Global-mean temperature change is projected to be as large as +1.4 °C to 
+3.1 °C by the turn of the century relative to pre-industrial times. Dangerous 
climate change might already be experienced within the first half of the 21st 
century. The probability of exceeding the +2 °C threshold spans from 55% to 
90% across the scenarios. 
The magnitude of temperature increase is expected to be larger over 
continents and exceptionally high at the mid-high latitudes of the Northern 
Hemisphere. The expected global range of temperature change by 2100 is from 
-0.7 °C to + 4.6 °C with respect to 1990. 
MAGICC outcomes for the oceanic thermal expansion component of sea 
level rise at the end of this century span nearly from +10 to +50 cm relative to 
2000 level. An alternative assessment of future sea level change based on a 
semi-empirical model, that includes the contribution from melting water of ice 
sheets and caps over continents shows that full climate-related sea level 
response by 2100 might be as high as +70 to +110 cm above the 2000 level. 
This result clearly indicate that sea level rise will be among the most impacting 
future effects of global warming. 
The present projections support the key conclusion that fossil fuels 
depletion alone will likely not prevent dangerous climate change. Deliberate 
mitigation actions aiming at reducing emissions cannot be avoided, if we wish 
to stay below the +2 °C limit. 
 
Some of the subjects introduced in this chapter can be also found in the papers by Chiari 
and Zecca (to be published) and Zecca and Chiari (to be published a).  
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In the present chapter the results of the current projections of future climate change, taking 
into account the ongoing depletion of fossil fuels, are introduced and discussed. These 
projections originate from the emission scenarios developed in chapter 3 and are generated by 
the model MAGICC/SCENGEN, described in chapter 4. 
 
5.1 Atmospheric concentration of the main greenhouse 
gases 
 
5.1.1 Atmospheric CO2 concentration 
 
The present projections of atmospheric CO2 concentration, obtained as output by MAGICC 
are summarized in table 5.1 for each emissions scenario and shown in figure 5.1 for both IR (a) 
and ECGA (b) scenario groups. Table 5.1 gives the CO2 concentration in 2100 and 2200, as well 
as at peak. Mean values are provided together with their corresponding uncertainty range. 
 
 
Scenario 
CO2 concentration (ppm) 
2100 2200 Peak 
Mean Range Mean Range Mean Range Year
Independent Researchers (IR) 
Conservative scenario 431 412-455 381 369-400 451 435-471 2056
Optimistic scenario 531 499-566 480 451-518 531 501-566 2094
WEAP model 426 408-449   449 433-468 2056
2008 Olduvai assessment 470 446-499 408 391-432 477 456-503 2075
ERC model 528 497-563 487 456-526 529 497-566 2110
Ensemble mean (except WEAP model) 490 463-521 439 417-469 492 468-521 2085
Energy Corporations and Governmental Agencies (ECGA) 
Logistic analysis 479 455-506 464 438-497 484 458-515 2130
USGS (2000) 523 492-558 489 458-528 524 492-561 2106
EIA (2005-2009) 473 449-501 442 420-472 473 450-501 2102
BP (2009) 474 451-502 445 422-475 474 451-503 2105
Ensemble mean 487 462-517 460 435-493 488 462-520 2111
Table 5.1. Summary of the present projections of atmospheric CO2 concentration derived by the 
emissions scenarios of the IR and ECGA group: mean values and confidence ranges in 2100, 2200 and at 
the year of peak are given. Average values for the respective ensembles are also specified in the last row of 
each group. 
 
 
Confidence bounds for CO2 concentration in MAGICC derive exclusively from 
uncertainties in ocean uptake and CO2 fertilization (Wigley, 2008). Confidence levels do not 
account for uncertainties in modelling the climate feedbacks on the carbon cycle, nor for the 
effects of climate sensitivity uncertainties on the magnitude of these climate feedbacks (Wigley, 
2008). The uncertainty range that MAGICC gives matches the 90th percentile of the range of the 
ten C4MIP model results under the SRES A2 scenario (Wigley, 2008). 
Mean values and average profiles are also computed for the two projection ensembles (table 
5.1, figure 5.1). The average of the IR ensemble does not include the WEAP model. The reason 
is that this projection stops already at the end of the 21st century and turns out to be almost 
indistinguishable from the one of the Conservative Scenario in their overlapping time interval. 
The uncertainty range for the ensemble mean is shown in figure 5.1: it is estimated as the average 
of each ensemble scenario’s confidence bound. 
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Figure 5.1. Projections of atmospheric CO2 concentration derived from the emissions scenarios of the IR 
(a) and ECGA (b) groups. An average profile for each ensemble (in the IR group the WEAP model is 
excluded) is also given, together with its confidence range. 
 
As expected from the CO2 emission scenarios described in paragraph 3.2.1, the present 
projections all show an increase of CO2 concentration, reach a maximum and then turn down 
within the two centuries of simulation. 
Ensemble mean projections of CO2 concentration in the IR and ECGA group turn out to be 
very close to each other. Ensemble mean values predicted for 2100 and at the peak of 
concentration increase are around 490 ppm and differ by a few ppm from one group to the 
other. By the end of the 22nd century the discrepancy is somewhat higher, with an ensemble 
average of 439 ppm and 460 ppm for the IR and ECGA group, respectively, though still within 
the respective confidence bounds. This small disagreement can be easily explained, given that the 
emissions scenarios of the ECGA group typically decrease much slowly towards the high-end of 
the bell-shaped profiles compared to the IR group (see figure 3.4). The timing of CO2 peak is also 
slightly different: in the IR group it occurs around 2085, nearly a quarter of century earlier than in 
the ECGA group (2111). 
CO2 projections by the WEAP model and the Conservative Scenario in the IR group are 
very close to each other up to 2100. CO2 concentration among the IR scenarios ranges from 426 
ppm of the WEAP model to 531 ppm of the Optimistic Scenario in 2100 and from 381 ppm 
(Conservative Scenario) to 487 ppm (ERC model) by the end of next century. The concentration 
peak spans between 449 ppm (WEAP model) and 531 ppm (Optimistic Scenario) and is generally 
located within the second half of the 21st century in all scenarios, with the exception of the ERC 
model (in 2110). 
Within the ECGA group, the CO2 concentration profiles of EIA (2005-2009) and BP (2009) 
strikingly overlap through the whole projection range, while the USGS (2000) profile is 
noticeably higher than all other projections. Besides, CO2 ranges are narrower here relative to the 
IR group. The CO2 predicted at the end of this century is around 473-479 ppm, except for USGS 
(2000) with 523 ppm. At the top of concentration rise, that is near the turn of the century, the 
discrepancy between the scenarios becomes somewhat larger, with USGS (2000) peaking at 524 
ppm and the logistic analysis reaching its maximum just in 2130. Finally, in 2200 CO2 
concentration spans between 442 ppm and 489 ppm. 
It has to be clear that projections by existing models are still affected by large uncertainties, 
owing to the current poor knowledge of the carbon cycle and consequently of the limited 
reproductive capacity of the carbon cycle models. Moreover, there are reasons to believe that the 
present projections should be not regarded as average values, but rather as lower bounds to the 
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changes that will effectively happen in the future. Firstly, because of the carbon cycle-climate 
positive feedback: the CO2-induced warming affects the natural carbon sinks, by further 
enhancing the CO2 concentration in the atmosphere and thus causing additional warming 
(Friedlingstein et al., 2006). Although MAGICC accounts for the effects of climate feedbacks on 
the carbon cycle (see §4.1.1), there are still large uncertainties in the knowledge and in the way the 
carbon cycle and the temperature response to changing CO2 concentrations are modelled. 
Secondly, there is a lack of reliability about the current geological information on fossil fuels, 
which makes existing estimates of fossil fuel proven reserves largely uncertain (see figure 3.2). 
Moreover, none knows if and how much unconventional resources and additional occurrences 
might be exploited in the future. So, should additional CO2 be emitted in the future other than 
the one planned by the present scenarios, these would only enhance the carbon content in the 
atmosphere and hence increase the projected CO2 concentration with respect to the present 
values. The reader can refer to the Conclusions for further information about positive feedbacks 
acting on the climate system and about additional CO2 emissions from newly discovered reserves 
of conventional fossil fuel and from unconventional sources. 
By comparing the CO2 concentration projections of table 5.1 and table 2.1, it is clear that the 
present predicted values for 2100 are on average lower than the ones based on the SRES 
scenarios, due to highly different 2000-2100 cumulative fossil CO2 emissions (especially 
compared to the SRES BAU A1B, A2 and A1FI scenarios), that reflect the discrepancy in the 
underlying estimates of fossil fuels reserves left for the rest of this and the next century. On the 
contrary, the present CO2 projections turn out to be in fair agreement, at least for this century, 
with previous assessment of future climate change reckoning on fossil fuels exhaustion (table 
2.5). 
 
5.1.2 Atmospheric CH4 concentration 
 
MAGICC projections of atmospheric CH4 concentration for all present scenarios are 
reviewed in table 5.2 and shown in figure 5.2. Table 5.2 gives mean values and uncertainty ranges 
of the concentration at the end of the 21st and 22nd century and at peak, while figure 5.2 shows 
the concentration profiles to 2200. Projections for each scenario of the IR (a) and ECGA (b) 
groups are provided, together with their respective ensemble means (again with the exception of 
the WEAP model for the IR group). 
 
Scenario 
CH4 concentration (ppb) 
2100 2200 Peak 
Mean Range Mean Range Mean Range Year
Independent Researchers (IR) 
Conservative scenario 767 655-886 617 506-739 2173 2119-2227 2027
Optimistic scenario 1399 1354-1449 702 590-823 2620 2474-2773 2043
WEAP model 728 615-848   2124 2077-2171 2027
2008 Olduvai assessment 1004 906-1104 611 500-733 2279 2205-2355 2029
ERC model 1453 1408-1501 699 586-820 2236 2166-2308 2039
Ensemble mean (except WEAP model) 1156 1081-1235 657 545-779 2290 2212-2368 2032
Energy Corporations and Governmental Agencies (ECGA) 
Logistic analysis 1438 13811494 790 679-908 2009 1983-2035 2028
USGS (2000) 1356 1297-1418 740 627-860 2376 2281-2474 2037
EIA (2005-2009) 1237 1158-1316 721 608-841 2082 2043-2121 2030
BP (2009) 1259 1183-1336 728 615-848 2082 2043-2121 2030
Ensemble mean 1322 1255-1391 745 632-864 2128 2080-2177 2032
Table 5.2. MAGICC outputs for future atmospheric CH4 concentration from the emissions scenarios of 
the IR and ECGA group: mean values and uncertainty ranges in 2100, 2200 and at maximum are given. 
Average values for the two ensembles are also specified in the last row of each group. 
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Figure 5.2. Profiles of future atmospheric CH4 concentration obtained from the emissions scenarios of the 
IR (a) and ECGA (b) groups. The ensemble mean for each group (except the WEAP model for the IR 
group) is also shown, together with its confidence bound. 
 
Also for CH4, confidence bounds estimated by MAGICC originate solely from uncertainties 
in modelling the carbon cycle and are not related to uncertainties of the carbon-cycle climate 
feedbacks, nor of the climate sensitivity (Wigley, 2008). The uncertainty range for the ensemble 
mean is again estimated as the mean of each scenario’s confidence bound. 
Even in this case, as expected, CH4 concentration increases up to a maximum and then starts 
to decline in all scenarios. This is because for all present scenarios we have assumed that 
anthropogenic CH4 emissions are proportional to fossil fuel CO2 emissions (see paragraph 3.2.3). 
Since CH4 has a much shorter atmospheric mean lifetime, about 12 years, compared to CO2, 
having three lifetimes of about 173, 19 and 1 years (IPCC, 2007), the concentration peak for CH4 
occurs quite earlier than for CO2, typically a decade or so after fossil CO2 emissions peak (that is 
around 2032, see table 5.2). Towards the high-end of the projections, CH4 concentrations reach 
even the pre-industrial level of around 700 ppb (IPCC, 2007), because at that point 
anthropogenic CH4 sources are almost depleted and thus total emissions stem in practice almost 
from natural sources only. 
CH4 concentrations differ substantially between the two groups, both at peak and toward the 
end of the projections. At the maximum of concentration, the ensemble mean of the IR group is 
higher with respect to the ECGA group, with 2290 ppb opposite to 2128 ppb, respectively. By 
the end of the first and second century of simulations, the situation reverses, with CH4 
concentration of the ECGA ensemble average being higher than in the IR group: 1322 ppb 
compared to 1156 ppb in 2100 and 745 ppb vs. 657 ppb in 2200, respectively. This means that 
CH4 concentration in the IR group turns back more rapidly towards the pre-industrial level. 
Finally, within the IR group, the CH4 concentration span between the different scenarios is 
significantly larger relative to the ECGA group. 
 
5.1.3 Atmospheric N2O concentration 
 
Results of MAGICC projections for atmospheric N2O concentration are given in table 5.3 
and shown in figure 5.3. Table 5.3 summarizes the concentration values in 2100, 2220 and at 
peak, together with ensemble mean values (except for the WEAP model in the IR ensemble). 
Figure 5.3 shows the 2000-2200 concentration profiles of each scenario of the IR (a) and ECGA 
(b) group, ensemble averages included. 
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Scenario 
N2O concentration (ppb) 
2100 2200 Peak 
Mean Mean Mean Year 
Independent Researchers (IR) 
Conservative scenario 319 248 356 2046 
Optimistic scenario 387 298 399 2071 
WEAP model 318  357 2047 
2008 Olduvai assessment 346 260 368 2057 
ERC model 374 296 379 2077 
Ensemble mean (except WEAP model) 356 276 373 2062 
Energy Corporations and Governmental Agencies (ECGA) 
Logistic analysis 360 304 362 2078 
USGS (2000) 373 300 383 2069 
EIA (2005-2009) 352 287 362 2062 
BP (2009) 353 289 363 2063 
Ensemble mean 359 295 367 2068 
Table 5.3. The present projections of atmospheric N2O concentration for the emissions scenarios of the 
IR and ECGA group: values in 2100, 2200 and at the year of maximum are given. The average for each 
ensemble is also provided in the last row of each group. 
 
 
Also here, N2O concentration rises up to a maximum and then turns down, because the 
emissions scenarios for N2O essentially follow fossil fuel CO2 emissions (see paragraph 3.2.3). 
However, N2O has a fairly long atmospheric mean lifetime, nearly 114 years (IPCC, 2007), so its 
concentration generally peaks in the ‘60s of this century, that is much later than CH4 and a bit 
earlier than CO2.  
The ensemble mean projections of the two groups are quite close to each other, except near 
the end of the simulations. The averages of the ensembles, in fact, differ by a few ppb both at the 
peak, with 373 ppb for the IR group and 367 ppb for the ECGA group, and in 2100, with 356 
ppb and 359 ppb, respectively. By the end of the second century, on the contrary, the IR mean is 
close to the pre-industrial level (around 270 ppb (IPCC, 2007)) with 276 ppb, while the ECGA 
group is still at 295 ppb. Again, N2O concentrations turn back to the pre-industrial level towards 
 
 
Figure 5.3. Projections of atmospheric N2O concentration through 2200, resulting from the emissions 
scenarios of the IR (a) and ECGA (b) groups. An ensemble mean profile for each group (in the IR group 
the WEAP model is excluded) is also shown. 
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the end of the projections, for the reason that anthropogenic N2O sources are more or less 
negligible at that time and thus total emissions originate from natural sources only. 
As for CH4, the N2O concentrations extent within the IR group is greater than in the ECGA 
group, ranging for instance between 318 ppb (WEAP model) and 387 ppb (Optimistic Scenario) 
by the end of this century.  
 
5.2 Radiative forcing 
 
5.2.1 Main radiative forcing components 
 
For the ultimate sake of projecting climate change in the present and next century starting 
from the emissions scenarios developed in chapter 3, MAGICC computes also the change in the 
radiative forcing of the factors affected by human activities and altering the thermal equilibrium 
of the climate system. Figure 5.4 and 5.5 show the change of the radiative forcing components as 
a function of time relative to the start of the industrial era (here assumed to be about 1765) for 
each emission scenario of the ECGA and IR group, respectively. For brevity, only the most 
important radiative forcing components are given in figure 5.4 and 5.5, namely CO2, CH4, N2O, 
halocarbons, tropospheric and stratospheric ozone, aerosol direct and indirect effect. 
 
  
  
Figure 5.4. The most important radiative forcing components liable to the projected climate change are 
shown for each emission scenario of the ECGA group: logistic analysis (a), USGS (2000) (b), EIA (2005-
2009) (c), BP (2009) (d). 
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Figure 5.5. The most important radiative forcing components responsible for climate change in the 21st 
and 22nd century are shown for each emission scenario of the IR group: Conservative scenario (a), 
Optimistic scenario (b), WEAP model (c), 2008 Olduvai assessment (d), ERC model (e). 
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The values obtained for the radiative forcing components in 2005 are fully consistent with 
the ones published in the IPCC 2007 AR4 (IPCC, 2007). It is clear that CO2 represents the most 
important factor among all components and obviously the magnitude of each component is 
related to its own atmospheric concentration, which, in turn, depends on the emissions. Because 
of the assumption of taking all anthropogenic emissions proportional to CO2, all radiative forcing 
values, regardless of the component type, are typically larger especially at peak for the high-case 
emission scenarios, e.g. the Optimistic Scenario and the ERC model in the IR group and the 
scenario by USGS (2000) in the ECGA group. 
 
5.2.2 Total net anthropogenic radiative forcing 
 
Results of projections for total net anthropogenic radiative forcing from the present 
scenarios are summarized in table 5.4 and shown in figure 5.6. Table 5.4 gives the mid-year values 
in 2100, 2200 and at peak, while figure 5.6 presents the time profiles. Provided are also ensemble 
means for the two groups (but the WEAP model is excluded from the calculation of the average). 
Total radiative forcing peaks approximately in the second half of the present century with 
ensemble mean values of the order of 3 W/m2. The IR group average is slightly higher at the 
maximum, while decreasing faster towards the end of the simulation time interval relative to the 
ECGA ensemble mean. Total radiative forcing is not expected to go back to nowadays level or 
below before the beginning of the 23rd century, at least for the ensemble means. This is mainly a 
consequence of the preponderance of the CO2 component in the total net sum and the very long 
lifetime of anthropogenic CO2 in the atmosphere. Only the Conservative Scenario seems to 
project a total net forcing by the end of the 22nd century, which is lower than today, although the 
CO2 forcing is still about 1.7 W/m2 by that time. 
 
 
Scenario 
Total net anthropogenic radiative forcing (W/m2)
2100 2200 Peak 
Mean Mean Mean Year 
Independent Researchers (IR) 
Conservative scenario 2.09 1.07 2.75 2044 
Optimistic scenario 3.58 2.51 3.76 2071 
WEAP model 2.04  2.73 2048 
2008 Olduvai assessment 2.72 1.49 3.03 2057 
ERC model 3.50 2.57 3.52 2088 
Ensemble mean (except WEAP model) 2.97 1.91 3.19 2064 
Energy Corporations and Governmental Agencies (ECGA) 
Logistic analysis 2.91 2.36 2.92 2107 
USGS (2000) 3.44 2.62 3.54 2072 
EIA (2005-2009) 2.79 2.03 2.87 2067 
BP (2009) 2.81 2.07 2.88 2069 
Ensemble mean 2.99 2.27 3.03 2075 
Table 5.4. Summary of total net anthropogenic radiative forcing in 2100, 2200 and at the year of 
maximum projected by the emissions scenarios of the IR and ECGA group. The ensemble average is also 
provided in the last row of each group. 
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Figure 5.6. Projection profiles of total net anthropogenic radiative forcing stemming from the emissions 
scenarios of the IR (a) and ECGA (b) groups. An ensemble average is also provided for each group (in the 
IR group the WEAP model is excluded from the mean). 
 
5.3 Temperature 
 
5.3.1 Global-mean temperature 
 
MAGICC profiles for global-mean surface temperature change relative to 2000 up to the 
end of next century are shown in figure 5.7 for both groups (IR in (a) and ECGA in (b)). The 
projection results are also detailed in table 5.5, where mean values and related uncertainty ranges 
at the end of the 21st and 22nd century and at the warming maximum are given. As for 
atmospheric concentration of GHGs, an average profile is also provided for the two ensembles 
of temperature projections, together with its uncertainty range (except the WEAP model for the 
IR group). The latter is again merely estimated as the average of the uncertainty ranges of each 
scenario within the respective ensemble. 
 
  
Figure 5.7. Projection profiles of temperature change relative to 2000 for the emissions scenarios of the IR 
(a) and ECGA (b) groups. A mean profile for each ensemble (except the WEAP model for the IR group) 
is also shown with its uncertainty bound. 
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Scenario 
Temperature change w.r.t. 2000 (°C) 
2100 2200 Peak 
Mean Range Mean Range Mean Range Year
Independent Researchers (IR) 
Conservative scenario 0.80 0.36-1.54 0.29 0.03-1.00 0.92 0.50-1.57 2065
Optimistic scenario 1.56 0.82-2.67 1.22 0.50-2.66 1.57 0.83-2.80 2102
WEAP model 0.78 0.35-1.50   0.91 0.49-1.55 2065
2008 Olduvai assessment 1.12 0.55-2.00 0.57 0.17-1.54 1.13 0.60-2.01 2086
ERC model 1.47 0.77-2.50 1.25 0.53-2.68 1.50 0.77-2.77 2120
Ensemble mean (except WEAP model) 1.24 0.62-2.18 0.83 0.30-1.97 1.24 0.65-2.22 2093
Energy Corporations and Governmental Agencies (ECGA) 
Logistic analysis 1.12 0.58-1.96 1.06 0.45-2.28 1.19 0.58-2.31 2138
USGS (2000) 1.47 0.77-2.53 1.27 0.54-2.71 1.49 0.77-2.77 2114
EIA (2005-2009) 1.10 0.55-1.94 0.87 0.34-1.99 1.10 0.56-2.09 2110
BP (2009) 1.10 0.56-1.95 0.90 0.35-2.03 1.11 0.56-2.12 2113
Ensemble mean 1.20 0.61-2.10 1.02 0.42-2.25 1.22 0.61-2.32 2120
Table 5.5. Results of the present projections of temperature change relative to 2000 originating from the 
emissions scenarios of the IR and ECGA group: mean values and confidence ranges in 2100, 2200 and at 
the year of peak are given. Average values for the respective ensembles are also specified in the last row of 
each group. 
 
In MAGICC, confidence ranges for temperature reflect the uncertainties in the 
parameterization and quantification of the carbon-cycle climate feedback and, most importantly, 
our scarce knowledge of the magnitude of the climate sensitivity (Wigley, 2008). 
Of course, because of the bell-shape of emission scenarios, all scenarios predict a 
temperature rise, culminating with a peak and then followed by a rather slow thermal decrease. 
The temperature projections by the two groups are very close to each other: in fact, the ensemble 
averages are basically the same, both at the end of the 21st century and at the warming peak, with 
about +1.2 °C relative to 2000 in all cases and the confidence bound ranging from 0.6 °C to 
about 2.2 °C. The warming maximum, however takes place at quite different timings: the 
ensemble mean peaks around 2093 in the IR group and near 2120 in the ECGA group. As seen 
in the projections of atmospheric GHG concentrations, the declining phase is usually 
characterized by a slower decreasing trend for the ECGA group rather than the IR group: 
temperature behaves like-wise, with the group averages attaining nearly 1.0 °C and 0.8 °C by the 
end of next century, respectively. 
The spread between the different projections of each group is, however, quite large and is 
bigger for the IR group than the other one, as already observed earlier for GHG concentrations. 
Within the IR group, the warming peak is predicted to occur between 2065 and 2120, with the 
mean value spanning between about 0.9 °C and 1.6 °C. Taking into account the uncertainty 
bounds, however, the highest achievable warming might attain just to 0.5 °C or be as high as 2.7 
°C. Among the ECGA scenarios, the lowest/highest one predicts a top temperature of 1.1 
°C/1.5 °C, possibly extending from 0.5 °C to 2.6 °C. 
As expected, the SRES projections for the future temperature rise (table 2.1) are clearly 
much higher than the present ones, because of the large difference in the cumulative fossil CO2 
emissions of the respective scenarios and due to a lack of account for fossil fuels exhaustion. 
Even the lowest SRES scenario (B1) predicts a mean temperature increase of 1.8 °C (confidence 
bound from 1.1 °C to 2.9 °C) by 2090-2099 relative to 1980-1999, to be compared with the 
present 1.2 °C (0.6 °C to 2.2 °C) in 2100 with respect to 2000. 
However, we note that also the previous temperature projections already accounting for 
fossil fuels depletion (table 2.5) are slightly higher (1.4 °C to 2.3 °C in 2100 relative to 2000) than 
the present ones, although still by far lower than the IPCC SRES projections. This is mainly due 
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to the way non-CO2 future emissions are assessed. All previous projections assume BAU 
scenarios for non-energy-related GHGs, while here those emissions are supposed to be 
proportional to CO2 from fossil fuels (see paragraph 3.2.3). Nevertheless, the range of 
temperature change in 2100 predicted by all previous temperature projections accounting for 
fossil fuels depletion is still within the confidence bounds of the present ensemble means. 
 
5.3.2 Carbon-Climate Response 
 
Two interesting papers (Allen et al., 2009; Matthews et al., 2009) recently found a strong 
correlation between total CO2 cumulative emissions and peak warming among many different 
scenarios, and, at the same time, that peak warming is remarkably insensitive to the shape of 
emission pathway or to peak emission rates. Hence, they introduced the concept of Carbon-
Climate Response (CCR), or, alternatively, Cumulative Warming Commitment (CWC), that is 
defined as the peak CO2-induced warming response to a given total cumulative amount of CO2 
injected into the atmosphere. CCR provides a simple measure of climate system response to 
scenarios in which CO2 concentrations peak and decline (Allen et al., 2009). CCR directly relates 
CO2 emissions to temperature change, by incorporating the standard concept of climate 
sensitivity, in addition to a “carbon sensitivity” (the amount by which atmospheric CO2 
concentrations increase in response to CO2 emissions, as mediated by natural carbon sinks, and 
including also the effect of feedbacks between climate change and carbon uptake) (Matthews et 
al., 2009). 
CCR is an almost constant quantity, since it does not change much (within 10%) depending 
on CO2 emission scenario and on the shape of the emission pathway for cumulative emissions of 
up to 2 Tt C (Matthews et al., 2009). In addition, CCR does not seem to be a function of time on 
timescales between 20 and 1,000 years (Matthews et al., 2009). Allen et al. (2009) derived from 
several model simulations a best-fit value for CCR of 2 °C per Tt C and the 5-95% confidence 
interval to be 1.3-3.9 °C per Tt C. The same paper constrained CCR also from past observations 
of temperature and CO2 emissions from fossil fuels and land-use change, obtaining a best-guess 
of 1.9 °C per Tt C with a 5-95% range of 1.4-2.5 °C per Tt C. Matthews et al. (2009) estimate 
CCR to be in the range 1.0-2.1 °C per Tt C (5-95% confidence level) with a mean value of 1.6 °C 
per Tt C from model simulations and a best estimate of 1.5 °C per Tt C from historical carbon 
emissions data and observed temperature changes. 
If we plot now the peak CO2-induced warming relative to pre-industrial level as a function of 
total cumulative CO2 emissions to 2200 for each of the present emission scenarios (figure 5.8), 
we find a strong dependence of peak warming on cumulative CO2 emissions, which can be 
approximated by a linear relationship. Scenarios characterized by different emission rates and 
pathways, but with similar cumulative emissions (e.g. WEAP model and Conservative scenario; 
EIA, 2005-2009 and BP, 2009; Optimistic scenario, ERC model and USGS, 2000), yield 
comparable temperature enhancements, confirming the insensitivity of peak warming to the 
shape of emission profile. We derive a best-guess for CCR of about 1.6 °C per Tt C, with a 
confidence interval of 1.3 to 2.3 °C per Tt C driven by the uncertainty range on the temperature 
projections, which in very good agreement with previous estimates by Allen et al. (2009) and 
Matthews et al. (2009). 
Since cumulative CO2 emissions from pre-industrial times to today amount to about 0.5 Tt C 
(Boden et al., 2009; Houghton , 2008), a CCR mean value of  about 1.6 °C per Tt C implies that 
we would still be allowed to emit nearly 0.7 Tt C into the atmosphere and, at the same time, keep 
global-mean temperature below +2 °C w.r.t. pre-industrial to avoid dangerous climate change 
(see next paragraph for the discussion about dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system). This is consistent with the conclusion by Matthews et al. (2009), that future 
cumulative CO2 emissions should be restricted to less than 0.8 Tt C to maintain global 
temperature rise below +2 °C. However, the uncertainty on this number is quite large (0.4-1.1 Tt 
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C according to the present projections, while Meinshausen et al., 2009 estimate 0.4 to 1.5 Tt C), 
given that the possibility of higher values of CCR (and consequently lower values of allowable 
emissions) cannot be excluded, owing to poorly quantified uncertainties in historical land-use 
change emissions and structural uncertainties in the simulated sulphate aerosol response 
(Matthews et al., 2009). 
In order to be prudent with respect to the +2 °C threshold, future total CO2 emissions 
should be limited to less than 0.4 Tt C. However, we must note that all the present emission 
scenarios based on fossil fuels depletion assume future cumulative total CO2 emissions that are 
much higher than this amount (see §3.2). Hence, just fossil fuels exhaustion is not enough to 
prevent dangerous climate change, but deliberate actions aiming at emissions reduction are 
needed. 
 
 
Figure 5.8. Peak CO2-induced warming relative to pre-industrial levels as a function of 1750–2200 total 
cumulative CO2 emissions for the present emission scenarios. Shown is also the best linear fit to the 
points, which yields a CCR value of about 1.6 °C per Tt C. 
 
5.3.3 Dangerous climate change under fossil fuels depletion 
 
Let us next investigate the present temperature projections by looking for a possible 
dangerous anthropogenic interference (DAI) with the climate system in the light of fossil fuels 
depletion. We remind that the definition of dangerous climate change and safe operating space 
for humanity, that has gained increasing prominence in science and policy circles, is keeping 
global-mean warming below the +2 °C limit above the pre-industrial level (see e.g. Hansen et al., 
2007; Mann, 2009). This corresponds to about +1.2 °C with respect to 2000, as global 
temperature by that time had already raised by nearly 0.8 °C since pre-industrial times. By looking 
at the present ensemble mean temperature profiles (figure 5.7), it seems like DAI would be 
0,0
0,5
1,0
1,5
2,0
2,5
0,0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1,0 1,2 1,4 1,6 1,8
P
ea
k 
C
O
2-
in
d
u
ce
d
 w
ar
m
in
g 
w
.r
.t
. p
re
-i
n
d
u
st
ri
al
 (
°C
)
1750-2200 total cumulative CO2 emissions (Tt C)
ERC model
2008 Olduvai assessment
WEAP model
Conservative scenario
Optimistic scenario
Logistic analysis
BP (2009)
EIA (2005-2009)
USGS (2000)
Linear fit
78 
 
approached just closely to the peak of the projections, namely around the turn of the century. It 
would mean that we can continue burning fossil fuels and keep on emitting GHGs into the 
atmosphere, as we would not face DAI anyway. 
Nonetheless, existing estimates of fossil fuel proven reserves are largely uncertain (see figure 
3.2), mainly owing to a lack of reliability about the information on the geological availability of 
fossil fuels. It is also currently unknown how much unconventional resources and additional 
occurrences might be exploited in the future under a growing demand for fossil fuels. In 
addition, there are still uncertainties in the knowledge of some climatic phenomena (e.g. the 
carbon cycle and climate sensitivity) and in the way they are reproduced by current climate 
models. So, if we look at the spread of the single projections within each group or just account 
for the uncertainty range of the projections, it becomes clear that the risk of crossing the +2 °C 
threshold is not so far away: DAI might happen well before the first half of this century, 
specifically already around 2040. 
To the purpose of accounting for uncertainties in the present temperature projections, the 
average value of the projected peak warming is plot for each emission scenario along with the 
respective confidence level (figure 5.9). From figure 5.9 it is clear that most of the present 
scenarios project an average value of the expected maximum temperature rise, that is well beyond 
+2 °C with respect to pre-industrial time (ERC model, Optimistic scenario and USGS, 2000) or 
very close to it (Logistic analysis, 2008 Olduvai assessment, EIA, 2005-2009 and BP, 2009). 
However, if considering the extent of the error bars, all the present projections of the 
temperature rise at peak time are well-consistent with a maximum warming on the order of 2 °C, 
or even higher than that in most cases. Note also that the present scenarios account in large part 
for proven reserves of fossil fuels only and not for unconventional resources: additional CO2 
emissions from these sources can only lead to a higher peak warming than the one projected in 
figure 5.9. 
 
 
Figure 5.9. Projected peak warming relative to pre-industrial for each of the present emission scenarios. 
Shown is the average value (open dash) of the projected warming at the time of maximum temperature 
rise along with the corresponding uncertainty range (vertical black bar) of the mean. 
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In order to quantitatively estimate the probability of avoiding DAI based on the present 
emission scenarios and projections of peak warming, we refer to the recent results by 
Meinshausen et al. (2009). They evaluate the probability of exceeding +2 °C global warming, by 
constraining future climate projections from several different emission scenarios with a reduced 
complexity coupled carbon cycle–climate model (Meinshausen et al., 2009). In their paper a 
comprehensive probabilistic analysis is provided, aiming at quantifying CO2 emissions that would 
limit future global warming to below 2 °C, based on a combination of published probability 
distribution functions of climate system properties (e.g. climate sensitivity) and observational 
constraints (Meinshausen et al., 2009). The authors find that cumulative total CO2 emissions up 
to 2050 are in general robust indicators of the probability that twenty-first century warming might 
exceed 2 °C relative to pre-industrial levels (Meinshausen et al., 2009). 
To assess the probability of staying below +2 °C w.r.t. pre-industrial, starting from the 
cumulative CO2 emission of the present scenarios, we make use of the “2 °C Check – Tool” 
provided online as Supplementary Data to the paper by Meinshausen et al. (2009). This tool 
allows to quickly estimate the probability that an emission pathway is going to exceed +2 °C 
relative to pre-industrial, once cumulative total CO2 emissions for the 2000-2049 period are 
specified. The data used in that tool is the one underlying table 1 and figures 3a in Meinshausen 
et al. (2009). Please note that this approach allows to estimate only the CO2-induced warming 
component of global-mean temperature rise, thus neglecting the contribute of other GHGs. 
Although the dominant anthropogenic warming contribution is from CO2 emissions, non-CO2 
GHG emissions add to the risk of exceeding warming thresholds during the twenty-first century 
(Meinshausen et al., 2009). 
 
 
Figure 5.10. Probability of exceeding +2 °C (left; percentage units) and of staying below +2 °C (right; 
likelihood) relative to pre-industrial for each of the present emission scenarios, estimated according to the 
Illustrative Default case of Meinshausen et al. (2009). Shown is the average probability value (open dash) 
along with the corresponding uncertainty range (vertical black bar) of the mean. 
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Figure 5.10 shows the probability of exceeding +2 °C relative to pre-industrial for each of 
the present emissions scenarios, based on the Illustrative Default case of Meinshausen et al. 
(2009). The average values of the probability of exceeding +2 °C span from nearly 55% to 90% 
across the different scenarios. By taking into account the confidence bounds, that range extends 
to about 35-95%, nevertheless there is an apparent prevailing trend towards higher probability 
values. All emission scenarios clearly indicate that is “less likely than not” or even “unlikely” for 
global-mean temperature to stay below +2 °C, even if accounting for fossil fuels exhaustion. 
Hence, burning all currently known fossil fuel reserves will likely not prevent dangerous climate 
change to occur. Fossil fuels depletion is not enough to reduce future fossil CO2 emissions: 
mitigating actions aiming at deliberately further reducing the emissions cannot be avoided. The 
present conclusion is in fair agreement with the ultimate result of Meinshausen et al. (2009), 
though the latter estimate somewhat larger cumulative total CO2 emissions for 2000-2049 
compared to the present ones (693-842 Gt C vs. 412-555 Gt C, respectively): CO2 emissions 
from all proven fossil fuel reserves would definitely cause global-mean temperature to cross the 
+2 °C limit. 
As expected, there is also an obvious correspondence between the projections of peak 
warming (figure 5.9) and the probability of exceeding +2 °C (figure 5.10). The scenarios, that 
project peak warming larger than +2 °C (Optimistic scenario, ERC model and USGS, 2000), 
exhibit an unlikely chance of staying below that threshold, while all other scenarios, predicting a 
peak warming in between +1.5 °C and +2 °C, reveal a “less likely possibility than not” of 
remaining below that limit. 
We remind that the +2 °C upper threshold simply stems from a general agreement in the 
scientific community of being the goal to prevent dangerous climate change (Schellnhuber et al., 
2006). Nevertheless, it is opinion of several people and countries that this warming limit cannot 
be regarded as a “safe level” and, thus, they are calling for a safer lower threshold (Meinshausen 
et al., 2009). For instance, prominent scientists like James Hansen, head of the NASA Goddard 
Institute for Space Studies in New York City (USA), believe that a temperature increase on the 
order of +1.8 °C relative to pre-industrial level is already to be considered a threshold on which 
DAI could set in (Hansen, 2009). The Alliance of Small Island States and the Least Developed 
Country group called for warming to be limited even to +1.5 °C at the 14th Conference of the 
Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in Poznan, Poland, 
December 2008 (ENB, 2008). 
So, if the commonly accepted +2 °C threshold for DAI is to be reduced, it is obvious that 
the presently assessed probabilities of avoiding DAI are very likely underestimated. In addition, if 
we assume +1.5 °C as the upper limit for an “acceptable” temperature rise, figure 5.9 evidences 
that the projected average value of peak warming is expected to exceed DAI in all scenarios, with 
the lower bounds of all projections being almost entirely above that threshold. 
Finally, there are strong reasons to believe that the present projections should be regarded as 
lower bounds to the temperature rise that will effectively occur in the future. Firstly, because 
several important mechanism in the climate system are at present poorly known and thus climate 
models do not account for them yet. These processes are often positive feedbacks on the climate 
and thus will likely amplify the climatic effects of the projected warming (see the Conclusions for 
more information about positive feedbacks). 
Secondly, we have already stressed that that the currently available geological information 
about fossil fuel reserves and resources are possibly unreliable. Hence, there is a large uncertainty 
about the estimates of proven reserves (see figure 3.2). Furthermore, under an urgent demand for 
fossil energy, the world might decide to use the whole additional occurrences of fossil fuels 
resources or even use unconventional resources in the future, if future technological 
improvements will enable their extraction. However, if and how much these sources will be 
exploited is unknown at present. So, should new reserves of conventional or unconventional 
fossil fuels become available in the future, other than the ones accounted for by the present 
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scenarios, these would only add other CO2 in addition to the projected emissions of the present 
scenarios. The reader can refer to the Conclusions for further information about positive 
feedbacks acting on the climate system and about additional CO2 emissions from newly 
discovered reserves of conventional fossil fuel and from unconventional sources. 
From the present discussion we can thus conclude that fossil fuels depletion itself is not 
enough to avoid dangerous climate change, or, at least, cannot exclude its onset. Hence, a strong 
reduction of world GHG emissions is also quickly needed, if we wish to safely stay well below 
the +2 °C threshold and avoid crossing potentially dangerous climate tipping points. 
 
5.3.4 Spatial patterns of temperature change 
 
In §5.3.1, future changes in global-mean temperature have been assessed with MAGICC. 
However, surface temperatures will not equally change all over the globe: rates of thermal 
variation vary between different areas of the world both in their direction (warming or cooling) 
and magnitude. SCENGEN allows to chart the spatial patterns of temperature change predicted 
for the future on a global scale. 
SCENGEN outcomes for the world spatial patterns of annual mean temperature change 
projected for the 30-year interval centered on 2100 are given in figure 5.11 for each scenario of 
the IR and ECGA groups. Table 5.6 summarizes the global-mean value and global range of 
annual mean temperature changes predicted by SCENGEN. Please note that temperature 
changes are given here as departures from the 1990 level (reference year in SCENGEN), 
opposite to global-mean temperature anomalies given in §5.3.1, where year 2000 is taken as 
reference. 
 
Scenario 
Temperature change w.r.t. 1990 (°C) 
2085-2114 
Global average Global range 
Independent Researchers (IR) 
Conservative scenario 0.95 -0.60 to 2.59 
Optimistic scenario 1.72 -0.32 to 4.60 
WEAP model 0.93 -0.70 to 2.67 
2008 Olduvai assessment 1.27 -0.01 to 3.08 
ERC model 1.63 -0.33 to 4.40 
Energy Corporations and Governmental Agencies (ECGA) 
Logistic analysis 1.28 -0.20 to 3.33 
USGS (2000) 1.63 -0.26 to 4.24 
EIA (2005-2009) 1.25 -0.08 to 3.11 
BP (2009) 1.26 -0.10 to 3.14 
Table 5.6. Global average value and global range of annual mean temperature predicted by SCENGEN 
for the 30-year interval centered on 2100. Results for emissions scenarios of the IR and ECGA group are 
expressed as changes with respect to 1990. 
 
It is clear from figure 5.11 that there are some areas in the world that will warm up more 
than others: this result obviously holds true irrespective of the scenario. This is typically the case 
of the Arctic and the continents at the mid-high latitudes of the Northern Hemisphere. Climate 
model simulations generally result in amplified warming in polar regions (Doran et al., 2002), 
however, the warming is much greater for the Arctic and only modest for Antarctica (Steig and 
Schmidt, 2004). The enhanced warming over the North Pole regions almost certainly arises 
because of the known effect of the “polar amplification”: temperatures in the Arctic increase 
faster compared to the Earth as a whole. This is the result of the collective effect of positive and 
negative feedbacks acting in the Arctic (McBean et al., 2005). 
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Independent Researchers (IR) 
Conservative scenario Optimistic scenario 
WEAP model 2008 Olduvai assessment 
ERC model 
 
Energy Corporations and Governmental Agencies (ECGA) 
Logistic analysis USGS (2000) 
EIA (2005-2009) BP (2009) 
Figure 5.11. SCENGEN outputs of the projected spatial patterns of annual mean temperature change 
for the 30-year interval centered on 2100 with respect to 1990 relative to each scenario of the IR and 
ECGA group. 
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Conversely, the mid-high latitudes of the Southern Hemisphere do not seem to show the same 
thermal enhancement, probably because of the Southern Ocean acting as a heat sink (Steig and 
Schmidt, 2004). 
In some scenarios there are also world areas characterized by a slight cooling: the Labrador 
Basin in the North Atlantic Ocean south of the Arctic Circle, the Atlantic-Indian Basin and the 
Southeast Pacific Basin of the Southern Ocean across the Antarctic Circle. This pattern of change 
is possibly consistent with the slow-down of the world ocean themohaline circulation (THC) (see 
figure 5.12), that is expected to occur in a future warmer climate (IPCC, 2007, paragraph 10.3.4). 
The THC regulates the large-scale ocean circulation, which is mainly driven by global density 
gradients created by surface heat, freshwater fluxes, water temperature and salinity. The THC 
redistributes the heat, coming from the Sun and gathering mostly in the tropical and equatorial 
zones, among the Earth’s different latitudes. A slowing down of the THC, thus, would imply less 
heat to be transferred from the Equator towards the high latitudes of both Hemispheres. 
Consequently some ocean areas in the mid-high latitudes might show a cooling trend, rather than 
a warming, as the Earth as a whole gets warmer. This may be particularly true for the Labrador 
Basin, that is exactly where the warm surface water of the Gulf Stream starts sinking. Here, the 
North Atlantic ocean current becomes cold and saline deep water, by releasing its heat to the 
atmosphere and by water mixing with the Labrador and East Greenland cold oceanic currents 
(see figure 5.12). 
About the magnitude of the changes, as expected, the global range of annual mean 
temperature changes is larger for the scenarios whose global average is higher. Some world areas 
might even warm up more than 4 °C by the end of this century relative to 1990 in the high 
emission cases of the Optimistic Scenario, the ERC model and by USGS (2000). 
 
 
 
Figure 5.12. A scheme of the path of the Earth’s ocean thermohaline circulation (Ahlenius, 2007). 
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5.4 Sea level 
 
5.4.1 MAGICC results 
 
Projections of sea level rise obtained with MAGICC starting from the present emission 
scenarios are summarized in table 5.7: sea level mean change and uncertainty range of the mean 
relative to 2000 are given for the end of the 21st and 22nd century. Sea level profiles for the IR 
(a) and ECGA (b) groups are shown in figure 5.13 with their respective ensemble means (except 
for the WEAP model in the IR group). 
 
 
Projections with MAGICC 
Scenario 
Sea level change w.r.t. 2000 (cm) 
2100 2200 
Mean Range Mean Range 
Independent Researchers (IR) 
Conservative scenario 18 6-40 23 4-62 
Optimistic scenario 26 10-54 38 9-97 
WEAP model 18 6-40   
2008 Olduvai assessment 21 7-46 28 6-75 
ERC model 24 9-51 38 10-95 
Ensemble mean (except WEAP model) 23 8-48 32 7-82 
Energy Corporations and Governmental Agencies (ECGA) 
Logistic analysis 20 7-43 33 8-83 
USGS (2000) 25 9-52 38 10-96 
EIA (2005-2009) 21 7-44 31 7-79 
BP (2009) 21 7-44 31 8-80 
Ensemble mean 22 8-46 33 8-85 
Table 5.7. MAGICC projections of sea level change relative to 2000 based on the emissions scenarios of 
the IR and ECGA group: mean values and uncertainty ranges at the end of the 21st and 22nd century are 
given. Ensemble mean values are also indicated in the last row of each group. 
 
 
  
Figure 5.13. MAGICC outputs for the projected sea level rise with respect to 2000 stemming from the 
emissions scenarios of the IR (a) and ECGA (b) groups. An ensemble mean is provided for each group (in 
the IR group the WEAP model is excluded), together with its confidence bound. 
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The results for the two ensemble means are consistent with each other: sea level rise 
predicted by 2100 with respect to 2000 is about 22-23 cm, with a confidence bound of 8-48 cm, 
while for 2200 it amounts to 32-33 cm, with an uncertainty ranging from nearly 7 to around 85 
cm. 
The projections spread among the IR scenarios is slightly larger relative to the ECGA group, 
as already observed for the projections of atmospheric GHG concentration and temperature, 
although all scenarios still lie within the confidence bound of the ensemble mean. In the IR 
group, mean values in 2100 range from 18 to 26 cm, with the lowest and highest scenario bound 
at 6 and 54 cm, respectively. In the ECGA group all scenarios project a mean rise in 2100 of 21-
22 cm (uncertainty 7-44 cm), with the exception of USGS (2000) pointing to 25 cm (from 9 to 52 
cm). 
Sea level is still increasing at the end of the 22nd century, although global-mean surface 
temperature has already peaked well before that time, simply due to the large thermal inertia of 
the oceans. 
If we compare now the present outcomes for the end of the 21st century (figure 5.13) with 
the IPCC AR4 (IPCC, 2007) projections for sea level in 2090-2099 relative to 1980-1999, shown 
in figure 5.14, it is clear that the present ensemble mean projection of 22-23 cm is typically lower 
compared to what the SRES scenarios predict, as expected. However, the discrepancy is not so 
large, especially with respect to the B1 scenario. Anyhow, the present mean uncertainty range 
(about 8-48 cm) overlaps the confidence bounds of the SRES scenarios and therefore the 
projections are still compatible, despite the large differences in the respective emission scenarios. 
 
 
Figure 5.14. The IPCC AR4 projections of global-mean sea level rise and its components in 2090-2099 
relative to 1980-1999, with related 5 to 95% uncertainty ranges, for the six SRES marker scenarios (IPCC, 
2007). 
 
5.4.2 Projections with the dual model 
 
It is well known that global warming affects sea level rise through two main factors: thermal 
expansion of ocean water and additional melting water that flows into the oceans from the ice 
sheets and ice caps on land. The IPCC AR4 (IPCC, 2007) concludes that thermal expansion can 
explain nearly 25% of observed sea-level rise for 1961-2003 and 50% for 1993-2003; the 
remainder is predominantly due to ice melt. A recent paper by Domingues et al. (2008) argues 
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that for the period 1961-2003, thermal expansion contributed about 40% to the observed sea 
level rise, while shrinking mountain glaciers and ice sheets have contributed about 60%. 
Future sea level rise is highly uncertain, as the mismatch between observed and modelled sea 
level already suggests. Observed sea-level rise, in fact, exceeded that predicted by climate models 
(best estimates) by nearly 50% for the periods 1990-2006 (Rahmstorf et al., 2007) and 1961-2003 
(IPCC, 2007). Since 1993 sea level has been rising 80% faster than the best estimate of the IPCC 
AR3 (IPCC, 2001) for the same time period (Allison et al., 2009) (see e.g. figure 5.15). Model 
based simulations of future sea level are therefore currently believed not to be reliable enough, 
due to the scarce modelling of the underlying physical processes driving the changes in global sea 
level (Vermeer and Rahmstorf, 2009). In particular, the dynamics of ice sheets and glaciers and, 
to a lesser extent, that of oceanic heat uptake is still not adequately understood (Vermeer and 
Rahmstorf, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 5.15. Sea level change during 1970-2010 (Allison et al., 2009). Tide gauge data indicated in red are 
and satellite data in blue are compared against the grey band, which shows the projections range of the 
IPCC AR3 (IPCC, 2001). 
 
The coupled models of the last IPCC AR4 (IPCC, 2007) did not include dynamic 
representations of rapid ice flow changes in ice sheets and caps in its projected sea-level ranges, 
arguing that they could not yet be modelled, and consequently an upper limit of the expected rise 
was not presented. The main reason for this is the large uncertainty in the response of the big ice 
sheets of Greenland and Antarctica. The models in the IPCC AR4 (IPCC, 2007) assumed a 
positive mass balance over the Antarctic ice sheet for the 21st century, so that Antarctica was 
estimated to have contributed to global sea level decline during the same period. However, the 
Antarctic Ice Sheet is currently losing mass as a consequence of dynamical processes (Allison et 
al., 2009). As such, sea level is likely to rise much more by 2100 than the range of 18-59 cm 
projected by the IPCC AR4 (IPCC, 2007) (figure 5.14). 
Also the climate models in MAGICC include only simple mass balance estimates of the sea 
level contribution from the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets. Therefore, the present 
projections of sea level rise introduced and discussed in paragraph 5.4.1 are very likely to be 
underestimated as well. Here, we show an alternative and probably more reliable assessment of 
future sea-level rise based on a semiempirical approach, the dual model, that has recently been 
developed by Vermeer and Rahmstorf (2009). 
The divergence between observations and modelled results, indeed, has caused significant 
interest in semiempirical models for projecting future sea-level rise (see e.g. Vermeer and 
Rahmstorf, 2009 and references therein). This kind of approach makes use of an observable that 
climate models can really predict with confidence, namely global-mean temperature, to establish a 
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link between global mean temperature and sea level, for instance by testing the model on 
observed data (Vermeer and Rahmstorf, 2009). However, a limitation of this approach, that has 
to be reckoned with when interpreting the results, is that a response that differs fundamentally 
from that found in the data used cannot be captured; for example, a large and highly nonlinear 
ice discharge event of a type not in the observational record (Vermeer and Rahmstorf, 2009). 
According to the dual model by Vermeer and Rahmstorf (2009), the rate of rise of sea level 
H, dH/dt, in response to a large, rapid warming can be approximated by equation (5.1): 
 
݀ܪ ݀ݐ⁄ ൌ ܽሺܶ െ ଴ܶሻ ൅ ܾ ݀ܶ ݀ݐ⁄ ,    (5.1) 
 
where t is the time (here years), T is the global-mean temperature in year t, T0 is a base 
temperature at which sea level is in equilibrium with climate and a and b are parameters to be 
determined from data. First part of the right side of equation 5.1 assumes that the rate of sea 
level rise is proportional to the warming above the base temperature. For the contribution to sea 
level rise coming from melting ice sheets and caps, this means that the rate of mass loss is 
assumed to be proportional to the temperature increase above a threshold value (Oerlemans et 
al., 1998). 
First part of the right side of equation 5.1 is based on the assumption that the response time 
scale of sea level is long compared with the time scale of interest (typically about 100 years). 
However, some components of sea level adjust quickly to a temperature change, e.g., the heat 
content of the oceanic surface mixed layer: the second term in the right side of equation 5.1 
corresponds to this rapid-response term. This second term corresponds to a sea-level response 
that can be regarded as “instantaneous” on the time scales under consideration, because it implies 
H ~ T. The name “dual model” stems from the two time scales represented by the model. 
The model was first tested to the global-mean temperature and sea-level outputs from 
climate models for 1880-2000, thus analyzing just thermal expansion, i.e. the only contribution to 
sea-level rise that models are currently able to reproduce. Next, the model was tested to 
observational data, such as to cover the full climate-related sea-level response, that is thermal 
expansion plus melting water from ice sheets and caps. The parameters obtained by Vermeer and 
Rahmstorf (2009) by fitting the dual model to observed data of global temperature and sea level 
for 1880-2000 are: T0 = 0.41 ± 0.03 °C (temperature relative to the reference period 1951-1980), 
a = 0.56 ± 0.05 cm/(yr·°C) and b = -4.9 ± 1.0 cm/°C. Since we aim here at assessing future sea 
level rise with respect to current values (namely the 2000 level), T0 has to be expressed as an 
anomaly relative to 2000. As such, T0 turns out to be: T0 = -0.81 °C. 
Table 5.8 and figure 5.16 show the present results for future sea level change obtained from 
the emissions scenarios developed in chapter 3. The projections are obtained by using the dual 
model with the above parameters and starting from the present MAGICC outputs of global-
mean temperature as of table 5.5 and figure 5.7. Given are mid-year values along with uncertainty 
ranges of the mean for each scenario of the IR group (a) and ECGA group (b) and their 
respective ensemble average. Confidence bounds here originate only from uncertainties on future 
global-mean temperature and do not account for the error bars of the parameters of the model. 
Ensemble mean values predicted by the dual model for the two scenario groups are 
consistent with each other and attain to around 85 cm above the 2000 level by the end of this 
century, with an uncertainty bar spanning from 67 to 111 cm (figure 5.16 and table 5.8). This 
result is to be compared with the IPCC AR4 (IPCC, 2007) model projections of 18-59 cm (figure 
5.14) and with the 8 to 48 cm range predicted by MAGICC for the two ensemble means from 
the present scenarios (figure 5.13, table 5.7). It is clear from figure 5.16 and table 5.8, that by 
including the full climate-related sea-level response and not just thermal expansion, the dual 
model projects much higher values for future sea level rise, relative to both the IPCC AR4 
(IPCC, 2007) model projections (figure 5.14) and the present ones based on MAGICC (figure 
5.13, table 5.7). 
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Projections with the dual model 
Scenario 
Sea level change w.r.t. 2000 (cm) 
2100 2200 
Mean Range Mean Range 
Independent Researchers (IR) 
Conservative scenario 80 64-101 158 121-221 
Optimistic scenario 94 73-121 221 158-320 
WEAP model 79 64-100   
2008 Olduvai assessment 85 68-109 181 134-258 
ERC model 89 70-114 215 155-310 
Ensemble mean (except WEAP model) 87 69-111 194 142-277 
Energy Corporations and Governmental Agencies (ECGA) 
Logistic analysis 80 65-101 191 141-270 
USGS (2000) 93 72-119 218 156-315 
EIA (2005-2009) 82 66-104 186 134-264 
BP (2009) 82 66-104 187 134-265 
Ensemble mean 84 67-107 195 143-278 
Table 5.8. Projections of sea level change based on the dual model by Vermeer and Rahmstorf (2009) and 
obtained from MAGICC global-mean temperature projections of table 5.5 and figure 5.7. Average values 
and uncertainty ranges are given at the end of the 21st and 22nd century for each emissions scenarios of 
the IR and ECGA group and are referred to year 2000. Ensemble mean values are also indicated in the 
last row of each group. 
 
  
Figure 5.16. Projections of sea level rise relative to 2000 obtained from MAGICC global temperature 
outputs of figure 5.7 with the dual model by Vermeer and Rahmstorf (2009). Results are shown for each 
emissions scenario of the IR (a) and ECGA (b) groups, together with their respective ensemble average 
(except the WEAP model in the IR group) and uncertainty range of the mean. 
 
Sea level rise in 2100 seems to be less sensitive to GHG emissions in the 21st century than 
e.g. atmospheric CO2 concentration or global-mean temperature. The present dual model results 
with emission scenarios accounting for fossil fuels depletion are, in fact, remarkably similar, at 
least for the low end of the projections, to those based on the standard IPCC SRES scenarios 
obtained by Vermeer and Rahmstorf (2009) with the same model (see figure 5.17): their sea-level 
projections range from 75 to 190 cm for the period 1990-2100. Vermeer and Rahmstorf (2009) 
note that the model averages for all IPCC SRES emission scenarios considered in their paper are 
remarkably close to each other, probably owing to the large inertia of the oceans, but mostly 
because sea-level change integrates temperature variations over time in the first term of equation 
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5.1. Moreover, temperatures in the various emission scenarios are still close together in the first 
half of the century. Finally, the second term on the right side of equation 5.1 implies a time lag, 
so that emissions reductions have an effect on sea-level just after a long time delay. The same 
conclusions of Vermeer and Rahmstorf (2009) apply also here. 
 
 
Figure 5.17. Observed annual global sea-level data in red are shown along with projection of sea-level rise 
from 1990 to 2100 obtained by Vermeer and Rahmstorf (2009) with the dual model and based on IPCC 
temperature projections for three different SRES emission scenarios. The sea-level range projected by the 
IPCC AR4 (IPCC, 2007) climate models for the same scenarios is shown for comparison in the vertical 
bars on the right of the plot. 
 
Mostly because of the large thermal inertia of the oceans, sea level will keep on rising during 
the 22nd century and beyond, notwithstanding the projected decrease of world temperatures. 
Despite the exhaustion of fossil fuels, sea level rise is expected to reach huge levels at the end of 
next century. With the dual model, in fact, the present projections for sea level change in 2200 
attain to slightly less than 200 cm above the height in 2000 with a large uncertainty bound 
ranging from about 140 to 280 cm (figure 5.16, table 5.8), whereas the present projections with 
MAGICC present a range of only about 7 to 85 cm by the same time (figure 5.13, table 5.7). 
These results point out the apparent evidence that sea-level rise might turn out to be among 
the potentially most serious impacts of climate change. Actions aiming at a methodical cut of 
future GHG emissions are highly and more than ever required, if we wish to mitigate and 
minimize future impacts of sea level rise on the environment, the human society and ecosystems. 
More importantly, these results suggest that emissions reductions undertaken especially in the 
first decades of this century will be much more effective in limiting sea-level rise than cuts carried 
out later on. 
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5.5 Precipitation 
 
SCENGEN outputs for the worldwide patterns of annual mean precipitation change 
projected by the end of the current century are shown in figure 5.18 for each emission scenarios 
of the IR and ECGA groups. A summary of the global range of precipitation variations is also 
given in table 5.9. Changes are expressed as percentage variations for the 30-year interval 
centered on 2100 relative to 1990. 
An increase of annual mean precipitation is generally expected for the future along with the 
Earth’s surface warming (Wentz et al., 2007). A warmer atmosphere, in fact, contains more water 
vapour, but this alters the planet’s hydrologic cycle and, thus, affects precipitation rates. 
Nevertheless, as for temperature, precipitation changes are not even throughout the whole world, 
but are rather characterized by areas of increase and others of decrease. 
Here, precipitation reduction patterns have quite a zonal distribution and focus particularly 
over the ocean in the tropical areas of both Hemispheres. Outstanding is the broad area of 
precipitation decrease over the Eastern Tropical Pacific, the acting area of ENSO. The 
Mediterranean area seems also to be particularly affected in the future by precipitation decrease. 
Over land, an overall reduction in annual precipitation is predicted by climate models over the 
western USA, Brasil, the southern part of South America, North and South Africa, south-western 
Asia and southern Australia. 
On the contrary, precipitation might increase over mid-high latitudes of both Hemispheres 
and along the Equator. Precipitation seems to be particularly enhanced over these areas in the 
high emission scenarios (Optimistic scenario, ERC model and USGS, 2000): here its change 
exceeds +20% over large areas of the Arctic and Antarctica. 
However, the global full range of precipitation changes does not appear to reflect the outline 
of global-mean temperature rise at all. A higher increase of temperature does not seem to 
necessarily correspond to a higher range of precipitation change, nor to an overall increase or 
decrease of precipitation. 
 
 
Scenario 
Precipitation change w.r.t. 1990 (%) 
2085-2114 
Global range 
Independent Researchers (IR) 
Conservative scenario -37 to 49 
Optimistic scenario -35 to 37 
WEAP model -38 to 52 
2008 Olduvai assessment -32 to 37 
ERC model -32 to 34 
Energy Corporations and Governmental Agencies (ECGA) 
Logistic analysis -26 to 29 
USGS (2000) -34 to 36 
EIA (2005-2009) -28 to 32 
BP (2009) -28 to 32 
Table 5.9. Global range of annual mean precipitation change for the 30-year interval centered on 2100 
projected by SCENGEN for the emissions scenarios of the IR and ECGA group. Changes are expressed 
as percentage variations relative to year 1990. 
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Independent Researchers (IR) 
Conservative scenario Optimistic scenario 
WEAP model 2008 Olduvai assessment 
ERC model 
 
Energy Corporations and Governmental Agencies (ECGA) 
Logistic analysis USGS (2000) 
EIA (2005-2009) BP (2009) 
Figure 5.18. SCENGEN projections of the spatial patterns of annual mean precipitation change for the 
30-year interval centered on 2100 relative to each scenario of the IR and ECGA group. Changes are 
expressed as percentage deviations with respect to 1990. 
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5.6 Sea level pressure 
 
Projections of change in annual mean sea level pressure (MSLP) for the 30-year interval 
centered on 2100 referred to 1990, that are obtained as output with SCENGEN, are shown in 
figure 5.19 for each of the present scenarios. Table 5.10 reviews the global range of changes. 
As can be clearly seen in figure 5.19, an overall reduction of MSLP is expected at high 
latitudes in both hemispheres. Areas affected by increased MSLP values compared to today are 
mainly the mid-latitudes and the subtropical ocean, extending over continent in the 
Mediterranean, western and southern North America, South America, Australia and south-
eastern Asia. This pattern of change can be traced back to the expected expansion of the Hadley 
cell (IPCC, 2007) and a poleward shift of the mid-latitude storm tracks (Yin, 2005). 
The projected absolute changes in MSLP with the present scenarios are somewhat  smaller 
compared to the changes predicted on the base of the IPCC SRES scenarios (see e.g. figure 10.9 
in IPCC, 2007). For example, changes for the SRES A1B scenario projected for the period 2080-
2099 relative to 1980 to 1999 can get up to about ±3.5 hPa in summer, while here the highest 
annual variations span from -2.5 to +1.3 hPa at most. However, these pressure variations are 
much smaller compared to the typical changes related to synoptic-scale systems (see table 5.10). 
Thus, from the present MSLP projections it is not possible to infer any well-defined hint of 
climate change-induced MSLP alterations. 
 
 
Scenario 
Mean sea level pressure change w.r.t. 1990 (hPa) 
2085-2114 
Global range 
Independent Researchers (IR) 
Conservative scenario -0.7 to 0.4 
Optimistic scenario -2.5 to 1.3 
WEAP model -0.7 to 0.3 
2008 Olduvai assessment -1.5 to 0.8 
ERC model -2.4 to 1.2 
Energy Corporations and Governmental Agencies (ECGA) 
Logistic analysis -1.8 to 0.9 
USGS (2000) -2.3 to 1.2 
EIA (2005-2009) -1.6 to 0.8 
BP (2009) -1.7 to 0.9 
Table 5.10. SCENGEN projections of global range of annual mean sea level pressure change for the 30-
year interval centered on 2100 relative to 1990 for the emissions scenarios of the IR and ECGA group. 
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Independent Researchers (IR) 
Conservative scenario Optimistic scenario 
WEAP model 2008 Olduvai assessment 
ERC model 
Energy Corporations and Governmental Agencies (ECGA) 
Logistic analysis USGS (2000) 
EIA (2005-2009) BP (2009) 
Figure 5.19. SCENGEN outputs of the projected spatial patterns of annual mean sea level pressure 
change for the 30-year interval centered on 2100 relative to 1990 for each scenario of the IR and ECGA 
group. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
The physical limits to stratospheric SO2 
aerosols geoengineering 
 
 
 
 
 
Overview 
 
The need of avoiding a “dangerous anthropogenic interference” with the 
climate system calls for actions intended to reduce the atmospheric 
concentration of greenhouse gases and the resulting warming. Among these 
measures, the safest and on the long-term most effective way is to reduce the 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases (mitigation). Nevertheless, the 
future warming might turn out to be much larger than projected, with potential 
dangerous consequences for life on Earth and high risk of crossing the tipping 
points of the climate system. In order to avoid this scenario, the world may 
decide to attempt extreme actions of geoengineering to temporarily offset the 
warming (countermeasures). 
Among the proposed geoengineering techniques, a scientific debate is 
going on about the possibility of injecting huge amounts of SO2 aerosols into 
the stratosphere to cool the planet’s surface. Here we assess the physical 
feasibility of this method, by analyzing the world geological availability of 
sulphur, which is the source precursor of SO2 aerosols. We develop a scenario 
of stratospheric sulphur injections, that is limited by the global annual 
production of this resource. Finally, we estimate the climatic effect of 
stratospheric SO2 aerosols geoengineering, by projecting the global-mean 
surface temperature change resulting from the scenario of sulphur injections. 
We find that the sulphur availability may limit the stratospheric injections 
to a time span of only 10 to 20 years, if the injections start in 2010. The cooling 
effect would be enough to keep global temperature at about the current level 
for that time period, but after stopping the sulphur injections, global 
temperature would increase back to the projection without geoengineering 
with a warming rate much higher and dangerous than before. These results 
confirm that the reduction of greenhouse gases emissions is the key road to 
climate change risk minimization. 
 
Most of the work introduced in this chapter is included in the paper by Zecca and Chiari 
(to be published b).  
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6.1 Mitigation and countermeasures to limit future global 
warming 
 
Despite the exhaustion of fossil fuels, as already seen in chapter 5, the extent of future global 
warming might turn out to be high enough to exceed a level of dangerous anthropogenic 
interference (DAI) with the climate system. In order to avoid DAI to occur, worldwide initiatives 
should be undertaken, aiming at least at mitigating the unavoidable future climate change. This 
can be achieve, for instance, by policy action intended to reduce the future emissions of GHGs 
by human activities. However, global exertions have not yet proved to be successful enough to 
provide confidence that the emissions reductions needed to avoid DAI will actually ever be 
attained. As shown by the accord signed at the 15th United Nations Climate Change  Conference 
of the Parties (COP 15) held in Copenhagen (Denmark) in December 2009 (UNFCCC, 2009), 
which does not contain any legally binding commitments for reducing CO2 emissions, it is not so 
easy to achieve an international agreement that satisfies each country’s requests. Thus there is still 
a severe risk that adequate mitigation actions will not be introduced in time. 
Besides, the future extent of global warming might turn out to be more serious than 
currently believed and/or take place at a faster warming rate than human socio-economical 
systems can adapt to at the same time, e.g. owing to the amplifying effect of positive feedbacks 
on the temperature change. In this case additional action may be required, should it become 
necessary to cool the Earth at any cost. Humanity might decide to cope with by then out of 
control growing temperatures, by undertaking man-made artificial initiatives: such actions might 
involve geoengineering. The so-called geoengineering or, more generally, countermeasures are 
defined as the “deliberate large-scale manipulation of the planetary environment to counteract 
anthropogenic climate change” (The Royal Society, 2009). The 2009 report of The Royal Society 
on geoengineering (The Royal Society, 2009) provides a detailed review on the subject. 
Proposed countermeasures can usefully be divided into two classes (The Royal Society, 
2009): 
1) Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) techniques aiming at removing CO2 from the atmosphere; 
2) Solar Radiation Management (SRM) techniques to reduce the flux of solar radiation hitting 
the Earth’s surface, by reflecting back into space a small percentage of it.  
CDR and SRM share the ultimate purpose of reducing global temperatures, although there 
are major differences in their methods, timings, effects and extra-consequences. 
CDR techniques address the original cause of anthropogenic climate change by removing 
GHGs from the atmosphere. However, owing to the large thermal inertia of the climate system, 
it would take several years for global temperature to start declining in response to a decrease of 
the atmospheric GHGs concentration. Among the CDR methods we can list (The Royal Society, 
2009): 
• land use management to preserve or enhance carbon uptake by land sinks, like e.g. the 
vegetation; 
• the use of biomass for carbon sequestration as well as a carbon neutral energy source; 
• enhancement of natural weathering processes to remove CO2 from the atmosphere; 
• direct engineered capture of CO2 from ambient air (Carbon Capture and Storage, CCS); 
• the enhancement of oceanic uptake of CO2, for example by fertilisation of the oceans with 
naturally scarce nutrients, or by increasing upwelling processes. 
SRM techniques try to offset the effects of increased atmospheric GHGs concentrations by 
diminishing the amount of incoming solar energy and thus directly modifying the Earth’s 
radiation balance (figure 6.1). Because they act quickly, SRM methods would take only a few years 
to have an effect on climate once they had been deployed. Nevertheless, they often provide only 
a temporary solution to increased temperatures, since their cooling effect would soon disappear, 
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once the geoengineering action stops being carried on. SRM techniques include (The Royal 
Society, 2009) (figure 6.1): 
• increasing the albedo of the planet, by whitening the Earth’s surface, e.g. by painting building 
roofs white, planting of crops with a high reflectivity, or covering deserts or oceans with 
reflective material; 
• enhancement of marine cloud reflectivity; 
• reproducing the effects of volcanic eruptions by injecting sulphate aerosols into the lower 
stratosphere; 
• placing shields or deflectors in space to reduce the amount of solar energy reaching the 
Earth. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1. Schematic showing the impact of different Solar Radiation Management methods on solar 
radiation fluxes (The Royal Society, 2009). 
 
 
It has to be clear that geoengineering cannot simply be regarded as an easy acceptable 
alternative solution to global warming. The only safe and long-term way of moderating and 
possibly reversing the ongoing climate change trend is to undertake efficient actions to reduce 
emissions of GHGs as soon as possible. Geoengineering could, however, potentially help in case 
of impending emergency, like e.g. avoiding reaching a climate “tipping point”, though not 
without any cost and side-effects on the environment, the climate and the socio-economic 
systems. 
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6.2 Stratospheric SO2 aerosols geoengineering 
 
Among the SRM techniques, the scientific community has recently had a special interest in 
studying the climatic effects and examining the feasibility of stratospheric SO2 aerosols 
geoengineering. For an exhaustive review of the state-of-the art of the research in this topic the 
reader can refer to the paper by Rasch et al. (2008b) and references therein. 
It is well known that tropospheric SO2 aerosols generate a negative radiative forcing in the 
energy budget of the climate system and thus have a net surface cooling effect (IPCC, 2007, 
chapter 2). Aerosols reflect part of incoming solar radiation (the aerosol “direct effect”), but also 
act as cloud condensation nuclei, influencing the size of cloud water droplets and the lifetime of 
clouds (the aerosol “indirect effect”), thus enhancing on average the albedo of cloud cover. 
The study of physics and chemistry of stratospheric SO2 aerosols, on the contrary, was 
boosted by the June 1991 eruption of the Pinatubo volcano, which emitted about 17 million tons 
of SO2 into the stratosphere (Self et al., 1996). The effect on climate was a global temperature dip 
of a few tenths of degree (up to -0.4 °C) and an observed surface cooling in the Northern 
Hemisphere perhaps as large as -0.5 °C to -0.6 °C, lasting for a couple of years (1991 to 1992-93) 
(Self et al., 1996). 
The sources of the aerosol precursors are natural and anthropogenic sulphur-bearing gases, 
namely dimethyl sulphide (DMS), sulphur dioxide (SO2), hydrogen sulphide (H2S), carbonyl 
sulphide (OCS) (Rasch et al., 2008b). The stratospheric sulphur-bearing gases oxidize primarily 
via reactions with the OH radical to form SO2, which is then further oxidized through both 
gaseous and aqueous reactions to become gaseous H2SO4 (Rasch et al., 2008b). This acidic liquid 
solution is in the form of a vapour and condenses onto particles of solid matter present in the 
stratosphere. In addition, H2SO4 is a highly hydrophilic molecule and thus can easily attract and 
capture water molecules to form mixtures of condensed sulphuric acid, water and, under some 
circumstances, hydrates with nitric acid (HNO3) onto existing aerosol particles (Rasch et al., 
2008b). 
Stratospheric SO2 aerosols geoengineering was first proposed in the mid-1970s by the 
Russian scientist M. I. Budyko (Budyko, 1974). He suggested that, if global warming ever became 
a serious threat, we could partly offset it with airplane flights in the stratosphere, burning sulphur 
to produce aerosols that would reflect sunlight away. 
In order to offset part of the future anthropogenic greenhouse warming, the two Nobel 
prizes Paul Crutzen and Thomas Schelling (see Crutzen, 2006) have recently proposed again to 
artificially recreate the so-called “Pinatubo effect”, i.e. the cooling effect of some sort of 
“periodical volcanic eruptions” via injections of sulphur into the stratosphere (see also Wigley, 
2006; Rasch et al., 2008b; Robock et al., 2008; Caldeira and Wood, 2008; Brovkin et al., 2009). 
Once in the stratosphere, sulphur would soon turn into sulphate aerosols through the above 
quoted physic-chemical reactions and as a result backscatter part of the incoming solar energy, 
owing to the aerosol “direct effect”, hence producing a cooling effect at the Earth’s surface 
(figure 6.2). 
Various techniques were proposed for delivering the sulfur into the stratosphere. 
Stratospheric sulphur injections could be achieved, for instance, by high-altitude-capable aircrafts, 
with modified artillery or high-altitude balloons (Caldeira and Wood, 2008). 
The scientific debate on this topic is still open and most of pros and cons have already been 
addressed in the literature (see e.g. Robock, 2008; Hegerl and Solomon, 2009). Arguments for the 
implementation of this geoengineering technique are briefly the following: 
• based on a “natural process” with respect to other more speculative geoengineering projects 
(e.g. space sunshade) (Bates et al., 1992); 
• fast speed of action (Matthews and Caldeira, 2007) relative to other projects aiming at 
reducing future greenhouse warming (e.g. carbon sequestration); 
99 
 
• technological feasibility: only already existing technology is required (Rasch et al., 2008b);  
• low cost relative to many other interventions, due to its low-tech nature (Brahic, 2009); 
• efficacy in the amplitude of intervention on the climate: high radiative forcing potential 
(Lenton and Vaughan, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 6.2. Schematic of the stratospheric sulphur cycle and its effects on climate (NASA, 2006). 
 
Supporters of stratospheric SO2 aerosols geoengineering, nevertheless, have still not 
addressed the many side effects involved in this technique. Problems are not only related to the 
scientific (environmental and climatic) field, but to socio-economics and politics as well. Among 
the major side effects on the climate and the environment we can shortly list: 
• spread droughts, along with the disruption of the Asian and African summer monsoons, by 
strongly reducing precipitation that is needed for the food supply of billions of people 
(Robock, 2008; Robock et al., 2008; Hegerl and Solomon, 2009);  
• depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer (Crutzen, 2006; Robock, 2008; Tabazadeh et al., 
2002; Kenzelmann et al., 2008); 
• ocean acidification (Robock, 2008); 
• effects on clouds formation (Robock, 2008); 
• effects on ecosystems (biosphere: vegetation and animals) (Gu et al. 1999; 2002; 2003; 
Robock, 2008); 
• effects on solar energy and solar power systems (Govindasamy and Caldeira, 2000; 
MacCracken, 2006; Robock, 2008);  
• rapid warming if deployment stops (Robock, 2008); 
• temporal uneven effects: aerosols are active only during daylight hours and especially in the 
summer season, opposite to GHGs activity 24 h a day for the whole year (Charlson and 
Wigley, 1994). 
In addition, there are efficacy problems due to the difficulty of modeling the impact of this 
geoengineering method on the climate system. These problems are related to: 
• the particle size distribution (Rasch et al., 2008a); 
• the lifetime of aerosols in the stratosphere, which is a function of height: SO2 aerosols in the 
lower stratosphere have a typical lifetime of a few weeks or months, while in the higher 
stratosphere they could remain also for several years (Robock et al., 2008); 
• the aerosol delivery system; 
• the distribution around the globe. 
Anyhow, stratospheric SO2 aerosols geoengineering seems to require enormous amounts of 
sulfur to be periodically injected into the stratosphere to recreate a cooling effect with an 
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amplitude like the one produced by the Pinatubo volcano or even larger. Wigley (2006), for 
instance, calculated that yearly injections of nearly 5 million tons of S into the stratosphere should 
be enough to obtain about the same climatic impact of the volcanic eruption of Mount Pinatubo 
in June 1991. 
Nevertheless, Robock (2008) stressed that we do not have (nor will have in the future) an 
objective and shared way to decide the amount of countermeasure to be implemented, that is the 
amplitude of the cooling effect. In other words, should we regulate the sulphur injections such as 
to keep global temperature at the current level or go back to the pre-industrial one? 
The only side of stratospheric SO2 aerosols geoengineering that has not been examined yet 
by the scientific community is whether physical factors might limit the implementation of this 
method. The key factor would be the geological availability of sulphur, as it is, of course, a finite 
resource on Earth, as well as fossil fuels and other minerals are. The aim of the work described in 
the present chapter is, hence, to determine to a first approximation how the geological availability 
of sulphur might possibly influence, control and, eventually, limit the implementation of the 
stratospheric SO2 aerosols geoengineering technique. 
 
6.3 The sources of sulphur and alternative surrogates 
 
Resources such as sulphur have not only a mining origin as elemental material, but exist also 
in many other different forms and concentrations. Sulphur is largely contained in oil, natural gas 
and coal: most sulphur production is a result of the processing of fossil fuels (USGS, 2010), 
though in the chemical form of hydrogen sulphide (H2S) through hydrodesulfurization. 
According to the USGS, world reserves of elemental sulphur in evaporite and volcanic deposits 
and sulphur associated with natural gas, petroleum, tar sands, and metal sulphides amount to 
about 5 billion tons (USGS, 2010). Currently, about 80 million tons of sulphur per year are being 
emitted into the atmosphere as a side effect of worldwide consumption of fossil fuels (Olivier et 
al., 2005). 
Some 600 billion tons of sulphur is contained in coal, oil shale, and shale rich in organic 
matter (USGS, 2010). As gas production moves deeper or we keep exploiting ultra-heavy fuels 
the availability of sulphur contained in fossil fuels should thus increase further. However, low 
cost methods of extraction have not yet been developed to recover sulphur from these resources. 
Capture of sulfur in a usable form would be a technological challenge. Nevertheless, even 
allowing for desulphurization, the energetic and economic return of sulphur obtained with such a 
technique would most likely be so low compared to costs, to prevent its feasibility and long-term 
sustenance. 
In principle, sulphur may also be replaced by other types of light scatterers, possibly made of 
more radiatively efficient material (Teller et al., 2002). Though of much greater potential 
efficiency in the scattering of short-wave radiation, metallic, metalloids or resonant scatterers like 
Mg, Al, Si, S, Ca and Ti may raise concerns related to their interaction with the stratospheric 
ozone layer and respiratory impacts (Caldeira and Wood, 2008). Although emplacement costs for 
metallic scatterers would be higher, Teller et al. (2002) estimate that net costs may be as much as 
five times less than for sulphate aerosols. Particles of dielectric material have also been proposed 
as alternatives to sulphur (e.g. NAS, 1992) and in principle seem to be feasible as well. 
Nevertheless, SO2 still seems to be the best choice as a scatterer of sunlight, owing to its 
optimized mass efficiency, transport convenience and relatively small interference with biological 
processes (Caldeira and Wood, 2008). As a consequence, sulphur hardly appears to be easily 
replaceable by alternative materials, which have similar physical-chemical properties and the same 
efficiency at reflecting sunlight back to space. Substitutes for sulphur at present or anticipated 
price levels are not satisfactory. 
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6.4 Analysis of the world sulphur availability 
 
In order to assess the long-term feasibility of performing a geoengineering action based on 
injections of sulphur into the stratosphere, the availability of geological sulphur on Earth needs 
to be investigated. To this scope and to obtain a quantitative estimate of the reserves of sulphur 
left over on the planet, we perform a logistic analysis of the historical sulphur production data 
(USGS, 2009) by means of the Hubbert’s linearization technique (Hubbert, 1982) (see Appendix 
A for a complete description of this method). This method implies some degree of arbitrariness 
in defining the time interval for the application of the linear regression. This, in turn, reflects in 
the uncertainty of the projection. Nevertheless, this technique proved to be quite reliable in 
reproducing the past historical evolution of the world production of several other minerals 
(Pagani, 2007; Bardi and Pagani, 2007; Déry and Anderson, 2007). 
To estimate the geological resources of sulphur, we make use of the United States 
Geological Service dataset of the world annual production of sulphur spanning from 1900 to 
2008 (black open circles in figure 6.3) (USGS, 2009). World sulphur production data include all 
forms of sulphur and are in terms of their sulphur content (USGS, 2009). Data prior to 1936 
include elemental sulphur production from principal producing countries and world pyrite 
production, while data for the years 1936 to the most recent are world production of all forms of 
sulphur (USGS, 2009). 
World annual production data (figure 6.3b) look rather noisy: sulphur production has been 
fluctuating more than the production of other minerals (see e.g. Pagani, 2007). A discontinuity 
seems to be present in the data around 1970. We are not able to attribute this discontinuity to any 
known reason, nor are we aware of any change in sulphur usage that may justify such a large 
jump (+36% in one year, to be compared with an average annual increase of the production of 
about 5% in the previous decade). On the basis of a-priori criteria for the evaluation of historical 
time series, we believe that this discontinuity is probably an artifact, rather than being a real 
feature of the production record. Nonetheless, we carry out the present analysis on the original 
dataset, since we do not have any objective way to correct for the discontinuity, basically for the 
reason that we ignore its origin.  
The historical annual production data (fig. 6.3b) show regions of “high frequency noise”, 
that may have an easily explainable socio-economic/political origin. The fast increase of the 
production after the mid 1990’s is probably owed to the fast growth of the Chinese economy, 
while the drop off in the years 1990 to 1995 may be due to the collapse of the whole industrial 
apparatus of the former Soviet Union. Conversely, the historical record of cumulative production 
(fig. 6.3a) is much less sensitive to short-term fluctuations than yearly production, merely for the 
reason that cumulative production stems from a summation of all previous annual values. 
The presence of noise and of the discontinuity in the historical dataset of sulphur production 
adds to the error bar of our results, though not impairing the policy conclusions we achieve. 
Figure 6.3 shows the present results (coloured lines) of the Hubbert’s linearization technique 
coupled to a logistic analysis applied to the historical record of the world annual production of 
sulphur (black open circles). Figure 6.3a shows the cumulative production, while figure 6.3b 
illustrates the corresponding yearly values. The coloured shaded areas denote the confidence 
ranges of the fits, as determined by the uncertainty in the linearization technique. 
In figure 6.3a, the original production data are well reproduced by the superposition (red 
straight line) of two logistic functions (blue and green curves), given by equation A.2 in Appendix 
A. A third logistic function would improve the fit in the early years of the 20th century. However, 
we do not include it in the present analysis, since it would only slightly affect the results in the 
following years, that is the time period we are interested in. The total amount of resource 
available on Earth, often also denoted as the Ultimate Recoverable Reserve (URR), is given by 
the asymptotic value of the logistic fit to the cumulative production at large values of time (i.e. t 
→ ∞). The present estimate for the URR of sulphur is 3.45 ± 0.15 billion tons, the error bar 
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being determined by the uncertainty in the linearization. This value turns out to be nearly 30% 
lower than the global reserves estimated by USGS (2010) to amount to around 5 billion tons. 
Figure 6.3b shows the derivatives of the two logistic functions of figure 6.3a, as given by 
equation A.3 in Appendix A, fitting quite well the historical dataset of yearly production. The two 
bell shaped functions reach a maximum in 1984 (blue curve) and 2008 (green curve), respectively, 
the first being larger in amplitude and width with respect to the second one. We are interested in 
the total annual production (red curve): it is given by the sum of the two logistic derivatives. 
Total yearly production of sulphur shows a first peak in 1985 and a second bigger one in 2007, 
yielding a maximum annual production of nearly 68.5 ± 4.5 million tons.  
 
  
Figure 6.3. Results of the logistic analysis of sulphur world production coupled with the Hubbert’s 
linearization technique (Hubbert, 1982) (see Appendix A). (a) Cumulative production. (b) Annual 
production. The historical data are from the USGS (2009) and span from 1900 to 2008. The coloured 
shaded areas represent the confidence bounds of the fits, due to uncertainties in the linearization 
technique. 
 
We would like to stress that the logistic derivative functions of figure 6.3b should be 
interpreted as smoothed best fits to the historical production dataset. It is known that production 
of a resource is mainly driven by demand on the short term and mostly by geological availability 
on the long term. Because of this superimposed “natural” high frequency noise, such smoothed 
curves cannot exactly predict the time evolution of sulphur production in detail, though still 
provide a reliable mean to evaluate both reserves and future production. 
Despite the relatively large noise in the historical record of sulphur production, the error 
bars we obtain from the present analysis for the URR and the annual production at the maximum 
amount to no more than 6%, allowing to make relatively accurate predictions about the future 
availability of sulphur.  
 
6.5 Climatic projection with stratospheric SO2 aerosols 
geoengineering 
 
Having now an estimate of the world sulphur availability, we can assess the physical limits of 
pursuing sulphur injections into the stratosphere to cool the planet’s surface. To do so, we work 
out a scenario of yearly injections of sulphur into the stratosphere and evaluate their effects on 
climate as a function of time. 
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Stratospheric injections are supposed to start in 2010 and the injections scenario is arbitrarily 
chosen to keep global temperature close to present levels (the predicted global-mean temperature 
in 2010) as long as allowed by sulphur availability. The temperature projection of §5.3.1 based on 
the GHG emission scenario called “ERC model” is used as benchmark here, i.e. stands for the 
no-geoengineering reference case. In order to evaluate the cooling effect of the stratospheric 
sulphur injections on future global-mean surface temperature, the amount of stratospheric SO2 
aerosols is added to that emission scenario. 
As in the no-geoengineering case, the climatic projections with stratospheric SO2 aerosols 
geoengineering are performed here by using the coupled gas-cycle/climate model MAGICC, that 
has already been described in detail in chapter 4. However, MAGICC does not allow the user to 
directly deal with inputs for emissions of stratospheric aerosols. Injections of stratospheric SO2 
aerosols are thus here treated as additional tropospheric SO2 aerosol emissions, by multiplying 
the yearly stratospheric injections by about 50 times their amount, to be consistent with the 
emissions of tropospheric aerosols. The reason for this is the assumption that the annual cooling 
effect of SO2 aerosols in the stratosphere is about the same in magnitude to that in the 
troposphere, once correcting for a factor due to the different mean lifetime of aerosols in the two 
different atmospheric layers. It is known that the mean lifetime of aerosols in the troposphere is 
about 7-10 days, while it increases to about 1 year in the stratosphere (Rasch et al., 2008b), thus 
yielding a ratio of about 50 for the two mean lifetimes. A further underlying reason for this 
assumption is that the main removal process of aerosols from the stratosphere is the fate of 
falling down to the troposphere sooner or later. 
In the period between about 2010 and 2030 the time evolution of global-mean temperature 
can be approximated by a linear dependence in the no-geoengineering case of the ERC model 
scenario (figure 5.7a, black line in figure 6.4b). Therefore, the yearly amount of sulphur required 
for stratospheric injections should change more or less linearly with time as well (black line in 
figure 6.4a), such as to keep global-mean temperature constant in the same time period. This 
linearly increasing injection rate, however, can be sustained only as long as the required yearly 
amount of sulphur will be lower than the global production rate. With the future annual 
production rates of sulphur estimated in the previous paragraph, stratospheric SO2 aerosol 
geoengineering might thus be pursued only until about 2035. 
Nevertheless, there are strong reasons to believe that in no case the total world production 
of sulphur might be employed just to put in practice and keep on supporting this geoengineering 
technique. Many important economic sectors, including chemistry industry and agriculture, rely 
on the availability of sulphur to carry on their activity. All these sectors will face major problems 
to cope with worldwide depletion of sulphur. Hence, we may hypothesize that stratospheric SO2 
geoengineering would probably never have more than 10% of global sulphur production (red line 
in figure 6.4a) available for the injections at best. In this case, the ultimate date for stratospheric 
sulphur injections would advance to nearly 2021 (black line in figure 6.4a). Since 10% is perhaps a 
quite optimistic estimate of the limit imposed by other sulphur-based economic activities 
together with geological availability, it is likely that 2021 is a rather hopeful estimate of the last 
useful date for stratospheric injections. 
Figure 6.4 shows the present scenario of stratospheric sulphur injections (a, black line) and 
the corresponding projection of the global-mean surface temperature change (b, blue line) under 
the 10% limit assumption. Please note that an injection of 1 million tons of sulphur into the 
stratosphere causes 2 million tons of SO2 aerosol particles to form (Rasch et al., 2008b). Owing 
to stratospheric SO2 aerosols geoengineering, global temperature is predicted to remain nearly 
constant between the starting year of the injections (that is 2010) and nearly 2020 (blue line in 
figure 6.4b), but after that rises back again to rejoin the temperature evolution projected without 
any geoengineering intervention (black line in figure 6.4b). This means that the cooling effect due 
to the backscattering of sunlight by stratospheric SO2 aerosols will start fading away just after the 
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end of the stratospheric sulphur injections in 2021, which is basically caused by the depletion of 
world sulphur reserves. 
 
  
Figure 6.4. The present scenario of stratospheric sulphur injections and the corresponding projection of 
global temperature. (a) The scenario of stratospheric sulphur injections (black), limited by the 10% of the 
world yearly production of sulphur (red). (b) The projections of global-mean surface temperature change 
relative to the 2000 level with (blue) and without (black) stratospheric SO2 aerosols geoengineering. The 
projections are based on the ERC model GHG emission scenario (see §3.2) and corresponding projection 
(see §5.3.1). The coloured shaded areas stand for the confidence bounds of: the fit in (a) and of the 
projections mean in (b). 
 
The present results show that stratospheric SO2 aerosols geoengineering might actually be 
effective at limiting the rise of global temperature, however, for a limited time span of only about 
10 years, due to the future shortage of sulphur originating from the exhaustion of the world 
reserves. 
On the other hand, our analysis of global sulphur production cannot account for 
unpredictable major discoveries of new ore fields and/or the implementation of new extractions 
techniques, that might noticeably improve the reserves availability as well as the production rate, 
though probably at higher economic and energetic costs. Such occurrences may introduce an 
additional logistic function in figure 6.3a and a corresponding further bell shaped curve in figure 
6.3b. This means that both the date of maximum production, as well as the last useful year for 
the stratospheric injections under the assumption of using no more that 10% of world annual 
production may move forward in time. Nevertheless, it seems very unlikely that both new 
discoveries and new extraction techniques might increase the URR of sulphur by, let us say, a 
factor of two or more. By performing a trial and error robustness analysis of the logistic fit of 
global sulphur availability, it turns out that the date of peak production may shift in time by a 
couple of years at most, very unlikely more. This means that, in a very optimistic hypothesis, the 
ultimate useful date for stratospheric injections may be delayed by five to ten years at most (i.e. 
shift to 2025-2030). 
Like all other countermeasures, stratospheric SO2 aerosols geoengineering may, thus, be 
useful to only temporarily offset global warming. The only safe and on the long-term effective 
way of restraining the ongoing rise of temperatures is with no doubt a substantial reduction of 
future anthropogenic GHGs emissions. In a future context of GHGs emissions reduction, 
countermeasures may be indeed helpful at counteracting the warming during the phase of 
emissions reduction, although not without any significant side-effects. 
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6.6 About the side-effects of stratospheric SO2 aerosols 
geoengineering 
 
Among these side-effects, there is one in particular, that is often not even accounted for or is 
not enough seriously considered as a potential danger resulting from stratospheric SO2 aerosols 
geoengineering. This risk resides in the residence time of aerosols in the stratosphere. SO2 
aerosols have an atmospheric lifetime in the stratosphere on the order of a few years (Rasch et al., 
2008a): this implies that any time the stratospheric sulphur injections had ceased, the cooling 
effect would disappear in a relatively short time. 
A recent paper by Robock et al. (2008), for instance, projected the global climate responses 
to a 20-years time span of different tropical and arctic stratospheric SO2 injections. According to 
the model results (see figure 6.5), global-mean surface temperature would go back to the no-
geoengineering projection with a typical time on the order of about 10 years, once the 
stratospheric injections had stopped. This timing is essentially confirmed by the outcome of the 
present simulation (see figure 6.4b). The problem is that the resulting warming rate would be 
even more rapid than the global warming that has already occurred in the past century or than 
what is projected to be without geoengineering, as previously found also by Wigley (2006) and 
Matthews and Caldeira (2007). Such a very fast warming might be much more difficult to adapt 
to than a steady slower warming (Robock et al., 2008), both by the human society and natural 
ecosystems. Thus, when assessing the opportunity of deploying stratospheric SO2 aerosols 
geoengineering, this important aspect of the technique should definitely not be neglected. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5. Global-mean surface temperature change from Robock et al. (2008). Historical observations 
(green) are from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Goddard Institute for Space Studies 
analysis dataset (Hansen et al., 2006). Projections are for anthropogenic forcing only under the SRES A1B 
scenario (red) and with stratospheric SO2 aerosols geoengineering: Arctic 3 Mt/yr (blue), Tropical 5 Mt/yr 
(black), and Tropical 10 Mt/yr (brown) SO2 injections. 
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However, climate change is driven not only by temperature, but its impacts are determined 
also by other physical parameters, such as precipitation and climate extremes (Hegerl and 
Solomon, 2009). If focusing only on the thermal effects of stratospheric SO2 aerosols 
geoengineering, critical risks associated with other aspects of the climate systems may 
imprudently be left out or not being appropriately evaluated. Among all climatic variables, 
changes in precipitation seem to be matter of considerable concern in the scientific community 
(see e.g. Robock, 2008; Robock et al., 2008; Hegerl and Solomon, 2009).  
As expected, Robock et al. (2008) find that global average precipitation is reduced along with 
temperature in their projections accounting for stratospheric SO2 injections. However, relative to 
reductions in outgoing longwave radiation associated with GHG forcing, changes in the radiative 
forcing from reduction of sunlight (incoming shortwave radiation) have a far much strong impact 
on precipitation as compared to temperature (Robock et al., 2008; Hegerl and Solomon, 2009). 
This is because the radiative forcing from shortwave radiation has no compensating impact on 
the vertical temperature structure of the atmosphere (Yang et al., 2003). Thus, as anticipated in 
§6.2, large areas of significant drought are expected to appear in many parts of the world as a 
consequence of the reduction in incoming shortwave radiation. But the major consequences for 
humans may originate from the weakening or even the disruption of the African and Asian 
summer monsoons, causing spread precipitation reductions, that would be enough to threaten 
the food and water supplies to billions of people (Robock et al., 2008). 
To examine any eventual considerable effect of stratospheric sulphur injections on the 
worldwide precipitation patterns, we assess also the spatial changes of annual mean precipitation 
during the time of geoengineering, by making use of SCENGEN (see §4.2). Figure 6.6 shows the 
present projections for precipitation change relative to 1990 averaged over the 30-year period 
centred on 2020. The projections are based on the ERC model GHG emission scenario (see 
§3.2) without (a) and with (b) the present scenario for stratospheric sulphur injections (see figure 
6.4a). The shown time span is chosen, such as to examine the possible effects of geoengineering 
in the period of highest impact on climate, as confirmed by global-mean surface temperature 
change in figure 6.4b. 
 
  
Figure 6.6. The present output of SCENGEN for annual precipitation change 
averaged over the 30-year time interval centred on 2020 with respect to 1990. The 
projections are based on the ERC model GHG emission scenario (see §3.2) 
without (left) and with (right) the present scenario for stratospheric sulphur 
injections (see figure 6.4a). 
 
 
The global range of precipitation change in 2020 turns out to vary from -17.7% to +13.8% 
for the ERC model scenario only (figure 6.6a), while it extends to -36.6% to +23.9% when the 
present scenario for stratospheric SO2 aerosols geoengineering is taken into account (figure 6.6b). 
This result confirms both the overall precipitation reduction and the increase in climate extremes 
being expected by Hegerl and Solomon (2009) to be the main impacts, along with global 
temperature drop. By comparing the two panels in figure 6.6, it is clear that the spots 
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characterized by precipitation reduction are almost the same in the two scenarios, however the 
total area slightly increases as a consequence of geoengineering. As expected from the lessening 
of incoming shortwave radiation, precipitation reduction is clearly larger when accounting for 
stratospheric sulphur injections, though the magnitude of the decrease is quite limited, owing to 
the relatively restricted time range of the injections. 
On the contrary, the areas that will experience a precipitation increase under the ERC model 
scenario, do not seem to undergo a further increase with geoengineering, but rather a decrease in 
only some parts of the regions. 
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Conclusions 
 
 
The present thesis was developed to cover some of the most important scientific subjects in 
the field of physics of climate. By starting from examining the major climatic changes of the past, 
like the glacial cycles, and then by delving into the causes of the climate swings that occurred over 
the last two millennia, we dealt with issues related to planetary and interplanetary dynamics and 
its modelling. Given the relevant role that carbon dioxide plays in the context of the 
anthropogenic greenhouse effect, we also coped with carbon cycle models. Despite the 
complexity of accurately reproducing the dynamics of carbon dioxide in the climate system, we 
developed an alternative and successful numerical approach to the problem. 
Next, we tackled the relatively new scientific issue of assessing the world’s energy resources 
and its implications in the field of climate change. In fact, we investigated here the constraints 
posed by the ongoing depletion of fossil fuels on the projections of future climate change. To 
develop the present climatic projections we used a simple climate model coupled to a set of gas-
cycle models, providing outputs for the global average and the spatial patterns of change of the 
most relevant climatic variables. Finally, we examined the long-term feasibility of stratospheric 
SO2 aerosols geoengineering in the light of geologically limited mineral resources. 
We principally find that, despite the exhaustion of fossil energy sources and even without 
implemented climate policies, future atmospheric CO2 concentration will reach levels between 
about 460 and 520 ppm during the 21st century. Accordingly, global-mean atmospheric surface 
temperature will rise by the turn of the century up to 1.4-3.1 °C above pre-industrial level. The 
probability of exceeding +2 °C relative to pre-industrial spans from 55% to 90% across the 
present scenarios: dangerous climate change is thus likely to occur notwithstanding fossil fuels 
depletion. From the present projections it turns also clearly out that sea level change will 
probably be among the most important impact of global warming, by negatively affecting the 
climate system, the environment and the human society, with nearly 1 m sea level rise predicted 
by 2100. 
The present CO2 and temperature values predicted for the end of the century fall within the 
low-end of the range of the IPCC AR4 projections (IPCC, 2007), that are based on the SRES 
BAU scenarios (IPCC, 2000). Unfortunately, this does not mean that fossil fuels depletion will be 
able to save us from global warming. 
Firstly, even if the world decides to rapidly clamp down future CO2 emissions, temperatures 
will still increase further due to all past greenhouse gases emissions that remain in the atmosphere 
and because of the large thermal inertia that characterizes the climate system. 
Secondly, a temperature increase on the order of 1.8 °C relative to pre-industrial level is 
indeed to be considered a threshold on which a dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
Earth’s climate system could set in (Hansen, 2009). According to the present climatic projections, 
dangerous climate change might already be experienced within mid 21st century. 
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Furthermore, there are strong reasons to believe that the present climatic projections should 
be regarded as lower bounds, rather than mean values, to the changes that will really take place in 
the future. 
The present temperature projections are, in fact, almost certainly affected by a one-sided 
bias. There are several climatic phenomena which are not fully understood yet. Waiting for longer 
observational time series, it is impossible to account for the effect of these phenomena. 
Unfortunately, almost all of them embed positive feedback loops (see figure C.1): 
• ice-albedo feedback, especially for Arctic sea ice and Greenland ice caps; 
• melting of Antarctic and Greenland ice caps and sea-level rise; 
• cloud-albedo feedback: effect of cloud cover change, which is modulated by aerosols; 
• carbon-climate feedback: effect of the saturation of natural carbon sinks on the carbon cycle 
and climate; 
• climate feedback with methane released into the atmosphere and the ocean from sea bed 
methane hydrates and Siberian permafrost. 
 
 
Figure C.1. Schematic of feedbacks in the climate system (UNEP, 2009). 
 
Overall, these feedbacks are not included in current climate models yet, nevertheless it is well 
known that, once accounting for them, they can only lead to a further increase of the projected 
warming. 
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Moreover, the present emission scenarios account in large part for proven reserves of fossil 
fuels only. The currently available estimates of the recoverable reserves are suspected to be 
affected by large uncertainties, mainly owing to the low reliability of the information about 
geological reserves. However, the extraction of additional occurrences of conventional fossil fuels 
or unconventional resources might also become economically convenient and with a sufficient 
energetic return in the future. If, how and when conventional and unconventional resources will 
be exploited in the future depends on technological improvements in the mining techniques or 
merely on the world’s urgent demand for fossil energy. Hence, should new reserves of fossil fuels 
become available for use in the future, other than the proven ones accounted for by the present 
scenarios, these would only add other CO2 in addition to the projected emissions of the present 
scenarios. Temperature projections would then be enhanced by such extra emissions. 
However, future discoveries of new conventional fossil fuel reserves, like significant oil and 
gas fields or coal ores are at present highly unlikely. Firstly, for the reason that major oil fields 
have already been discovered in the 1950s and ‘60s and since then world discoveries have been 
falling relentlessly for 40 years (see figure C.2) (Hall and Day, 2009). There is currently no good 
reason to expect the trend to change direction in the next years. Global oil consumption 
exceeded discovery in 1981 (figure C.2) and the gap between supply and demand of oil is 
expected to be widening. 
 
 
Figure C.2. Worldwide new oil discovery trend (blue) and projection of new future discoveries (green) 
(Hall and Day, 2009). Historical global oil consumption is also shown (red line). 
 
Secondly, but most important, because the energy return on energy invested (EROEI) of 
conventional fossil energy sources has been and is continuously declining (see figure C.3): US oil 
production’s EROEI, for instance, has decreased from about 100:1 in 1930, to 40:1 in 1970, to 
about 14:1 nowadays (Hall and Day, 2009). Declining EROEI means that more and more energy 
would have to be devoted simply to getting other energy, rather than being used. There are 
strong reasons to believe that the access to the remaining resources of conventional fuels will 
require the use of increasing amounts of technology and of energy, continuing the EROEI to 
decline. 
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The EROEI of unconventional sources, like tar sands or biofuels, is often too low (see 
figure C.3) to allow a large-scale exploitation of these sources. However, under extreme 
circumstances, like an urgent increasing demand for fossil energy, the extraction and production 
of these sources might become economically convenient enough.  
 
 
Figure C.3. The energy return on energy invested (EROEI) of common energy sources vs. the total 
amount of energy produced by each resource (Hall and Day, 2009). Domestic oil refers to the production 
in the USA. Lighter colours indicate a range of possible EROEI due to varying conditions and uncertain 
data. 
 
Finally, we remind that any action aiming at counteracting the warming (without emissions 
reduction) will accelerate the depletion of global resources and consequently will conflict with the 
need of controlling the economic crisis. In general, countermeasure actions, like stratospheric 
SO2 aerosol geoengineering examined here, can only be thought as a temporary help during the 
phase of emissions reduction.  
It is obvious that the solution to the anthropogenic global warming problem will not come 
from a single action: it will come from the sum of a number of small actions. 
It is safe to predict that the quantitatively most important action will be the reduction of 
anthropogenic emissions. As a matter of fact, fossil fuels – including uranium – will be almost 
completely depleted by the end of this century. On a different side, it is improbable that 
renewable sources will be capable to provide the same amount of energy pro-capita that is 
consumed at present in industrialized countries. We know that energy is being consumed world-
wide with a high degree of inefficiency. Therefore a strong decrease of energy consumption is 
unavoidable and feasible. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Hubbert’s linearization technique and 
logistic analysis 
 
 
The evaluation of worldwide resource availability is a growing scientific field. Most of the 
advancement is based on Hubbert’s seminal work (Hubbert, 1956) and on subsequent 
developments (Hubbert, 1981; 1982). To estimate the availability of a non-renewable resource, a 
logistic analysis of the historical production data can be performed, by coupling it with Hubbert’s 
linearization technique (Hubbert, 1982). 
The cumulative production P(t) of the resource can been expressed by means of the logistic 
equation A.1: 
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with the initial condition P(t0) = P0. Here r is the logistic growth rate and K is the total available 
amount of the resource, better known as Ultimate Recoverable Reserve (URR). 
The solution of equation A.1 is given by the logistic function A.2: 
 
 ܲሺݐሻ ൌ
ܭ ଴ܲ݁௥ሺ௧ି௧బሻ
ܭ െ ଴ܲ ൅ ଴ܲ݁௥ሺ௧ି௧బሻ
 (A.2)
 
 
while its derivative p(t) is given by equation A.3: 
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p(t) can be approximated here with the annual production of the resource. 
If we rewrite equation (A.1), such that p/P appears as a function of P, we obtain equation 
A.4: 
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which represents a line with y-intercept r and slope –r/K. 
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For most geological reserves, the data are intrinsically noisy at the beginning of the historical 
record. Such noise reduces in the last decades and the data show a linear dependence from a 
certain value P0 on, corresponding to time t0, when plotted according to equation (A.4). The 
application of a linear regression from t0 to the latest available t yields the values for the y-
intercept a and the slope b, from which r and K can be inferred: 
 
ݎ ൌ ܽ 
ܭ ൌ െܽ ܾ⁄  
 
Once P0, t0, r and K are known, it is possible to obtain the annual p(t) and cumulative P(t) 
production of the resource as a function of time t from equation A.3 and A.2, respectively. 
This method gives also an estimate of the time position of the world production peak tp: 
 
 ݐ௉ ൌ ݐ଴ ൅
1
ݎ
ln ൬
ܭ െ ଴ܲ
଴ܲ
൰ (A.5)
 
 
as well as the value of world production at that date. 
The annual production of some resources may show more than one peak. This is probably 
due to long-term fluctuations of the demand and/or to new large resource fields starting 
producing on a later time. In this case it is still possible to fit the production data with more than 
one logistic function (one for each bell-shaped curve). To determine the second logistic function, 
one needs first to remove the production calculated with the first logistic function from historical 
p and P in the following years. Hence, only the contribution of the new resource fields is 
accounted for in the second logistic fit. The total annual/cumulative production is clearly given 
by the sum of the logistic derivatives/functions, while the URR is obtained from the sum of K of 
each logistic function. 
This technique implies some degree of arbitrariness in defining the time interval for the 
application of the linear regression. This, in turn, reflects in the uncertainty of the fit. 
Nevertheless, it proved to be quite reliable by “predicting” the past historical evolution of world 
mineral production (Pagani, 2007; Bardi and Pagani, 2007; Déry and Anderson, 2007). 
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